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ABSTRACT
PLAYING THE FIELD: A CASE OF RESTRUCTURING AT THE UNIVERSITY
OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
FEBRUARY 2018
JACQUELINE A. BROUSSEAU-PEREIRA, B.A., PROVIDENCE COLLEGE
M.P.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ryan S. Wells
In 2008, the United States economy entered a rapid and profound decline. As a
result most public universities experienced decreased endowments and a decline in state
allocations. Some universities seemed to respond to this crisis by refocusing their
institutional priorities and restructuring their campuses. This study used the lens of
organizational field theory (e.g., 1993; Davis & Marquis, 2005; Fligstein & McAdam,
2012; McAdam & Scott, 2005) to analyze a decision-making and restructuring process at
the University of Massachusetts Amherst (UMass), which began in late 2008 and
concluded in 2011. The purpose of the research was to investigate the ways the UMass
Amherst restructuring process was influenced by two of the organizational fields to
which the University belongs: public research universities and Massachusetts higher
education. The research also examined the effects of the economic and political
environment on these fields, and by extension, on the actions of the University of
Massachusetts Amherst during this period.
Whereas earlier organizational field theorists (Bourdieu, 1993; DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Scott, W. R., 1995) primarily considered the influence of fields on actions
adopted at the organizational level, more recent research (Davis & Marquis, 2005;
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Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012) has begun to focus on the
strategic actions of individual actors within organizations and the ways those actions can
also affect organizational efforts. This study considered the actions of stakeholder
groups, and this led to a richer understanding of the interplay of individuals, organization,
field, and environment, and the effects of these on university mission.
Using a retrospective, descriptive case study design that included analysis of
selected documents and interviews of individuals who were part of the decision-making
process, I reviewed, coded, and developed preliminary constructs, which later became the
themes for analysis. The findings suggested that organizational fields as well as
organizational actors each influence an organization’s path in various ways.
Additionally, the study gave indications of shifts in mission at least on the UMass
campus. This study contributes to a better understanding of the influence of
organizational fields in higher education and offers suggestions for further research on
shifts in university mission.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
In 2008, the United States economy experienced a rapid and profound decline.
This predicament began in the financial sector but quickly spread, disturbing most other
industries within the nation and beyond. Institutions of higher education – and public
higher education in particular – were disrupted and changed by this state of affairs as
endowments plummeted and institutions reliant on public funding saw further decline in
their already-shrinking state allocations. Several universities responded to this crisis by
refocusing their institutional priorities and restructuring their campuses or by adopting
strategies that would generate more revenues to make up for those lost from state
appropriations. One of these institutions was the University of Massachusetts Amherst
(UMass).
In late fall 2008, after hearing from University of Massachusetts Board of
Trustees that sizable budget cuts were forthcoming, then-chancellor Robert Holub
proposed a restructuring of the academic units on campus. The proposal called for a
reduction in the number of schools and colleges from nine to six and a realignment of
several departments. Over the course of the next two and a half years, some parts of the
restructuring were implemented, others changed, and some never took place. During this
time of flux, Chancellor Holub (2009b) outlined his priorities for the campus in a
document titled, “The Framework for Excellence.” Some of the changes proposed in the
restructuring plan aligned with the priorities of this framework. Campus administrators
implemented other approaches that fit the goals of the Framework. One essential element
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within the Chancellor’s plan was a desire for UMass Amherst to move into the “cadre of
the very best public research universities in the country” (Holub, 2009b, p. 1). Language
comparing UMass to other institutions was prevalent throughout the framework and even
stronger in the revised plan the Chancellor presented the following year in which he
declared his goal for UMass Amherst to attain membership in the elite Association of
American Universities (Holub, 2010).
Throughout the restructuring process, there were several instances when campus
leaders intentionally compared UMass Amherst with other research universities. For
example, a task force reviewed the structure of universities in a specific group of “peer
universities” while they prepared recommendations for a new academic structure
(Fountain, 2009). Some restructuring options were proposed to make UMass look more
like its peer institutions. These connections and comparisons between and among
research universities and UMass Amherst during this case of restructuring are
documented in reports and meeting minutes.
Thinking about these connections, I became curious about the ways the
restructuring decisions at UMass were influenced by what was happening in the broader
societal context, the higher education “industry,” and more specifically, in those
institutions that look most like UMass Amherst – other public research universities. I
also wondered whether the changes made on the UMass Amherst campus would cause a
shift in the University’s priorities and thus, its mission. This research study originated
from that curiosity.
Through this study, I investigated how this case of restructuring at UMass
Amherst was relative to the University’s position among other universities and public
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institutions of higher education and how decisions made by campus leaders may have
been shaped by their own positions on campus as well as the relationships among UMass
and other institutions. I examined ways that specific groups and individuals influenced
the outcome of the decision-making process. Further, I explored whether and how the
institutional priorities of UMass Amherst may have shifted during the restructuring
process and how such shifts may have resulted in a change (however slight) in the
mission of the institution.
Statement of the Problem
Research universities in the United States do not exist within a vacuum and there
is much similarity among them. At the time the leaders of UMass Amherst undertook
this restructuring, several other research universities in the U.S. did as well (Olson,
2010). In fact, restructuring was so common that conferences held sessions to help
administrators learn techniques for merging units (Council of Colleges of Arts and
Sciences, 2014), and support organizations offered webinars to help academic leaders
consider ways to appropriately restructure (Magna Publications, 2010). The prevalence
of reorganizations on individual campuses, along with the appearance of advice from
membership and support agencies on how to restructure, indicates that institutions were
most likely modeling their strategies after those at other campuses. This reciprocal
influence among universities and supporting agencies is of central interest to the case
presented here.
Organizational theorists use the term “organizational field” to refer to a group of
organizations that have a similar function and that interact with one another regularly
(e.g., Bourdieu, 1993; Davis & Marquis, 2005; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Scott, W. R.,
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2001; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) use the following
definition:
“By organizational field, we mean those organizations that, in the aggregate,
constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or
products.” (p. 148)
The University of Massachusetts Amherst, like all organizations, exists within
organizational fields. One such field might be called “research universities;” it would
include other research universities, accreditation agencies, a host of non-profit and for
profit organizations that offer services and products to assist universities, and
membership organizations such as the Association of American Colleges and
Universities. Also within this field are media outlets like the Chronicle of Higher
Education and Insider Higher Ed that provide reporting specific to higher education.
Another field to which UMass Amherst belongs can be called “Massachusetts public
higher education,” which would be comprised of all of the public institutions of higher
education within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, along with the appropriate state
governing and regulatory bodies, and many of the other organizations and actors noted in
the “research universities” field.
Central to organizational field theory is the idea that members of a field have
shared interests and are committed to maintaining quality and stability within that field
(Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). This is important to organizational researchers because it
can help to explain when the efforts of an organization’s leadership appear to be
contradictory to that organization’s survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When seen
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through the lens of the field, actions that may at first glance seem counter to the purpose
of an organization make more sense because they are aligned with field-level interests.
Further, using a field-level framework allows researchers an opportunity to examine
institutional phenomena from a macro perspective, helping them to understand and
recognize the ways traditional practices may change when there are disruptions in the
field or the broader economic or political environments (Davis & Marquis, 2005).
A second element of field theory is the concept of field position. Within each
field are incumbents and challengers who compete for status and rank (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012). Incumbents are typically those organizations that have been in the field
the longest and whose processes have been incorporated into the workings of other field
members as standard practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008).
The field is designed to support and replicate the patterns of the incumbents (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012). An organization’s position in the field and whether it is an incumbent
or a challenger shapes the decisions it makes and practices it can adopt (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012). For example, a challenger research university might be unlikely to
undertake a new program or administrative practice that an incumbent had not yet tested.
A wrong decision could affect that institution’s field position and ability to compete for
faculty, students, and other resources. In other words, there is a careful balance between
ensuring institutional survival while competing for a better position in the field and
maintaining a commitment to the purpose and integrity of the field as a whole.
As fields go, higher education is well-established and has been relatively stable
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). However, recent economic and political forces have
brought a level of destabilization that may cause changes to the research university
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organizational field. Innovations and newer institution types within the field (e.g. forprofit institutions and MOOCs) may be disrupting the field (Christensen, Horn, Caldera,
& Soares, 2011). This combination of economic and political forces, along with potential
disruptions within the field, suggests that institutional administrators have opportunities
to redefine the organizational fields in which they exist. Fligstein and McAdam (2012)
proposed, “Challengers who are more attuned to moments when their position might be
significantly improved will work diligently to locate and exploit such opportunities” (p.
54).
Field theory allows researchers to explore the ways that participation in
organizational fields influences decision-making within an organization itself. In the case
of restructuring at UMass Amherst, pressures within the broader economic environment
and the political climate provided the motivation for campus leaders to consider making
changes on campus. At the same time, the scope of “possible actions” that UMass could
take to face these challenges was likely to be limited and influenced by the position
UMass occupied within the fields “research universities” and “Massachusetts public
higher education.”
Decision-makers at organizations like universities are also influenced by the
institution’s field position. At the same time, the decisions these individuals can make
are affected by their own role within the university as well as by the various groups to
which they belong on campus. The University can be viewed as a field on its own with
various groups and individuals acting in ways similar to those of larger institutions within
organizational fields. This study explored the connections and influences among
organizational fields, the university, campus-level groups, and individual actors. Each of
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these spheres shapes the actions of the others and influences the final outcome of a
university’s restructuring process and ultimately its goals, priorities, and mission.
Purpose of the Study
This study explored a decision-making process that resulted in an academic
restructuring at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. The purpose of the study was
to demonstrate connections between the University and at least two of the organizational
fields to which it belongs (these fields are “research universities” and “Massachusetts
public higher education”). I have considered the University’s position in these fields and
how that might have influenced the way the restructuring process took place. A related
line of inquiry explored the ways in which individual actors and various groups on
campus, along with the University’s position in these fields, may have influenced the
decision-making process. Finally, I also explored the interplay of these three spheres:
organizational field, university, campus-level groups and individual actors, and how they
may have influenced or shifted the mission and priorities of the University.
Research Questions
The primary research questions guiding this study are: how was the restructuring
at UMass Amherst influenced by its position in and interaction with specific
organizational fields? How did individual actors and campus-level groups influence the
restructuring and in what ways might their roles have been influenced by their position on
campus and the University’s position within the organizational fields? In what ways did
the restructuring indicate a possible shift in mission/priorities at UMass Amherst?
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Significance of the Study
This study examined three spheres of influence in decision-making and change in
a single case at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. The analysis took into account
power within the following three areas: individuals and campus-level groups, the
institution itself, and the organizational field, and the findings offered a nuanced look at
the ways in which each of these levels was intertwined with the others. An in-depth look
at the complexity of field-level influences on the choices made by leaders of an
individual campus can provide rich information about current trends in the field of higher
education, and in research universities in particular. At the individual, group, and
campus levels, this study provides an in-depth look at the ways organizational fields can
shape institutions and the ways they might not. Whereas at the field level, this case
points to the ways that restructuring and other actions may be indications of shifts in the
institutional mission of research universities.
Combining the three spheres of individual and campus groups, organization, and
organizational field with the concept of mission is a new take on the study of
organizational fields. Davis and Marquis (2005) seek to use the organization as a
mechanism through which to study specific phenomena – such as the interplay between
restructuring and mission, or how environmental conditions influence a change in
traditional practices within a field. For the University of Massachusetts Amherst, it is
important to know whether and how the restructuring may have led to a shift in the
mission and priorities of the institution and the ways that the organizational field
influenced (or did not influence) the shape of the restructured university. This study can
also direct future researchers to consider whether university missions are being revised at
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the organizational field level as a result of changes on individual campuses and in the
field.
Operational Definitions
The term restructuring “will refer to major changes in strategy and organization”
(Zajac & Kraatz, 1993, p. 83) within an institution of public higher education. Mergers,
which are discussed in Chapter Two, refer to either intra-institutional merging of units
within a single campus, or inter-institutional merging of individual institutions into one
single institution.
The term organizational field is defined slightly differently by different scholars
(e.g., Bourdieu, 1993; Davis & Marquis, 2005; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012; Scott, W. R., 2001; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). Many scholars prefer
the definition proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), cited above, which refers to a
field as a grouping of organizations with similar consumers, commodities, and
regulations. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) used the term “strategic action fields” and
provided this more nuanced definition:
fundamental units of collective action in society…[a] mesolevel social order in
which actors are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared
understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others in the field,
and the rules governing legitimate action in the field. A stable field is one in
which the main actors are able to reproduce themselves and the field over a fairly
long period of time. (p. 9)
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) also introduced the concepts of competition and
power in their discussion of fields. For the purposes of this study, I propose to combine
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the two definitions above with W. R. Scott’s (1995) explanation of organizational field:
“a community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose
participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors
outside the field” (p. 56). This combination incorporates four important concepts that are
relevant to this study of organizational fields in higher education:
1. There are organizations that “in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of
institutional life” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148).
2. Actors within a stable field typically “reproduce themselves and the field”
over time (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 9).
3. Actors in the field have shared interests and a common meaning system
(Scott, W. R., 1995).
4. Organizations within a field compete with each other for a better position
within that field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).
Overview
This study examined a case of academic restructuring at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst in order to demonstrate connections among individual decisionmakers, campus-level groups, the University, and the organizational fields to which it
belongs. I explored the University’s position in these fields, considered the notion of
who may be incumbents and challengers, and how these factors might have influenced
the outcome of the restructuring process. At the same time, I investigated the ways in
which decisions made by individual actors at the University may have been influenced by
their role on campus, by the actions and positions of various campus-level groups, as well
as the University’s field position. Finally, I analyzed the tensions and connections among
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three spheres: campus-level groups and individual actors, the institution, and the various
organizational fields to which it belongs, in order to consider potential changes to the
University’s mission and priorities emerging from this set of circumstances.
With these objectives in mind, this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter
One outlined the problem and purposes of the study and provided a rationale for its
significance. In Chapter Two I introduce the study of organizational fields and go on to
explore how field theory can be applied to higher education – and research universities in
particular. Next I explore the broader environmental conditions that institutions of higher
education are currently facing. From there, because this study focuses on a case of
restructuring, I investigate empirical studies of merger and restructuring in higher
education as well as exploring a handful of contemporary university restructurings. I
discuss the concept of university mission as it relates to the study and to organizational
fields. Finally, Chapter Two closes with an overview of the study’s conceptual
framework and the proposed research questions.
Chapter Three details the research design and methods for data collection and
analysis. This is a retrospective, descriptive case study that first reconstructs and then
analyzes the decision-making process and resulting academic restructuring that took
place at UMass Amherst. The research design section specifies the selection of the case,
highlights its boundaries, and explains why the University is the ultimate unit of analysis.
In Chapter Three, I describe the data sources and process for collection. The design
relies on a review and analysis of several types of documents as well as interviews of
individuals who were involved in the restructuring process. Next, I present the guiding
questions and framework that will shape the coding, analysis, and interpretation of data.
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Chapter Three concludes with an exploration of factors that contribute to the
trustworthiness of the study, the ways in which I reduced researcher bias, and an
overview of the limitations of this study.
Chapter Four provides the narrative of the case. Through an intensive review of
close to two hundred source documents, I have recreated the story of what transpired at
UMass Amherst during the period under study (2008-2011). The account begins with the
Chancellor’s arrival at UMass and the budget crisis that descended on campus shortly
thereafter, through the various phases of the process, to the “final” structure in 2011 and
the Chancellor’s announcement of his departure.
Chapter Five includes the results of this study, beginning with an account of the
ways that location in various fields influenced the actions leaders took at the University
during the case under study. Next, I define and describe “local influence” at UMass
Amherst. Through this research, I discovered three main organizing principles that most
actors used to talk about the restructuring and to guide their views of the situation; these
(budget crisis, excellence, and interdisciplinarity) are presented in Chapter Five. From
there, I discuss how stakeholders utilized these organizing principles along with fieldlevel arguments to support their positions regarding various plans and strategies for the
campus. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of mission, mission shifts, and
the ways individuals and groups used mission as a way to support their arguments.
Chapter Six presents a discussion of the findings in relation to organizational field
theory and mission and offers suggestions for future research. At least in this case, the
position of the university within its various fields had an influence over some kinds of
decision-making; however local logics proved to be just as important. The major changes
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that did and did not take place as a result of Chancellor Holub’s restructuring proposal
can be seen in this light. Similar to the findings of Barrier & Musselin’s (2016) research,
campus leaders may aspire to fit the mold of peer institutions in the organizational field,
but this may translate differently to the campus itself. Finally, Chapter Six explores the
ways that mission seems to be evolving at UMass Amherst and discusses what this may
mean for the organization and the field.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Restructuring in institutions of higher education is a widespread phenomenon (e.g.,
Curri, 2001; Gumport, 2001; Harman & Harman, 2003; Kashner, 2010; Pattenaude, 2010;
Rowley, 1997; and others). Organizational leaders rationalize their efforts to reorganize their
institutions in a variety of ways. They may cite changes in the external environment as a
force behind the restructuring (Pattenaude, 2010). Economic and political motivations are
common as are decisions to restructure that are based on keeping up with similar institutions
or finding new markets to support institutional survival (e.g., Fielden & Markham, 1997;
Gumport & Pusser, 1999; Harman & Roberston-Cuninghame, 1995; Pick, 2003).
Contemporary organizational theory explores social phenomena such as restructuring
through the lens of connection between the organization and organizational fields, as well as
the larger environment (Davis & Marquis, 2005; McAdam & Scott, W. R., 2005).
Scholars of social action and behavior examine phenomena such as restructuring
through a variety of levels – from a world system perspective to an individual interaction
perspective (Scott, W. R., 2001). However, using an organizational field perspective with a
focus on the interplay of the three spheres of field, organization, and campus-level
group/individual actor, provides an opportunity to explore the complexity of macro- and
micro-influences on the subject under study.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of organizational field theory, including
key elements that will help to illuminate the case at UMass Amherst. Several currents of
thought about the influence of external societal forces on higher education dovetail nicely
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with the study of organizational fields and the next section makes the connection between
these two bodies of literature. Following this is a review of various empirical studies on
merger and restructuring in higher education, including an overview of five recent cases of
university restructuring. This section serves to build a connection between organizational
field theory and the existing literature on academic restructuring.
Because institutional restructuring may be related to shifting goals, priorities, and
mission I decided to explore the historical development of university missions and to include
the expectations of some scholars concerning present day and future changes to mission.
University missions are not developed in a vacuum; rather they are developed through an
organization’s interaction with its peers within an organizational field. This study offers a
unique perspective by bringing together mission, organization, and field and the chapter
concludes by weaving these strands to form the conceptual framework for the study.
The Study of Organizational Fields
Institutional theorists seek to understand how organizations function and the ways in
which they influence both macro-level processes and micro-level attitudes and behaviors
(Scott, W. R., 2001). Scholars of institutions and organizations hail from a diversity of
disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, and anthropology. A variety
of corresponding methodological approaches are used to examine organizations of different
types from various perspectives. Within this mix is the study of organizational fields. Field
theory looks at these “mesolevel social orders…the basic structural building block of modern
political/organizational life in the economy, civil society, and the state” (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012, p. 3) and helps to explain the ways organizational-level behaviors are
influenced by an organization’s interaction with this larger sphere.
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The study of organizational fields emerged out of economic sociology, network
analysis, institutional theory, and social movement theory (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).
Several scholars utilize the concept of the organizational field. They have crafted theory to
explain how organizational fields function and how they contribute to change and stability
within the fields and among the organizations within them (e.g., Bourdieu, 1993; Davis &
Marquis, 2005; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008; Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012; Martin, 2003; Scott, W. R., 2001 and 2015; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008).
Whereas these theories have several common elements, each scholar has a slightly different
emphasis and method for applying the theory.
Generally, organizational fields are described as “a community of organizations that
partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and
fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (Scott, W. R., 1995, p. 56). A
more detailed definition of the types of organizations in the field comes from DiMaggio and
Powell (1983): “By organizational field, we mean those organizations that, in the aggregate,
constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or
products” (p. 148). Several scholars have described organizational fields as arenas in which
organizations “reproduce themselves and the field” over time (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p.
9). Fligstein and McAdam (2012) also introduced the concept of power in their definition of
what they label “strategic action fields” (p. 3), which are described as: “constructed social
orders that define an arena within which a set of consensually defined and mutually attuned
actors vie for advantage” (p. 64, emphasis mine). For the purposes of this study, each of
these definitions has something to offer and four concepts are of particular relevance:
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1) Organizations within a field share a “common meaning system” (Scott, W. R.,
1995, p. 56).
2) Organizations within a field comprise a “recognized area of institutional life”
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148)
3) Organizations within a field become like one another, establish the norms of the
field and reproduce the field over time (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein &
McAdam, 2012).
4) Organizations within a field compete with each other for a better position within
the field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).
In the origins of the study of organizational fields, scholars “conceptualized the
organizational field as the domain where an organization’s actions were structured by the
network of relationships within which it was embedded” (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008, p. 131).
Researchers focused on fields as a way to understand why decisions that were made at the
organizational level may not have seemed to fit with the goals of these organizations. When
put in the context of the field, organization-level decisions could be recognized as moving
the field towards a common goal (Warren, 1967). As scholars continued to explore
organizations from a field perspective, they also recognized that organizations often chose
strategies that were similar to those of other organizations of similar type that were seen as
successful and more legitimate (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) wrote extensively about institutional isomorphism in their
study of organizational fields, they described it as a trend towards homogeneity among
organizations within a well-established and highly-structured field.
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Current research on organizational fields has focused less on ideas about
isomorphism within fields and more on the ways in which change takes place in fields and
organizations, as well as how organizations can respond strategically to changes in the field
or broader environment (Davis & Marquis, 2005; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). Contemporary
organizational field theory is explicative rather than predictive. Davis and Marquis (2005)
argued that specific phenomena, such as a shift in organizational priorities and mission after
a restructuring, could be investigated through the mechanism of the organization and the
organizational field. Further, studying organizations and their interactions within the various
fields to which they belong can help scholars understand and observe particular phenomena
as they occur over time (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). Finally, field research can also help
to explain phenomena that happen within an organization by serving “as a bridge between the
macro- and micro- [level interactions] by providing detailed explanations of how field-level
interactions influence internal organizational phenomena” (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008, p.
141).
Tensions within and among Fields
As discussed above, organizational fields are collections of actors that share common
interests and relate with each other around them. Fields are not tangible in the same way that
organizations are. Field boundaries are unclear and subject to change depending on the ways
in which organizations relate to each other within the field. There are several ways to think
about how fields are established. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) contend that fields, like
organizations, are created out of a human need to create shared meaning and to define
collective identity. In this view, fields would trend towards stability as various
organizational actors work to accomplish a common goal. On the other hand, some scholars

18

assert that fields are defined by their power dynamics (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992;
Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). Both of these perspectives contain truth; within a field,
organizations are working towards common goals, however, they are also pursuing their own
individual survival.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) asserted that as fields became more established and
stable, the organizations within them began to homogenize. They identified three types of
factors that influenced this trend towards sameness: “1) coercive isomorphism that stems
from political influence and the problem of legitimacy; 2) mimetic isomorphism resulting
from standard responses to uncertainty; and 3) normative isomorphism, associated with
professionalization” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). Embedded in these sources of
institutional isomorphism are two types of factors: 1) those that challenge institutional
survival (regulative/governmental pressures leading to coercive isomorphism, and economic
and other environmental pressures that lead to mimetic isomorphism), and 2) those that help
organizations work together reach their common goals (professionalization of the field). A
closer look at these two categories reveals a tension between competition and cooperation
among organizations in the field.
Competition occurs because organizations within the field are constantly trying to
improve their standing in relation to each other (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). This
competition is apparent in the research university field, which seems to rely heavily on
various ranking systems that appear in the media (Hazelkorn, 2013). “Actors who are both
more and less powerful are constantly making adjustments to the conditions in the field given
their position and the actions of others” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 12). At the same
time that organizations are competing for position within the field, they also share a
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commitment to the goals of the field itself – or as Bourdieu described it: “an objective
complicity that underlies all the antagonisms” (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 73).
Collaboration may occur within a field when there is an external, destabilizing
incident that is perceived to challenge the survival of the field as a whole (e.g., an economic
crisis that threatens funding to organizations within a field). Under these circumstances,
organizations may come together to work towards a field-level solution. At the same time,
however, such episodes of contention may instead lead to innovative solutions that challenge
the position of higher status organizational actors (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).
In a recent study from Europe, Hüther & Krücken (2016) look at the ways “nested”
fields influence the organizations within them. This work acknowledged that organizations
exist in multiple fields and must respond to a variety of external contexts – from the local to
the global level. This range of often-conflicting influences means that sometimes
institutional leaders respond by creating plans and structures that are similar to their peers
(isomorphism), while at other times they adopt strategies that will distinguish them from
other organizations in a field. Knowing the details of a specific case is the best way to
understand which of these different influences prevailed (Hüther & Krücken, 2016).
Incumbents and Challengers
A field is comprised of various organizational actors. As noted above, same-type
organizations within a field typically vie for position within that field. Most scholars divide
these same-type actors into two groups: incumbents and challengers. Incumbents are often
those who have been in the field the longest and therefore are able to set the standards.
Challengers have less influence over field norms and often have slightly different
institutional logics even if they largely conform (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). “Those who
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dominate in a given field are in a position to make it function to their advantage but they
must always contend with the resistance, the claims, the contention, ‘political’ or otherwise,
of the dominated” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 102).
Incumbent organizations are often the first to adopt innovations that are later hailed as
“best practices” and duplicated by others. Whereas the incumbents choose these strategies
out of a desire to seek efficiencies, later adopters often implement them because these actions
have become “normatively sanctioned” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). There are often
internal governance units that manage compliance within strategic action fields (e.g. in the
field “state higher education,” a state’s department of education or the legislature would
serve as an enforcer). Informal governance units, such as professional associations, may also
exist. The role of these organizations is to maintain the status quo, confer legitimacy, and
“reinforce the dominant perspective” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 14) in the field. “The
very presence of these units serves to legitimate and ‘naturalize’ the logic and rules of the
field” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 14) – often established by the incumbents. Actors who
play the role of field overseer are further meaningful to incumbent organizations because
they can serve as gatekeepers to new organizations that seek entrance to the field. Internal
governance units may also serve as liaisons to other external fields (Fligstein & McAdam,
2012).
The relative position of incumbents and challengers may change during episodes of
contention within the field. Incumbents typically appeal to the status quo and use their
considerable influence to pressure official and unofficial governing bodies to assist them in
returning the field to normal while challengers are more likely to try innovative action as a
way to advance their own positions (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). It is during these times,
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when fields are in flux due to external challenges that fundamental changes can occur. Some
organizations have more power to influence new field norms and logics and they are often
referred to as institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1988).
However, changes in field norms and logics will not occur without agreement among other
organizations in the field.
Field Position Constrains an Organization’s Actions
The scope of possible actions taken within an organization is limited by its
relationships within the field. As noted above, it may be easier for incumbents to adopt new
practices than it is for challengers. While striving to change positions within the field,
organizations can be entrepreneurial to some degree but are more likely to follow what others
have done. Earlier scholars, such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) may have assumed that
organizations implemented strategies from their peers without adjusting them to fit the
unique culture of their own establishments. However, current researchers recognize that
there is a process of adaptation that takes place, as Wooten and Hoffman (2008) described:
“In the process of translation, the original meaning of an organizational practice changes as
individual field members incorporate these items into their own organization” (p. 142).
Hallet and Ventresca (2006) emphasized the fact that logics and norms in organizations and
fields come from the individuals who “inhabit” these organizations. Logics are created
through the interactions of individuals.
Field Level Logics and Organizational Mission
Institutional or field level logics are created from shared meaning within the field. W.
R. Scott (2001) described field logics as the “belief systems and related practices that
predominate in an organizational field” (p. 139). Further, they are the principles that “furnish
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guidelines to field participants as to how they are to carry out the work” (Scott, W. R., 2001,
p. 139). It is important to consider the content and depth of these logics within fields and
organizations, as well as the ways they are connected to other belief systems. Within a single
field there may be multiple and competing logics, which are related to and help shape
organizational missions (Scott, W. R., 2001).
W. R. Scott (2015) described a number of traditionally-contested logics specific to
higher education. His portrayal of these logics helps to underscore current arguments about
purpose and resource distribution within the field of higher education. For example, is the
purpose of higher education to provide students with practical skills that are linked to specific
employment or is the purpose to offer a broad-based education based on inquiry? Was
higher education created to educate the children of the wealthy elite who can afford it or to
expand opportunities for all? Is higher education ultimately a public or a private good?
These questions are important to the ways that institutions embody their missions as well as
the strategies they choose to adopt.
McAdam and Scott (2005) discussed the ways in which institutional logics can
change. They used the term “bricolage” to describe the ways in which new logics are formed
within a field by patching together pieces of existing logics in new ways during rapidly
changing times. The authors suggest that such a recreation can “combine the strengths of the
old and familiar with the advantages of the novel and unusual” (McAdam & Scott, 2005, p.
27). Campbell (2005) also referred to “bricolage” in his description of how change occurs in
organizations and fields. When there is a disruptive event that prompts change, organizations
will piece together strategies that are already known along with newer elements. In large,
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complex organizations that are difficult to change this type of strategy can help them to move
forward (Campbell, 2005).
The Role of Groups and Individuals in Organizational Fields
Within organizations are individual decision-makers who determine the path of the
organization. However, these individuals are not entirely free to adopt any approach they
wish. The freedoms of individual actors are tempered by the influence of the local
environment, the position of relevant actors within that environment, and the position of the
organization within its various fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Despite these potential
constraints, Fligstein and McAdam (2012) emphasized the importance of social skills in an
individual’s ability to affect change or take advantage of opportunities in their organization.
Bourdieu (1984) highlighted the recursive nature of the influence of individual actors
on organizations as well as the field. He used the term “habitus” to describe the ways that
the economic and cultural conditions an individual experiences are imprinted on that
individual who then uses his skills and actions to make decisions within an institution. This
way of thinking about individuals, organizations, and the field can help to reveal the ways in
which each sphere influences the others. Habitus, however, is created and replicated without
conscious thought or action. “Thus, each member of an organization brings to it a habitus
formed under specific past conditions” (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008, p. 4) and through their
actions, new conditions are created.
Similar to Bourdieu, Hallet and Ventresca (2006) emphasized the important role that
individual actors play within organizations – it is people who make decisions, organizations
do not make decisions. Their study discussed why it is problematic to decouple human
interactions from institutions. The process of reification – attributing decision-making
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powers to organizations rather than people – separates institutional logics from human
interactions. Their review of an older institutional study (Gouldner, 1954) encouraged
current researchers to look at the multiple levels within an institution, the ways in which
interactions among people shape the institution, and also how the field-level context
influences the institution as well as the human interactions (Hallett & Ventresca, 2006).
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) intentionally used the term “strategic action fields” to
underscore the fact that individuals and groups within an organization have agency to make
decisions and influence outcomes based on their own interests and in response to available
resources. It is useful to consider an institution as its own strategic action field that is
reacting to fields it exists in as well as larger environmental forces while at the same time
being altered by the individuals within it as they vie for power. W.R. Scott (2015) stated,
“Actors are both constrained and enabled by institutional frameworks, and they are capable
of using them to pursue their own interests as well as challenging and attempting to change
frameworks if necessary” (p. 28).
Organizations, Fields, and the Broader Environment
Many scholars who study fields also recognize the importance of the larger societal
context on those fields and the organizations within them. Fligstein and McAdam (2012)
noted that “the source of many of the opportunities and challenges a given field faces stems
from its relations with this broader environment” (p. 3). They went on to state, “while fields
can devolve into conflict as a result of internal processes, it is far more common for an
‘episode of contention’ to develop as a result of change pressures emanating from proximate
state and/or nonstate fields” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 19). Additionally, when
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organizations within a field begin to adopt similar structures, it is often the result of state or
regulatory oversight (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008).
Some researchers, such as Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) and Bourdieu and
Wacquant (1992), viewed the state and the economy as fields on their own. The state is
“itself a field of bureaucratic administrative agencies, a bureaucratic field” (Emirbayer &
Johnson, 2008, p. 20) that can influence what happens within other fields. Emirbayer and
Johnson (2008) also conceptualized the economy as a “field made up of particular
organizations and configurations of organizations, [that] serve as a frequent point of origin
for organizational innovation” (p. 20). Regardless of whether state and economy are fields or
part of the broader environmental context, they do influence what happens in organizations
and in organizational fields.
Organizational Fields and Higher Education
Institutions of higher education are constrained by their placement in various
organizational fields. Because the case under study here occurred at a public research
university, this section will serve to draw connections between organizational field theory
and current research on changes and influences in higher education with specific focus on
public research universities. Higher education scholars may utilize different terminology but
they are studying the same types of effects that organizational field theorists have discovered.
Change and restructuring in higher education institutions may be the result of field-level
interactions and influences from the broader societal context, as well as responses by
individuals within individual organizations. This section explores the ways in which politics
and political accountability at the federal and state levels, the economy, and competition
influence what happens at research universities.
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Politics and Public Accountability
The public and various interest groups within it are demanding more out of public
higher education. Better financial aid with lower tuition and fewer student loans, remedial
education, and student learning outcomes that correspond with specific career skills are all
issues that are being discussed and moved into the policy arena (Schmidtlein & Berdahl,
2011). At the same time, corporate leaders are looking to state policy makers to influence
curriculum in ways that will help them have access to a pool of well-trained workers. These
influences drive the discussion about the purpose of higher education and whom it is
intended to educate.
Public accountability to external stakeholders is increasing as education is more
closely tied to economic success on the state and national levels. State legislatures and
boards of trustees are expecting more from universities while they are cutting back their
funding. There is sometimes an expectation for universities to restructure that is politically
driven. “Recently, external forces are compelling higher education institutions to review,
consolidate, and/or discontinue their programs” (Michael, 1998, p. 378). Michael (1998)
described the waxing and waning of the public influence over higher education. Current
public sentiment calls for more accountability and more influence on the part of legislatures
over what happens in higher education.
The results of recent elections may be another important factor in terms of political
influence over higher education. In 2014, Republicans gained control of governorships and
legislatures across the country, which led to additional spending cuts across a variety of
areas, including higher education. The 2016 Presidential election has left many public
university leaders concerned about strategies for recruiting international students as planned
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enrollments begin to drop. Also, perhaps for the first time, “academic freedom, civil rights,
and social justice” appeared on the American Association of State Colleges and Universities
(2017) top ten issues list.
At the same time that states are cutting back funding to universities, they are also
seeking to improve the performance of those institutions. A variety of interested and
influential parties are calling for colleges and universities to show more data on certain
student outcomes, including degree progress and completion rates. Legislators and the public
expect these improvements to be gained at a “reasonable cost” (Schmidtlein & Berdahl,
2011, p. 85). Stakeholders at both the state and federal levels have demanded that
institutions increase their degree production and improve rates of graduation (American
Association of State Colleges and Universities, 2013). The Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation and the Lumina Foundation, along with nonprofit groups such as Complete
College America, have encouraged and supported policies that increase the number of
students who graduate from college (Nash & Zaback, 2011). In 2013, President Obama
pledged to increase the number of college graduates by the year 2020 and called on
universities to help (The White House, 2013). It is unclear at this writing whether President
Trump will attempt to follow through with this plan.
For university presidents in states that are not opting for performance funding, there is
still an emphasis on increasing productivity through improved degree progress and
completion. While funding may not be specifically tied to these indicators, there seems to be
an unfunded mandate to apply performance measures to student learning outcomes. The
impetus for this may be coming from business leaders who are looking to higher education to
make sure that students gain skills that will serve them in the work force.
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In Massachusetts in particular, the state legislature and the governor highlighted the
importance of public higher education during the 2008-2012 period during which this case
took place. The authors of Vision Project, the featured plan for public higher education in
the Commonwealth, wrote, “We will produce the best-educated citizenry and workforce in
the nation. We will be a national leader in research that drives economic development”
(Massachusetts Department of Higher Education, 2000-2017). The project’s stated outcomes
are: increased college participation and completion, demonstrated student learning, alignment
of some degree programs with workforce needs, minimizing gaps in achievement among
diverse populations, creating informed citizens, and producing research that benefits the
economy (Massachusetts Department of Higher Education, 2000-2017). The strategic
priorities of the University of Massachusetts System were similar to the broader state goals.
These included:
•

Improve student learning experience;

•

Strengthen research and development;

•

Renew faculty;

•

Continue a focus on diversity and positive climate;

•

Maintain and improve access and affordability;

•

Develop leadership role in public service;

•

Increase endowment

•

Improve administrative and IT services; and

•

Develop first-rate infrastructure

(University of Massachusetts, 2008, p. 1)
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Economic Forces
For the last two decades and particularly since the economic crisis of 2008, public
institutions of higher education have experienced a decrease in state funding. The College
Board reported that after adjusting for inflation, “Total state appropriations declined by 19%,
from $88.7 billion in 2007-08 (in 2012 dollars) to $72.0 billion in 2012-13, while FTE
enrollment in public institutions increased by 11% over these five years” (The College
Board, 2014). States have seen an overall drop in their tax revenues since the recent
economic crisis, while at the same time expenses for programs and services like Medicaid,
prisons, and K-12 education have increased (McGuinness, 2011). These programs require
state revenues and do not have alternative funding sources, unlike public universities that use
a “mixed funding model” (Hossler, 2004, p. 147).
Because universities can access other sources of revenue, including a mix of federal
funds through student aid and research dollars, tuition and fees from enrolled students,
private fundraising, and also some funding from grants, contracts, and various revenue
generating activities, states often view appropriations to universities as discretionary
(Zumeta, 2004). One result is that when state budgets decline, higher education is seen as a
place where funding cuts can be absorbed. Despite the fact that state revenues are beginning
to recover after the 2008 recession, it is unlikely that higher education will see an increase in
state appropriations in the future (Travis, 2013). The National Association of State Budget
Officers (2013) cautioned institutions to expect reforms and new financing models that may
tie financial support to performance.
Two of the options that seem appropriate to campus administrators are: 1) consider
how reorganization might assist in reallocating resources internally, and 2) find alternative
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sources of revenue. Several administrators in the contemporary restructuring cases that will
be discussed in a subsequent section, used reductions in state allocations as a rationale for
their actions, stating that a reorganization would lead to economic savings. It is unknown
whether these recent cases have led to long-term savings; however, in the empirical studies
reviewed for this research, projected savings were typically not realized.
At the same time that state funding for higher education is decreasing, the costs of
providing higher education have risen. A number of factors have contributed to this increase
in expenses. One is the growth of the population of non-traditional students1 who are
enrolling in higher education. Typically, these students need more support to succeed,
making their education more expensive (Zumeta, 2004). New construction, related to
expanding enrollments and years of deferred maintenance, is another cause of increases in
expenditures. In some cases, faculty pay raises that are higher than those in the general
economy have contributed to increased overhead expenditures (Johnstone, 2011). Finally,
the increased use of technology in higher education has also added to increased expenses. As
more technology is used for instruction, the need for replacement and upgrades grows and
there are costs associated with staff salaries for training and support of faculty who are using
new technology (Johnstone, 2011)
One possible outcome of the reduction in state appropriations is a complete defunding
of public higher education by the states. Travis (2013) reviewed several cases of
privatization in public higher education institutions in the U.S. and came to the conclusion

Non-traditional students are defined as having one or more of these qualities: delayed
enrollment into higher education, part-time students, financially independent from parents,
single parents, working full time while attending college, etc. (Horn & Carroll, 1996, as cited
in Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, 2012)
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that if the trend to cut back state appropriations continues, it will result in complete loss of
state support to public higher education by the year 2059 (Travis, 2013).
Competition in the Field
The concept of competition in higher education encompasses many things. As stated
above, competition occurs within organizational fields as organizations vie for incumbent
status. There is also competition within a single university as units compete for scarce
resources (Gumport, 2001; Scott, W. R., 2015). Competition occurs among institutions of
higher education as they contend for research support offered by private and federal funders
(McGuinness, 2011). Institutions often compete for the same students and faculty as a way
of distinguishing themselves and improving their rankings (Gumport, 2011).
As discussed above, as state funding allocations to higher education are reduced,
institutions must look for other means of support. Federal and private foundation research
dollars are sources of funding; however there is a limited pool of funds and ever-growing
competition for them (McGuinness, 2011; Rich, 2006). Also, there is evidence that
administration of public research funding is actually costly to universities (Lombardi,
Capaldi Phillips, Abbey, & Craig, 2014). As institutions seek to distinguish themselves from
their peers in order to attract research funding, they also compete for the same talented
faculty and graduate students (Gumport, 2011). Institutions that undergo restructuring are
often doing so in an attempt to remain competitive by refocusing the core of the institution in
a way that attracts more resources (Rich, 2006). Clark (2004) encouraged institutions to
adopt an entrepreneurial stance so that they could be in a position to embrace change and
remain competitive.
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Paradeise and Filliatreau (2016), in their brief history of the emergence and
proliferation of rankings systems, explained that rankings change what universities and their
stakeholders consider to be important as well as what they choose to account for. Their
argument is that rankings have become popular with universities because resources are often
allocated based on performance indicators and rankings provide a way to “count things.”
Beginning in the 1970s, the Carnegie Foundation’s Classification System created a
scheme that classified institutions by type, setting in motion a way of comparing colleges and
universities. Following in the wake of the Carnegie Classifications, several other
organizations developed their own ranking systems, most notably U.S. News and World
Report and more recently the Academic Ranking of World Universities (Hazelkorn, 2013)
and the Center for Measuring University Performance (Lombardi, Capaldi Phillips, Abbey, &
Craig, 2014). These systems have drawn global attention to the concept of university
performance. In addition to utilizing the rankings as a way to demonstrate excellence at the
university level, national leaders also refer to their nation’s standing in these categorization
schemes as an indicator of economic strength (Hazelkorn, 2013).
However, the rankings are also a source of consternation to universities. The
methods used to generate them have been the subject of much criticism. The agencies that
produce the rankings use a variety of subjective indicators to compare institutions of higher
education that are based on their own notions of what it important in higher education
(Hazelkorn, 2013).
There is also no agreed method on what or how to measure academic or educational
quality. This process ignores the fact that HEIs [higher education institutions] are
complex organizations, residing within vastly different national contexts, underpinned
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by different value systems, meeting the needs of demographically, ethnically and
culturally diverse populations, and responding to complex and challenging politicaleconomic environments. (Hazelkorn, 2013, p. 3)
A separate issue with the rankings is that they are issued annually, leaving no room for
evaluating long-range projects and further diluting the results (Lombardi J., 2010).
What does this competition do to institutions? It causes campus leaders to look for
ways to improve their standing through a constant striving for excellence (Michael, 1998)
and possibly by gaming the metrics. Allan (2007) identified “excellence” and its derivatives
as one of the most-used words in institutional mission statements. In itself, use of the word
“excellence” denotes competition in a “zero-sum” game (Charlton & Andras, 2005, as cited
in Allan, 2007) and can only be achieved by those elite institutions that can prove themselves
superior to others through some type of competition (Allan, 2007). The rankings foster this
type of competition, often to the detriment of institutions. Several scholars have argued that
competition and rankings are diminishing the public good of higher education, particularly in
research universities (Gumport, 2001; Marginson, 2011; Thelin, 2011).
As universities compete to rise up in the rankings, they may add programs and
projects designed to attract new students or new sources of funding. These new functions are
often at odds with the established mission of the organization. Gumport (2001) argued that
this “unprecedented competition” (p. 242) and responsiveness to the marketplace is
disturbing because it may serve to erode our knowledge creation “and to further stratify the
academic offerings for different segments of student populations” (Gumport, 2001, p. 242).
Another strategy universities might undertake to remain competitive is to restructure their
institutions in ways that are similar to their peers.
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Restructuring Institutions of Higher Education
Cases of university restructuring in the U.S., such as the one that took place at the
University of Massachusetts Amherst have been common since the 1990s; however there is
not a rich body of academic literature related to this phenomenon. Indeed, much of the
empirical research on mergers and restructuring has taken place outside the U.S. This section
explores a variety of reports and studies. Whereas many of these studies examined situations
that were different from the UMass restructuring process, there were enough commonalities
among cases to be relevant.
Types of Studies
Most of the literature reviewed for this section focused specifically on interinstitutional mergers outside the United States (e.g. Curri, 2001; Fielden & Markham, 1997;
Harman & Harman, 2003; Harman & Roberston-Cuninghame, 1995; Locke, 2007; Pick,
2003; Rowley, 1997; Ursin, Aittola, Henderson, & Valimaa, 2010). Mergers of two or more
campuses are much more common in the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and western
Europe where most higher education is publicly funded. Often these mergers are prompted
by government mandates or policies. Of the reviews of inter-institutional merger, some
considered a single case (e.g. Curri, 2001; Harman & Roberston-Cuninghame, 1995; Locke,
2007; Pick, 2003) whereas the rest provided comparative studies of the merger phenomenon
(Fielden & Markham, 1997; Harman & Harman, 2003; Rowley, 1997; Ursin, Aittola,
Henderson, & Valimaa, 2010). Kashner (2010) and Okendu (2008) considered restructurings
on a single campus in the United States. Finally, a few studies consider the influence of
organizational fields in higher education. Zajac and Kraatz (1993) explored restructuring in
liberal arts colleges over a sixteen year time span. Brint and Karabel (1991) discussed the
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transformation of the mission and focus of the U.S. community college field from liberal arts
transfer institutions to organizations that provided mainly vocational and training programs.
Barrier and Musselin (2016) investigated the effects of field vs. local influence in two cases
of institutional merger in France.
Several of the reports and studies of reorganization within the United States focused
on incidents at single institutions. Barnard and Ferren (2001), a department chair and an
administrator, provided an account of the merger of two departments at a public university.
Kashner (2010) wrote a journalistic account of restructuring at Cornell which was faced with
a sizeable budget deficit after losing twenty-seven percent of the value of its endowment in
the fall of 2008. Pattenaude (2010), chancellor of the University of Maine, discussed a
visioning process to reform that system as a result of the same economic crisis. Okendu
(2008) completed a case study of change at a religious institution; he reveals how
administrators were able to restructure their campus to maintain financial stability while
staying true to their religious mission.
The research indicates that there are common rationales for undergoing these changes
and also that the role of leaders is central to their success. With a few exceptions (Barnard &
Ferren, 2001; Okendu, 2008), most of the literature is focused on change from the
perspective of administrators or used the institution itself as the unit of analysis. One study
focused specifically on the role of deans in institutional management and change (Carvalho
& Santiago, 2010). Sullivan (2004) focused specifically on the criteria used for making
decisions about restructuring. Each of these studies focused on successful mergers, with the
exception of Harman and Roberston-Cuninghame (1995), who explored the failure of the
merger of the University of New England in Australia and Rowley (1997) whose survey of
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thirty merged institutions included a few failures. Two pieces that are largely missing from
these studies are: 1) a discussion of mission and changes in mission, and 2) studies that
consider university restructuring in the context of organizational fields.
Rationales for Restructuring
The studies reviewed here detail a variety of rationales for governments and campus
leaders to undertake large-scale change processes. Gumport (2001) and Guskin and Marcy
(2003) do not examine specific cases but they are included in this review because they
provide context for the study of institutional change in higher education. Gumport (2001)
discusses the political and economic realities like those detailed in the previous section that
often influence decisions to restructure. Guskin and Marcy (2003) offer guidance to
institutions of higher education in the United States as they decide how to face the changes in
higher education as a sector.
Economics
As the UMass situation suggests, restructuring processes or mergers are often
proposed as a way of appeasing political stakeholders or introducing economic savings
through resource reallocation. Sullivan’s (2004) study is based on the premise that campus
restructuring occurs primarily to gain economic savings. The merger of two departments at
Radford University was an example of a merger that took place to save money while keeping
two academic programs intact (Barnard & Ferren, 2001). Likewise, the chancellor at the
University of Maine was responding to a sizeable projected budget cut when he began a
visioning process to restructure its campuses (Pattenaude, 2010).
Institutional mergers in Nova Scotia (Curri, 2001) and the United Kingdom (Fielden
& Markham, 1997; Rowley, 1997) were initiated to produce cost savings, despite the fact
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that these savings were not always borne out by the results. In fact, all of the mergers led to a
multitude of one-time costs that may not have been expected (Fielden & Markham, 1997;
Rowley, 1997). Ursin, Aittola, Henderson, and Valimaa (2010) studied four separate interinstitutional mergers in Finland that were undertaken for political and economic reasons and
intended to produce cost savings. What they discovered was that the focus on structure and
economic savings may have been made at the expense of maintaining or improving academic
quality. Zajac and Kratz (1993) studied specific types of restructuring that took place in the
liberal arts college field between the years 1971 and 1986 during a time of economic and
cultural shifts in society. One discovery they made was that institutions that were worse off
financially were more likely to restructure.
To Accomplish Strategic Goals
Achieving academic or strategic goals are also reasons stated for undertaking a
merger or restructuring process. Rowley (1997) and Fielden and Markham (1997) uncovered
a variety of reasons for the mergers they studied: improving the institution’s academic
profile, positioning an institution to serve a new market or geographic region, and/or to help
them plan for anticipated changes in higher education. Pick (2003) discussed a merger in
Australia that was carried out to improve education for the mining industry and to assist in
the social and economic development in a particular geographic region.
In Brint and Karabel’s (1991) recounting of the shift in mission of community
colleges, the authors debunked earlier notions that the change in focus of community colleges
was due to consumer demand or the influence of the business sector. Rather, they supported
a view that administrative leaders within the community college field chose to make this shift
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in order to carve out their own niche within the greater higher education sector, thereby
acting as challengers to the existing field of higher education (Brint & Karabel, 1991).
Lessons from the Study of Academic Restructuring
Although each case of merger or restructuring is unique, there are enough
commonalities to draw meaningful connections across the studies. The lessons learned from
these studies fall into the following categories: stakeholder involvement, the influence of
structure on institutional change processes, insights from failed merger attempts, and the
effects of leadership style and culture on merger and restructuring.
In her review of thirty institutional mergers in the U.K., Rowley (1997) explained that
there were some unexpected findings and positive benefits that emerged from higher
education mergers. For one, mergers in her sample had a higher rate of success (90%) than
corporate mergers (20 – 50%). In the same study, she reported that mergers were successful
in satisfying the plans they had hoped to achieve, included in these were academic quality
improvements, redefined focus, and providing higher education in a specific region. The
small group of mergers that did not survive failed due to poor program quality, a mismatch of
cultures, or the failure of administrators in integrating the two institutions. In other cases, the
merged institutions found that they had pleasant surprises in terms of increased academic
quality, a revitalized culture and useful staff development. However, four out of five
mergers were met, at least initially, with hostility from some of the stakeholders and only in
one third of the merger cases was there widespread consultation with stakeholders prior to
the implementation of the plan (Rowley, 1997). The rest of this section will discuss lessons
gleaned from other studies.
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Stakeholders
Timing and urgency in a single campus restructuring situation affect who is allowed
to participate in the decision-making process. Gumport (2001) explained:
If there is some urgency, traditional mechanisms of academic governance are
bypassed by an ad hoc committee, system-level or state-level agency. In this case,
faculty are unlikely to be asked to participate in deliberations over the alternatives or
the likely consequences of proposed changes. If timing is not critical, academic
processes can reign, including faculty committees engaged in reevaluating their
charge as well as the options. (p. 241)
Gumport (2001) also stressed the fact that external pressure to restructure often
creates tension and divisiveness among various factions on campus. These tensions are
typically characterized as struggles between administrators who must comply with
accountability demands of external governing bodies and faculty or other stakeholders who
resist restructuring because it appears to undermine academic freedom. Including faculty in
decision-making in these situations may help create better plans and also to reduce tensions
on campus (Gumport, 2001).
Pattenaude (2010) and Kashner (2010) each reported that widespread participation of
stakeholders in both planning and implementation processes made for a smoother transition
to change. In each of these cases, stakeholders felt more invested in the restructuring and
worked together towards successful realization of goals. Barnard and Ferren (2001) in their
discussion of the merger of two departments on their campus also concluded that including
affected faculty in creating a solution to a problem helped to generate solutions that benefited
the campus overall.
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Structure
In restructuring cases, and mergers in particular, structure plays an important role in
success. Harman and Harman (2003) defined a variety of collaborative efforts on a spectrum
from informal collaboration to fully-integrated merger. Mergers themselves were grouped
into two categories, “federal” or “unitary” (p. 30), which have different management
arrangements. A federal merger allows the merged units to maintain some of their original
culture and autonomy with an organizational administrative layer to manage the new unit.
Unitary mergers fully integrate the two units under one leader and allow less autonomy in the
original units. The authors found the unitary style to be more effective in the success of
mergers over time as federal mergers make it more difficult for organizations to set future
directions and create a shared culture.
Learning from Failure
Harman and Robertson-Cuninghame (1995) detailed the case of a failed merger of
several universities in Australia. In their edited volume, they asked several stakeholders who
were part of the University of New England merger to discuss what worked and what did not.
Overall, they discovered that the failure was due largely to the incompatibility of two of the
five campuses. These two institutions had very different cultures; one was typified by a
collegial style whereas the other was more hierarchical and authoritarian. On each of these
campuses there were leaders with strong personalities who were not able to overcome their
differences. Other issues that contributed to failure were competition for scarce resources
among the units as well as conflicting ideas about academic status. Also, the researchers
discovered that the motivations for the initial merger had decreased over time (Harman &
Harman, 2003).
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Leadership and Culture
A review of institutional mergers in the U.S., U.K. and Australia offers several
lessons related to leadership and culture during change processes. Harman and Harman
(2003) stated that “visionary, transformational leadership that is sensitive to cultural factors
greatly facilitates merger processes” (p. 40). Thoughtful leadership begins at the planning
stage when leaders are responsible for developing support for merger plans among
stakeholders by sharing rationales, goals, and plans. During the implementation period,
Harman and Harman advised leaders to move quickly to merge once the decision has been
made. They also reminded leaders to be aware of the traditions and culture of both merger
partners during the transitional phase to ensure positive morale and to gain the loyalty of
faculty and staff.
Locke’s (2007) experience as the consultant to two British universities undergoing
merger corresponded with Harman and Harman’s (2003) suggestions for success. In this
case, a successful merger meant increased government resources for the participating
institutions. Locke stressed the importance for leaders to identify stages in the process that
would require more attention, particularly in terms of resolving tensions and uncertainty in
defining new roles for staff and faculty. He also emphasized the value of understanding and
managing the individual cultures of the merging institutions, beginning with a diagnosis of
existing cultures, subcultures and groups. “Leaders and managers at all levels will need to
act and react to direct and redirect the flow of cultural interactions, drawing on their intuition,
personal knowledge and creativity” (Locke, 2007, p. 94).
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Connecting Restructuring in Higher Education to the Organizational Field
There are a few studies that focus specifically on change and restructuring in
institutions of higher education as they relate to the organizational field. Zajac and Kraatz
(1993) studied restructuring of private liberal arts colleges in the 1970s through the mid
1980s. They investigated the factors that led some of these organizations to choose
restructuring while others maintained their original mission and character. Brint and Karabel
(1991) examined the shift in mission of community colleges, many of which began as twoyear liberal arts colleges preparing students to transfer to four-year institutions but later
shifted to focus on vocational training and connection to business. Barrier and Musselin
(2016) analyzed two university mergers in France that came about as a result of national
pressures and they highlighted the ways the outcomes of mergers did and did not ultimately
conform to field expectations. This section will discuss these studies and also present an
overview of some contemporary cases of restructuring that took place during the same time
period as the one at UMass.
Zajac and Kraatz
Zajac and Kraatz (1993) completed a longitudinal study of 631 private liberal arts
colleges over the period beginning in 1971 and ending in 1986. During this time, a specific
set of market constraints (both external factors and field-level pressures) was affecting the
survival of these institutions. The first of these was a field-level shift – students and their
parents were calling for educational outcomes that were tied to economic goals, i.e. skills
that would help students find jobs (Zajac & Kraatz, 1993). The second constraint the
institutions faced was the increasing specialization of the labor market, which potentially
meant there would be fewer jobs for students who had majored in the liberal arts (Zajac &
Kraatz, 1993).
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This was an external, economic challenge that affected other fields as well. A societal-level
influence was that the population of college-aged students had declined in the aftermath of
the baby boom generation going to college.
Facing these three constraints, many college leaders felt pressure to undergo some
type of restructuring as a way to improve their chances of institutional survival. In their
study, Zajac and Kraatz (1993) were testing a hypothesis developed by previous researchers
such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that because of their position in the field, these
institutions would be less likely to undergo major organizational changes and would instead
be constrained by structural inertia. Their results disproved the earlier theories. Zajac and
Kraatz (1993) concluded that in some instances, large-scale change was seen as the best
choice for college leaders facing difficult environmental or organizational conditions. Some
types of institutions were more likely to undergo restructuring than others, for example, those
colleges with smaller endowments or in more difficult financial situations, colleges in the
northeast where the population was declining, and larger colleges were all more likely to
restructure. However, more prestigious colleges were less likely to restructure – an outcome
that may be related to incumbent status (Zajac & Kraatz, 1993).
In their study, the researchers identified three separate types of restructuring: 1)
offering new academic programs (in this case undergraduate majors in business), 2)
developing graduate programs, and 3) changing from a single sex institution to a coeducational one (Zajac & Kraatz, 1993). What is interesting about this is that while the
authors disproved the theory that some institutions were resistant to change, they did identify
only three different strategies for restructuring among more than six hundred colleges. This
may indicate that college leaders were constrained in their actions and only felt safe in
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adopting strategies that were implemented by other institutions. In other words, the field
may have influenced what were considered acceptable strategies. Second, Zajac and Kraatz
(1993) described the restructuring as “ involving resource allocation and commitment
decisions, other significant policy changes, and often even a change in the organization’s
overall strategic orientation and mission” (p. 87). This connection between restructuring and
mission shift is important to the current case and will be discussed in a later section.
Brint and Karabel
Brint and Karabel (1991) used the lens of institutionalism to explore the
transformation of community colleges from mostly liberal arts based transfer institutions to
vocationally-focused schools. They argued that this shift in the community college field
came about not out of demand from students or businesses but rather out of a need for the
two-year colleges to find their niche within a status-laden sector. In the historical account
they explored the ways that the leaders of the American Association of Junior Colleges were
advocating for this change even in the face of resistance on the part of students and faculty
(Brint & Karabel, 1991). Brint and Karabel (1991) called attention to the fact that the
choices available to the community college administrators in shifting their focus were not
unlimited. Because of their position in the larger field of higher education, strategies that
would make them look more like higher-status institutions would not be acceptable. Similar
to the private liberal arts college leaders in the study by Zajac and Kraatz (1993), the
community college administrators were constrained in the choices they could make when
deciding how they would refocus. This decision to shift the purpose and mission of
community colleges provides another example of the ways that organizational fields
influence outcomes of decision-making. Also, this study presents an illustration of the ways
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that institutions may become challengers and define their own organizational type within an
organizational field.
Barrier and Musselin
Barrier and Musselin (2016) investigated two instances of university mergers in
France. They discovered that despite the fact that the mergers were influenced by external
forces in international higher education and the institutional leaders had intended to design
universities that matched “international norms” (p. 374), local influence over decisionmaking turned out to be more powerful. The authors described the outcome of the mergers
as a “patchwork” that used ideas from the field, combined with structures and strategies that
would work in the limited time they had to accomplish the mergers (Barrier & Musselin,
2016, p. 3??). The authors also point out that not all elements of the merger came together as
scheduled and the new institutions were still evolving at the time of their writing. One of
their conclusions highlights the ways that individuals within an institution can have a
significant influence on the outcome: “While a few powerful actors used the merger as an
opportunity to promote their own reform agenda, some of the key features of the two merged
universities stemmed from choices by exclusion, whose primary aim was the avoidance of
conflicts” (Barrier & Musselin, 2016, p. 362).
Contemporary Cases of Restructuring
In 2009 the American Association of State Colleges and Universities (an internal
governance unit in the field of public higher education) published an overview of recent
inter-institutional mergers in the organizational field of public higher education (McBain,
2009). This is the type of publication that administrators in institutions of higher education
might read to keep up on what it happening in the field. This particular piece presented an
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overview of a number of mergers under consideration, or recently completed, among public
and for-profit institutions. Primarily, the author concluded that the most mergers were
contemplated as a means to generate cost savings (McBain, 2009). The piece also included
the following caution to administrators regarding the potential for restructuring to shift an
institution’s mission: “However, even during a recession, care should be taken to balance
both the budgets and unique missions—including institutional culture, populations served,
public service missions, programmatic needs and local workforce development needs”
(McBain, 2009, p. 4).
McBain’s (2009) piece is helpful in providing a field-level perspective on recent
attempts to restructure colleges and universities in the U.S. After reading this and because
many of the empirical studies of merger and restructuring came from outside of the United
States and most took place prior to 2008, I decided to supplement the review of the literature
on higher education restructurings with an examination of recent cases that ostensibly
occurred in response to the same environmental conditions as the case at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst. A story in the Chronicle of Higher Education pointed out several of
these restructuring efforts (Olson, 2010) and others were found through a variety of internet
searches. Because of the contemporary nature of these cases, there are no academic studies
yet available to examine them; however, there is documentation available in the form of
reports, planning documents, faculty senate meeting minutes, and public press
announcements. The administrators who led these restructurings wrote many of these
documents; none contained a review of outcomes.
Utilizing such materials, I reviewed five cases of university reorganization in order to
provide a fuller look at this complex phenomenon. Appendix I provides an overview of each
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university’s restructuring. In all cases, there was evidence that the restructuring was
influenced by interaction with the organizational field. Many of the planning documents
used similar language and in the case of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, campus
leaders hired a consultant from Arizona State University (ASU) to help them consider how
they might restructure their institution to look more like ASU.
The institutions reviewed were:
•

Arizona State University

•

Northeastern University

•

Ohio University

•

University of Arkansas at Little Rock

•

University of Northern Iowa

My strategy in reading through the various planning documents and campus press
announcements was to search for the stated rationales behind each of these cases, what the
actual restructuring meant in terms of the campus configuration, and how the institutional
leaders connected these new structures to their motivations for change. Many of the themes
discussed in the restructuring section above were also present in this review. For example,
these institutions were restructuring to take advantage of economic savings or to accomplish
strategic academic or political goals. In addition to these, I identified other, more nuanced
themes in this collection of documents. Objectives such as increasing the selectivity of
admissions, developing more interdisciplinary research and teaching, utilizing higher
education as a regional economic driver, creating or expanding revenue generating programs,
and increasing institutional prominence are among the most salient of these. A deeper study
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of these cases might have revealed whether adopting these new objectives meant a shift in
each institution’s priorities and mission.
Of the five cases reviewed, each institution reported experiencing similar pressures
from external forces as well as field-level pressures to conform and compete with other
institutions. Although there is diversity across these institutions, there is remarkable
similarity in the language they used to describe the need for restructuring and their plans to
move forward. For example, the term “interdisciplinary” was used across all cases, as was
the concept of aligning resources to better match potential funding sources.
Themes in Restructuring
Previous studies of merger and restructuring provide a look at the mechanics of such
processes as well as the rationales and some of the external forces that influence these efforts.
As described above, much can be learned about leadership, strategies, and considerations of
culture from these studies. Taken as a whole, this research may demonstrate that
restructuring is a common occurrence in higher education. However, only one study
discussed the importance of mission and just three focused specifically on the influence of
the field in restructuring. Also, with the exception of Carvalho and Santiago (2010) none of
these studies specifically looks at the ways stakeholders and decision-makers think about the
mission of higher education. Most of these studies used the institution as the unit of analysis.
For the UMass case, the institution itself is the ultimate unit of analysis; however the case
will also focus on the macro- and micro-levels of the organizational field and individual
actors as a way to fully explore how each of these levels influenced the process and specific
outcome of the restructuring.
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The Mission(s) of Higher Education
The sections above bring together the concepts of organizational field theory with the
phenomenon of restructuring in institutions of higher education. Field theory suggests that
when events such as a restructuring or merger take place at a university, they are not
completed in isolation. The institution’s participation in one or more organizational fields
has an influence on the reasons the institution is choosing to restructure and also on the
outcomes of the process. It stands to reason that when university leaders undertake a largescale restructuring, they may also cause a shift in institutional goals, priorities, and mission.
As Gumport (2001) stated, “Within public research universities in particular, academic
restructuring entails a potential reshaping of institutional purposes” (p. 250). A university’s
mission is important to its existence. It provides a way for institutions “to make explicit their
aims and to signal how they are distinctive and different from other universities” (Allan,
2007, p. 56).
Institutions develop university missions and mission statements in relation to their
position within the organizational field. Shifts in institutional logics that can occur with a
restructuring may indicate corresponding shifts in the mission of an individual university.
Because of the recursive nature of change in individual organizations within fields, such
shifts in mission at the organizational level may also lead to shifts within the field itself, as
some scholars have suggested (Kerr, 1994; Scott, J., 2006; Marginson, 2011).
This section discusses the development of the university mission throughout history,
using J. Scott’s (2006) interpretation of the six missions of universities. It goes on to explore
the ways mission development is connected to the organizational field. Finally, the section
closes with a discussion of the ways the university mission may be changing and how change
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might be influenced by globalization (Kerr, 1994; Scott, J., 2006; Marginson, 2011),
privatization (Travis, 2013), or perhaps, as I expect to explore in this study, by shifts in the
political context of the organizational field.
Development of Mission
J. Scott (2006) investigated the development of university missions from medieval
times through the present day and categorized six missions that exist in higher education. He
described the process by which universities devised their mission and purpose in response to
specific societal needs and contexts. These six missions “are often coexisting, interlocking,
or contradictory in nature” (Scott, J., 2006, p. 4). University missions are not static; rather
they are adjusted to mirror changes in society as well as organizational fields, shifts in the
philosophy of education, and policies that affect them. J. Scott’s (2006) framework refers
specifically to university missions and therefore fits particularly well with this study.
Research and Teaching
The earliest identified missions are research (both pure and applied) and teaching.
Both of these missions pre-date the creation of modern nation-states and the ideal of
academic freedom appeared alongside them. These two missions have often coexisted and
their relative weight has changed over time. Currently, the research mission appears to be
more prominent than teaching (Scott J., 2006).
Service to Nation
Once nations were established, service to nation became a prominent mission in
Europe and still exists in nationally-established universities throughout the world (Scott J.,
2006). There are some difficulties inherent in this mission, particularly in totalitarian states
where the service to nation mission can be used to make rapid changes to society as
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universities are exploited as engines of propaganda (Scott J., 2006). This mission also relates
to a nation’s efforts to train civil service employees. In the United States, the service to
nation mission was largely absent because there is no national system of higher education
(Scott J., 2006). However, I would argue that this mission has surfaced in the last two
decades as states call upon higher education institutions to serve as a driver of their
economies.
Democratization
The democratization mission is one of two distinctly American-created missions. At
its core are the principles of individualism and self-government. This mission emphasizes
the benefits of education to all citizens. Democratization provided one of the earliest signals
for open access to higher education (Scott J., 2006).
Public Service
The public service mission arose out of the Morrill Land Grant Act. Its intent is to
provide knowledge and information that could benefit the lives of all citizens (Scott J., 2006).
The establishment of university extension services was an embodiment of this mission.
Internationalization
The sixth mission described by J. Scott (2006) is internationalization, which
incorporates the teaching, research, and public service missions into the global arena. The
increasing ease with which knowledge and information can be shared globally is noted as the
main cause of the development of this mission. From this perspective, knowledge is the most
important resource in the post-industrial era (Scott, J., 2006). The potential implications of
this sixth (and future) mission will be discussed more fully in a subsequent section.
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Connecting Mission to Field
As J. Scott’s (2006) exploration of mission suggests, university missions have
changed over time to accommodate changes in what society needs and expects from them.
His research not only makes a case for a strong connection between mission development
and societal conditions, but it also assumes a connection between university mission and
organizational fields. The fact that there are only six missions in J. Scott’s (2006) scheme
(several of which overlap within individual universities), paired with the knowledge that
universities exist and interrelate within organizational fields, implies that there is field
influence in the development of mission.
Societal conditions and organizational field shifts can – and do – affect mission. In J.
Scott’s (2006) examination, mission can be considered as “Mission” (with a capital “M”).
However, there may also be smaller shifts in mission (lowercase “m”) that occur over time
and that lead to these greater shifts in “Mission” that J. Scott (2006) and others (Kerr, 1994;
Marginson, 2011; Travis, 2013) have investigated. Phenomena such as organizational
restructuring can affect the ways that “mission” shifts on a single campus. When looked at
from the vantage point of the organizational field, these small shifts in individual mission
may begin to add up to a larger shift in “Mission” that affect the whole field. This macrofocus on a shifting “Mission” for universities is outside the scope of this research; however,
this individual case study can contribute to future research in this area.
The Future of Mission in Higher Education
Several contemporary scholars have noted a shift in the mission of higher education
over time (Kerr, 1994; Marginson, 2011; Scott J. , 2006; Travis, 2013). Kerr (1994) and
Allan (2007) each connected shifts in mission and purpose to the democratization of higher
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education, and more specifically to expanded access to higher education that took place after
World War II and the increasing diversity of the student body in more recent times. Some
scholars have pointed to a trend towards privatization and the use of corporate tactics as
influencing changes in higher education (Allan, 2007; Travis, 2013), while others have
expressed the view that the societal shift towards globalization and greater access to
knowledge is changing the mission of higher education (Kerr, 1994; Marginson, 2011; Scott
J. , 2006).
Privatization
Several scholars have called attention to the influx of corporate ideas and strategies
into universities and higher education (see for example: Allan, 2007; Slaugher & Rhoades,
2009; Travis, 2013). As it pertains to mission and mission statements, Allan (2007)
emphasized the increase in business language and tactics that have entered the field of higher
education, particularly in the United Kingdom. She discussed the effects of this: “Many
academics have commented on how the language of business and management has been
imported into the sector, as the internal structure and organisation of universities have moved
towards a business model” (Allan, 2007, p. 55).
In the U.S., Travis reviewed several reports of privatization in universities and made
the argument that public and political sentiments appear to have shifted away from
government spending on education. He argued that the democratization mission is
disappearing because universities must rely more on private revenue generation as state
funding shrinks, and therefore their ability to provide access to those students from lower
income brackets has been diminished (Travis, 2013). As universities continue down this path
of privatization, it will become more and more difficult to expect states to reverse the trend
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and increase their support of higher education (Travis, 2013). In terms of organizational
fields, privatization in higher education may be explained by the influence of one
organizational field – for-profit corporations – on another – research universities, perhaps
through the mechanism of state legislatures or trustees’ oversight.
Internationalization
J. Scott (2006), Kerr (1990; 2001) and Marginson (2011) each have identified
internationalization as an emerging mission of universities. Internationalization as a mission
encompasses the teaching, research and nationalization or public service missions, but also
includes service to nation-states as a global body (Scott J., 2006). Evidence of this new
mission can be seen through:
A new emphasis on international or multicultural curricula—a global education
mission—and on increasing foreign student populations, international exchange of
students and faculty members, and research collaborations between institutions in
different nations. (Scott J., 2006, p. 32)
J. Scott (2006) warned readers of two likely detrimental effects of the
internationalization mission: 1) internationalization may come at the expense of losing other
cultures, and 2) there may be an impulse on the part of science and technology firms to
commercialize information through intellectual property rights. He also argued that this
scenario could lead to privatization of information, thereby undermining public support to
universities (Scott, J., 2006). Kerr (1990) talks the ways that knowledge has become
international because it is shared and it is not easy to control this flow of knowledge and
information. He shares J. Scott’s (2006) concerns about the efforts to control access to
information (Kerr, 1990).
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Whereas J. Scott (2006) and Kerr (1990; 2001) cautioned readers about the negative
aspects of internationalization, Marginson (2011) presented more a positive view.
Marginson (2011) described internationalization as “the antidote to status competition, one
that creates space for the global public good to evolve” and “which lends itself to open,
democratic collaborative forms and gives authority to knowledge from anywhere” (p. 430).
Service to State
From my own experience working and studying in the research university field, it has
appeared that another new mission is emerging – or more accurately, an Americanized
version of the European mission that J. Scott (2006) identified as “service to nation.”
However, because of our unique system of higher education, this mission might be translated
as “service to state.” An increase in public accountability for research universities (and most
public institutions of higher education) and the expectation that colleges and universities will
provide their students with marketable job skills are two aspects of this (Zumeta, 2004).
After reviewing the contemporary cases of restructuring, I realized that the motivation I
classified as “education as economic driver” appeared in each of the public university cases.
For each of these institutions, there was an expectation that the university itself should be an
active participant in revitalizing the regional or state economy – either through research or by
preparing students for careers in a specific sector with a great need for employees. Although
the purpose of my research in this study is not to demonstrate the existence of this new
mission within the field, it has appeared as one of the motivating factors for the case of
restructuring at UMass Amherst. Further, it provides a potential avenue for future research.
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Conceptual Framework
The reasons organizational decision-makers give for proposing restructuring or other
planning initiatives on their campuses are often in response to changes in their external
conditions; for example, a state legislature may impose budget cuts in the wake of an
economic crisis, or they may align funding with a specific set of institutional outcomes. In
the UMass Amherst case, Chancellor Holub stated that he had to make changes to respond to
the Commonwealth’s economic crisis (Holub R. C., Chancellor's Message to Campus,
2009a) but he also stated in a meeting of chairs and directors from the College of Social and
Behavioral Sciences that he had to respond to instructions from the University’s Board of
Trustees.
As described earlier in this chapter, universities are not reacting only to external
conditions, but they are also influenced by the organization fields to which they belong.
Organizational theorists have proposed that an organization’s leaders act in ways that fit their
position within a field, and this is particularly true if that field is long-established and stable,
such as higher education (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Within fields, incumbent
organizations establish behavioral norms, which are typically replicated by other actors
within the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein & McAdam, 2012). Because
organizations strive to maintain their field position, often while competing for a better one,
decision-makers at these institutions may not be completely free to try experimental
strategies to solve problems during times of stress or change. If these institutions were to
make a sudden and untested move to solve a problem, it may cause them to lose legitimacy
and therefore slip in the rankings. When institutions do wish to make changes in response to
political or economic conditions, decision-makers often look to their peers for strategies that
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have already been attempted. As a result, the strategic plans and mission statements of
research universities look remarkably similar (Allan, 2007). A cursory review of the
language in a handful of planning documents at research universities over the past five years
demonstrates this similarity (e.g., Council of Presidents & Arizona Board of Regents, 2010;
Northeastern University News Office, 2009; Ohio University, 2010; Toro, 2013; University
of Northern Iowa, 2010).
External conditions motivate organizations to consider changes to their structure and
practices. At the same time, universities exist within organizational fields that have influence
over the ways they are able to make such changes. At the individual actor level, institutional
position and organizational field position have an effect on organizational decision-making.
Plans made by individual university administrators do not merely reflect conditions on a
specific campus; they are influenced by each of the spheres that surrounds it (see Fig. 1).
Movement in any of the spheres may lead to corresponding movement within another.
However, the “pull” of the larger spheres is greater. During a restructuring, these various
influences shape the final outcome. When an institution restructures, its priorities and
institutional logics can change; this may also mean a shift in mission. I plan to explore the
interplay of these various influences in the case of restructuring at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst.
Research Questions
Through this research I have sought to answer the following questions: How was the
restructuring at UMass Amherst influenced by its position in and interaction with specific
organizational fields? How did individual actors influence the restructuring and in what
ways might their roles have been influenced by their position on campus and the University’s
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position within the organizational fields? In what ways did the restructuring indicate a
possible shift in mission/priorities at UMass Amherst?

There is influence from one
sphere to the next. What is
happening in the broader
environment has an influence on
the field, which influences the
organization and then the
individual. However, there is
reflexive influence among
spheres. They have the ability to
shape each other; shifts in one
sphere affect the others.
Organizational mission is
influenced by the field and the
broader environment, and
perhaps as organizational
missions shift, so does the field.

Environment

Organizational
Field(s)

Organization/
Mission

Individuals &
Groups

There can be movement along this continuum; as one sphere moves, it influences movement
in the others.
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework Model
Conclusion
This chapter provided an introduction to the study of organizational fields, and the
ways universities participate in them. I explored the various environmental conditions such
as politics and the economy that influence what happens in higher education and how these
influences can lead universities to consider restructuring. From there I investigated empirical
studies of university merger and restructuring, including two studies that considered the
influence of organizational fields. Because restructuring can have an effect on institutional
goals, priorities, and mission, the chapter then turned to a discussion of university mission
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and possible future directions. Finally, I concluded with the conceptual framework and
research questions for this study of a single case of restructuring at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst.
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CHAPTER 3
DESIGN AND METHOD
Introduction
As noted in Chapter Two, previous studies on restructuring and merger in higher
education focused on the rationales for merger, implications for leadership and organizational
culture, and the factors that made restructurings successful or not successful (e.g., Carvalho
& Santiago, 2010; Gumport & Pusser, 1999; Harman & Harman, 2003). Most of these
researchers chose the institution as their unit of analysis (Harman & Roberston-Cuninghame,
1995), whereas others focused on individual decision-makers (Carvalho & Santiago, 2010)
and three studies discussed the influence of the organizational field in higher education (Brint
& Karabel, 1991; Zajac & Kraatz, 1993; Barrier & Musselin, 2016). What is missing from
this body of literature, however, is a study that uses a single case to focus on the interplay of
three levels of actors – the organizational field, the institution, and groups and individual
actors within the institution – as it relates to university restructuring and mission. The
purpose of this research was to use a retrospective, descriptive case study (Yin, 2003b; Street
& Ward, 2010) to examine the influence of organizational fields on individual actors and
institutions during a restructuring and the effects that restructuring under these conditions
may have had on institutional mission.
In this chapter, I present the research design and method, followed by a description of
data collection and analysis. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the study’s
trustworthiness and limitations.
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A Retrospective, Descriptive Case Study
In order to explore the study’s research questions, I used a retrospective, descriptive
case study to reconstruct the episode of restructuring at the University of Massachusetts
Amherst. Both Stake (1995) and Yin (2003b) emphasized the strength of using case studies
to explore a specific phenomenon within its context. In this study, organizational fields are
part of the context within which universities experience the phenomena of restructuring and
potential mission shift. Further, the use of a case study design was appropriate in this
instance because it allowed this researcher to examine process-oriented questions that ask
“how?” and it allowed me to focus on a specific set of circumstances that occurred in the past
and therefore could not be controlled (Yin, 2003b). Another reason to adopt a case study
design was to investigate what was distinct about this specific set of circumstances, while
exploring the commonalities of the case with other cases. By exploring this restructuring at
UMass Amherst my goal was to contribute to the literature on university restructuring and
mission shift and demonstrate the influence of organizational fields.
Thomas (2011) stated that a case study is a design frame and not a specific method.
Case study utilizes multiple methods as a way of explaining a situation or event. He further
asserted that case studies should be comprised of two parts: 1) clear boundaries for the event
or phenomenon, and 2) an analytical or theoretical frame. For this study I have carefully
considered both of these components. The boundaries of the case are explained in a later
section and the theoretical framework was designed to combine organizational field theory
with mission.
The label “retrospective” describes this case study design because the process I
investigated had already transpired at the time I began the research and the results of the

62

restructuring process were already known. Street and Ward (2010) described retrospective
case studies in this way:
All retrospective case studies have three factors in common: (1) data are collected
after the significant events have already occurred, (2) researchers have access to both
first-person accounts and archival data, and (3) the final outcomes—which were
presumably influenced by the variables and processes under study—are already
known when data collection takes place. (p. 824)
I was fortunate to have access to several of the relevant actors in this case as well as
public documents and other data. Retrospective case studies that are based on a set of
circumstances within a single organization can offer unique insights into specific phenomena
(Street & Ward, 2010).
Yin (2003b) described three purposes that case studies might fulfill: “exploratory,
descriptive, or explanatory” (p. 3). An exploratory case is a pilot study in which the
researcher is exploring an issue in a general way in order to determine the lines of
questioning to follow in future research (Yin, 2003a). An explanatory case study attempts to
show causation within a specific set of circumstances. The UMass Amherst case study can
be categorized as descriptive because it used theory to frame the way the case was
investigated (Yin, 2003a; Yin, 2003b). The discussion of organizational field theory in
Chapter Two classified the theory as “explicative” rather than “predictive” (Davis &
Marquis, 2005). The term “explicative” as it used in this sense is more closely aligned to
Yin’s definition of “descriptive,” meaning that the purpose of the study is to understand the
circumstances, rather than to predict what might happen or to show causation.
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For this study, I have drawn on organizational field theory to provide the structure
and focus for collection and interpretation of data. I intentionally selected this design to
highlight the ways the restructuring and subsequent shifts in mission at UMass Amherst were
influenced by the University’s association with various organizational fields, that included
considering groups and actors within the UMass field itself. These details were likely not
recognized by those who were involved in the restructuring process.
Research Design
This study focused on one case of restructuring that took place at a single institution.
The purpose of the research was to demonstrate connections between the university and at
least two of the organizational fields to which it belongs (these fields are “research
universities” and “Massachusetts public higher education”). Further, through this process, I
have considered the University’s position in these fields and how these positions might have
influenced the specific strategies and outcomes associated with the restructuring. A related
line of inquiry explored the ways in which individual actors’ roles on campus, along with the
University’s position in these fields, may have influenced the decision-making process. I
have also considered the University of Massachusetts itself as a field in which individuals
and groups acted in specific ways. Finally, I explored the ways the restructuring process may
have influenced or shifted the goals, priorities, and the mission of the University.
Unit of Analysis
The primary unit of analysis for this case is the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
Because the purpose of the research was to examine the effects of organizational fields on an
institutional restructuring and then on the mission of that institution, the focus of the study
was the University of Massachusetts Amherst. At the same time, however, the study
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investigated the role of individual decision-makers in the restructuring process and
considered the organizational fields to which the University belongs. Each of these
actors/units played an important role in the study but ultimately, the research focus was
specifically on how the interactions affected the University and its mission.
Selection of the Case
Stake (1995) suggested that the first condition a researcher should satisfy in selecting
a case to study is to find one that will “maximize what we can learn” (p. 4). One way to do
this is to select a location that is “easy to get to and hospitable to our inquiry” (Stake, 1995,
p. 4), or as Thomas (2011) described it – “a local knowledge case” (p. 514). Because I was a
professional staff member at the University of Massachusetts Amherst during the time of the
restructuring, I had access to relevant documents as well as individuals who were central to
the situation. Also, because UMass Amherst is a public research university, many of the
relevant documents were public and therefore easy to retrieve.
Site
The University of Massachusetts Amherst is a land grant institution located in the
suburban town of Amherst, Massachusetts. It is a large, public research institution which the
Carnegie Foundation classifies as “comprehensive doctoral” with “very high research
activity” (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2013). More than one
thousand full-time faculty members teach the more than twenty thousand undergraduates and
six thousand graduate students who are enrolled at the campus (University of Massachusetts
Amherst, 2017). Like many public universities, UMass Amherst has seen a decline in its
state appropriations over the last twenty years and in response, the administration has begun
implementing various strategies to raise new revenues. Increased fundraising from alumni
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and other likely sources, efforts to attract out-of-state students, investing in the parts of
campus that bring in corporate and government research dollars, and becoming a competitor
in the online education market were just a few of these strategies at the time of this case.
Students and faculty at UMass have a reputation as activists. At least five labor
unions were active on campus at all times. Anecdotal evidence suggested that the influence
of the faculty senate as a policy making body had declined in recent years and the faculty
union filled some of the void. Based on the results of a pilot study conducted in the fall of
2012, some faculty believed that the Holub administration had grown increasingly less
transparent and less likely to seek input in decision-making (Brousseau-Pereira, 2012). The
University’s board of trustees played an important governance role because of its ability to
authorize increases in student fees, which had been much sought after as a way of making up
for decreases in state appropriations. Finally, the state legislature often seemed less than
supportive of the University during this time (Weerts, 2008).
Fields
The University of Massachusetts Amherst is linked to several fields. For the purposes
of this study, the fields explored were identified as “research universities” and “MA public
higher education.” While there is some overlap among these fields, there are also
differences. The “research universities” field consists of public and private research
universities (using the Carnegie classification of a research university) as well as various
accreditation organizations, organizations that rank research universities such as the Center
for Measuring University Performance, media outlets such as the Chronicle of Higher
Education and Inside Higher Ed, a variety of membership organizations such as the
Association of American Universities (AAU) and the American Association of Colleges and
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Universities (AACU) and more specialized organizations such as the National Academic
Advising Association (NACADA) or the Council for Advancement and Support of
Education (CASE), non-profit and for-profit companies that sell products and services
specific to higher education, federal government agencies that sponsor research such as the
National Science Foundation, and more. The field identified as “MA public higher
education” would contain many of the organizations and agencies detailed above (excluding
research universities outside of the state of Massachusetts) and would also include all public
institutions of higher education in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the state legislature,
the Massachusetts Board of Higher Education, the University of Massachusetts Board of
Trustees, and others.
I decided to designate these two fields as fields of interest for this research after
conducting a pilot study in the fall of 2012 that centered on a piece of the restructuring
process (Brousseau-Pereira, 2012). Based on the findings of that study, these fields appeared
to have had the most influence on decisions made by UMass Amherst officials, particularly
in relation to the academic restructuring that constitutes the subject of this case. UMass
Amherst itself was also considered as a field for this study, with a variety of actors and
groups having influenced the outcome of the restructuring process.
Boundaries of the Study
Yin (2003b) and Thomas (2011) explained that it is possible to design case studies to
examine various types of events, including decision-making processes. They recommended
that researchers use caution in delineating the boundaries of a case because it may be difficult
to clearly identify a beginning or ending (Thomas, 2011; Yin, 2003b). Yin (2003b) proposed
three guidelines for determining the “completeness” of the case:
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1. “The complete case is one in which the boundaries of the case – that is the
distinction between the phenomenon being studied and its context – are given
explicit attention” (p. 162). The researcher can do this by demonstrating that he
or she has reached the “analytic periphery” of the case and further investigation is
less relevant to the study.
2. “The complete case study should demonstrate convincingly that the investigator
expended exhaustive effort in collecting relevant evidence. This does not mean
that the investigator should literally collect all available evidence – an impossible
task – but that the critical pieces have been given ‘complete’ attention” (p. 163).
3. Researchers should be sure to design a case study that they will be able to
complete in the time they have allotted (Yin, 2003b).
For the purposes of this study, the “case” is the decision-making process that took
place at the University of Massachusetts Amherst beginning with Chancellor Holub’s arrival
at UMass in August of 2008 through the July of 2011 when Chancellor Holub officially
announced his intention to step down from his position at the end of the following academic
year. Setting these specific boundaries allowed me to meet the first of Yin’s (2003b) criteria
outlined above. To ensure that I had examined all of the relevant data sources, thereby
fulfilling the second criteria, I reviewed more than 200 documents related to the case (and
outlined in Appendix II) and also interviewed thirteen decision-makers who were closely
involved in the restructuring process. I asked each of the participants to share any additional
documents to which they had access and also to recommend other stakeholders for inclusion
in the study. Finally, as a way of addressing the final concern above, I allotted sufficient
time to complete the data collection and analysis.
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Case Study Protocol
In order to develop the case study, data must be collected that fit the case study
protocol. “The protocol is a major way of increasing the reliability of case study research and
is intended to guide the investigator in carrying out the data collection from a single-case
study” (Yin, 2003b, p. 67).
The design of this research had three phases. The first step was to reconstruct the
restructuring process that took place at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. Chapter
Four provides the details of the case, including how it is integrated with the broader
economic and political contexts, and organizational fields. I reviewed close to two hundred
documents; including email messages, committee reports, news media reports, and surveys to
assemble the basic facts of the case. Appendix B provides a list of the data sources used to
compile the case, organized chronologically. This review of documents not only allowed me
to recreate the basics of what happened during the restructuring process but it also informed
the design of the interview protocol used for the second phase of data collection, which will
involved interviewing thirteen individuals who were part of the restructuring process. The
data collection phase was intended to be iterative and therefore the third phase included a
review of additional texts along with a deep reading of some of the more important
documents that were identified during the first two phases of data collection.
Data Sources and Collection
Stake (1995) reminded researchers that data collection ought to be guided by the
research questions they have set out for their studies. Yin (2003a) suggested that scholars
utilize two levels of questioning: the first are questions that guide the data collection and help
set the boundaries of the case, and the second are more specific questions that serve as the
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basis for interview protocols and document analysis. I used this guidance to formulate the
plan for data collection.
Documents
I have compiled a catalog of the various documents I used as evidence for this case
study (see Appendix B). Throughout most of the restructuring process, and particularly at
the beginning, the Chancellor sent detailed email messages to the campus regarding his plans
and the progress of the task force that was examining the proposal. Each of these messages
is public and available. Several committees explored aspects of the restructuring proposal
and they documented their process with meeting minutes and reports. These reports are
public and I was able to gain access to the majority of the meeting minutes from participants
on these committees. The Faculty Senate also has a public collection of minutes, memoranda
and reports, which I was able to access for this research. At the time the restructuring was
proposed and during the decision-making process, the student-run newspaper, The Daily
Collegian, both of the local newspapers, The Daily Hampshire Gazette and The Springfield
Republican, as well as The Boston Globe published stories related to the process. These,
along with regular reports from the UMass Office of News and Media Relations, were
helpful in reconstructing the case. Finally, I located minutes from meetings of the Board of
Trustees, as well as the University of Massachusetts Annual Report of Indicators. Both of
these sources were useful in providing context for the case. Through interviews I was also
able to gain access to a few more documents, primarily regarding the Provostial Committee
process.
There were several sources of data that were used to supplement those detailed above.
During the restructuring process, both the faculty union and the faculty senate conducted

70

surveys to gauge the support of faculty for the proposal. I analyzed the results of both of
these to provide evidence of faculty sentiment and influence in the case. I skimmed other
documents, such as the bylaws of the faculty senate and the processes for on-campus mergers
to understand details of the case study.
Reconstructed Observation
As an employee of the University of Massachusetts Amherst during the time of the
restructuring, I developed my own understanding of the events. Additionally, I kept notes
from various meetings in which I took part. In some instances, I had already analyzed and
reconstructed certain meetings and events for other pieces of research. To do this, I carefully
considered the various perspectives of the actors involved, the meanings individuals attached
to the processes, and the ways in which topics were discussed – including what was omitted
from the conversation (Charmaz, 2006). As I worked on this project, I endeavored to be
thorough in reconstructing meetings and events – using notes and memory as well as getting
corroboration of these views from the original participants. These reconstructed observations
were useful in rebuilding parts of the restructuring process that I was able to witness
firsthand.
Individual Interviews
I conducted interviews with thirteen campus decision-makers who were involved in
the process that shaped and informed the restructuring. This selection represents a
“purposeful sample” of individuals who had important information about the process and
how it unfolded (Patton, 1990). Appendix C provides a list of individuals who were
interviewed, some have allowed me to use their names, others have not. In cases where they
do not want their names used, they are referred to by category of actor. Not all of the
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individuals on this list were in favor of the reorganization. Through these multiple
interviews, I looked for evidence that was common across participants and also sought out
contradictions across the narratives (Seidman, 2006). In the end, I was able to build a sample
that represents the various stakeholder groups involved in the restructuring process, including
some from the upper administration, including former Chancellor Holub. Three of the deans
from the colleges that were involved in the merger process were interviewed as were
representatives from the faculty senate and the faculty union. At least two department chairs
who were involved in various negotiations were part of this sample. I was not, however,
successful in reaching members of the University’s Board of Trustees.
Interviewing Elites
Most of these interview participants are considered “elites” and at times it was
challenging to schedule ninety-minute interviews with them (Rubin & Rubin, 2005).
Seidman (2006) cautioned researchers about the difficulties of interviewing elites; because of
their position of power, they may try to take over the interview or may be uncomfortable if
someone in a position of lesser power is trying to lead a conversation. I did not find this to
be the case. I believe that I was able to respect their positions but also hold them
accountable for providing an accurate portrayal of their experiences in the restructuring
process (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). Some participants were more easily scheduled than
others but most of the interviews took place over the summer of 2015 and summer is often a
time when academics have more availability. I began by interviewing participants with
whom I had an established relationship so that I could ask them to make an introduction to
the next potential participant if necessary. Overall, most participants were willing to meet
with me without an introduction from a peer. I am even optimistic that many of the
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participants found the interview experience to be rewarding and some appeared to appreciate
being able to tell their version of the story.
Interview Consent and Protocol
The interview consent document along with a protocol can be found in Appendices D
and E. The protocol was used to guide each of the conversations but I did not follow it
dogmatically as some avenues of questioning were richer with one participant or another.
Because this is a retrospective case and much of the documentation I analyzed was publicly
available, I asked participants if they would be willing to use their own identity for this case
study or if they preferred to be referred to in another way. For the interview protocol, I
developed several categories of participation and offered these to interviewees: 1)
descriptive title, 2) specific category of actor, or 3) anonymity. The consent form explained
that it would be difficult to guarantee anonymity in the final account because of the
circumstances of the case.
Each interview was approximately 90 minutes in length and each participant
permitted the interviews to be recorded. As mentioned above, the interviews were semistructured and the interview protocol in Appendix D served as a guide (Yin, 2011). Prior to
each interview, I sent participants a timeline of reconstructed events of the case to help them
recall a situation that had begun several years ago. Participants found this timeline useful
during our discussions. Most interviews began with a conversation about the participant’s
history and current role at UMass Amherst. After this, we began to reconstruct their
participation in the restructuring process and to discuss interpretations of the situation. In
some interviews, participants spoke about the ways they keep up with developments in
higher education. At times the conversations focused on the various rationales for
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restructuring, the ways the case might have been related to plans at other institutions, the role
of the state legislature or the Board of Trustees in influencing the situation, and myriad other
things which are discussed in Chapter Five. With each participant, I asked about their
impressions of the mission and purpose of higher education in general and for the University
of Massachusetts in particular. Conversations also focused perceptions of a shift in mission
or priorities at UMass Amherst during the time of the restructuring.
Role of the Interviewer
As someone who experienced parts of the restructuring process, I have my own bias
regarding what took place and its implications. This insider status might have been
beneficial for some interviews as participants might have been more comfortable talking with
me about this event. I did not sense that my status made interviews more difficult, although
there was tension on a few occasions. I had anticipated that some of the Chancellor’s former
leadership team might have been more guarded in speaking with me because they knew I had
worked in one of the colleges where most faculty and staff were opposed to merger but this
did not seem to be the case (Yin, 2011).
Another possible problem related to insider status is the dilemma of taking too much
for granted when interviewing people with whom a researcher shares common experiences.
Insider status may unintentionally lead to the misrepresentation of a community or culture
because it can be difficult to publicly admit to negative aspects of one’s own culture
(Dominguez, 2000). My goal in each interview was to be an active listener and to allow
participants to tell their stories without judging their motives or assuming that I understood
their perspective before they had a chance to provide their view of the events that took place.
I strove to ask clarifying questions and to probe more when I felt I was getting too
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comfortable. More strategies for minimizing bias and attending to accurate data collection
and analysis will be explored in a later section (Role of the Researcher).
Data Coding, Analysis, and Interpretation
This study included several types of data: interviews, committee documents and
reports, electronic messages, meeting minutes, survey results, observations and various
institutional documents. Each data source was carefully examined and document review
began before the interview process, although the process was iterative. This allowed me to
reconstruct the case using the conceptual framework for this study and also to craft a timeline
of the decision-making process to use during interviews.
Case level questions

•
•
•

Questions to guide the
review of texts and
interviews

•
•
•
•
•

How was the restructuring at UMass Amherst influenced
by its position in and interaction with specific
organizational fields?
What roles did individual actors have in shaping the
restructuring and how were they related to organizational
fields?
In what ways did the restructuring indicate a possible
shift in mission/priorities at UMass Amherst?
What motivated the restructuring?
Is there evidence of connection to organizational field?
Is there language in documents/ interviews that is
common across other institutions?
How did the participant’s role in the restructuring process
influence the outcome?
Is there evidence of shifts in institutional logics through
the reorganization? What are the “code words” that tell us
what the mission should be?

Adapted from Yin (2003b).
Figure 2: Questions to Guide the Study
In analyzing the various data sources, I explored connections to the organizational
fields to which UMass Amherst belongs in order to discover how those connections had
potentially influenced the outcome of the decision-making process. I also sought proof of
any shift in the University’s goals, priorities, and mission during the time of the restructuring.
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Through interviews with individual decision-makers who led the restructuring efforts, I
explored the ways that field influences may have affected the decisions they made about the
restructuring and explored how these decisions may have changed institutional logics, and
therefore shifted the mission of the University.
The analysis was guided by questions about the ways the University and its mission
were affected by the restructuring process. Figure 2 divides the guiding questions into two
levels: case level questions are overarching inquiries that guided the overall research design,
and the second level of questions provided a more specific way to analyze the data (Yin,
2003b).
Analyzing the various documents required time and attention. I used the documents
catalogued in Appendix B as primary sources and also for corroborating the interview data. I
examined the content as well as the structure of many of the documents and utilized the
series of questions presented by Charmaz (2006, pp. 39-40) and reproduced in Appendix F to
gain a deeper understanding of the purpose and importance of the primary texts. In order to
analyze the interviews, I gained permission from participants to create a digital recording,
which was transcribed soon after the completion of each interview. I shared the transcribed
text of each interview with its participant and asked for clarifications and feedback, which
many of the individuals provided. I completed a preliminary analysis of each interview
transcript as a way of informing future interviews. For both the documents and the interview
transcripts, I utlized the constant comparison method outlined by Thomas (2013) to review,
code, and develop preliminary constructs from the data. These first level constructs were
further refined by a second and third review of the data until there was enough evidence to
identify reliable themes (Thomas, 2013). Appendix G offers a list of codes and themes.
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Role of the Researcher
During the restructuring process at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, I was a
professional staff member in the Dean’s Office in the College of Social and Behavioral
Sciences and I also served on one of the committees that was asked to consider the merger of
the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences and the College of Humanities and Fine Arts.
Because of my role, I was able to closely observe parts the reorganization and also to collect
data in the form of notes from observing meetings, official meeting minutes, committee
reports, memoranda from various faculty to the Chancellor and the Faculty Senate, and each
of the email messages sent out to the campus by the Chancellor. My proximity to this case
can be viewed as both a strength and a limitation.
Using recommendations from Reinharz (1997), I reflected on the different roles I
might have brought to the interviews I conducted. During each interview, I disclosed my
relationship to the case and discussed strategies for minimizing bias. I focused on being an
active listener during these conversations and asked for clarification of statements rather than
assuming shared meanings for the same set of circumstances. In most cases I asked
interview participants to reflect on their experience of the interview to ensure that they felt
heard. I also sent them transcripts of the interview to allow them to check for
misunderstandings or misinterpretations. Utilizing the constant comparative method of data
analysis, which looks for themes and constructs that are reinforced throughout the entirety of
the data, allowed for consistency in the findings (Thomas, 2013). Each of these steps was
planned to minimize the effect of potential bias on the data collection and analysis.
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Trustworthiness
Lincoln and Guba (1985) advised researchers to establish the reliability of their
research by ensuring that participants will recognize it as a true representation of their reality.
As stated above, I shared individual transcripts with each participant after completing and
transcribing interviews. To the extent feasible, I have offered to share the results of this
study with participants prior to publication (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). In this case, I am
confident that credibility was achieved by prolonged engagement, persistent observation,
trust building with participants and attending to any possible unintended distortions of
participants’ stories (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Triangulation of data was useful in guarding
against misrepresentations and was accomplished in a few ways (Rossman & Rallis, 2003).
First, interviewing thirteen people allowed me to verify consistency of themes and stories
across interviews. When participants offered diverging views in their narratives of the
process, it provided an opportunity to consider the negative case and further check my
assumptions (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Finally, because of the wide number of primary
source documents for this case, it was relatively easy to verify participants’ historical
reconstruction of events, as these were not entirely reliable.
Limitations
Because this study provided an in-depth look at one case at one university, the
specific results are not transferable to another setting. However, the results may be used as a
means of illustrating how a variety of contemporary issues discussed in higher education
today are emerging on one particular campus. Because this situation occurred in the past and
I did not take notes at every stage and opportunity, it is possible that my recollections of what
happened are not entirely accurate and the same limitation held true for interview
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participants; I asked them to revisit an event that began at least seven years prior to our
conversations.
Conclusion
This study presented an opportunity to focus on a single case of university
restructuring and to investigate how this event may have shifted the goals, priorities and
mission of that university. The research design incorporated and explored the interplay of
three levels of actors – the organizational field, the institution, and campus-level groups and
individual actors – as this related to university restructuring and mission. By investigating
this one case deeply and focusing on the ways the macro-influences of the organizational
fields and micro-influences of groups and individual decision-makers were able to influence
the outcome of the reorganization, this study adds to the knowledge on how university
leaders make decisions about change on their campuses. Also, this study may lead to further
exploration of the ways in which restructuring and other campus-based strategies may
influence the organizational fields and the mission of the university.

79

CHAPTER 4
A CASE OF RESTRUCTURING AT UMASS AMHERST
Introduction
In this chapter I have presented a chronological narrative of the case under study,
beginning with Chancellor Robert C. Holub’s arrival on campus in the summer of 2008
and continuing through the spring semester of 2011, when it became evident that further
plans to restructure the academic side of campus would be put on hold indefinitely. An
archive of historical documents (presented in Appendix B) provided the basis for this
account; this archive also provided documents for analysis in this study and it includes
for example, campus-wide email messages sent from the Chancellor’s Office; news
reports from the UMass News Office, The Massachusetts Daily Collegian (the UMass
student-run newspaper), and other news outlets; and minutes and reports from the UMass
Faculty Senate, as well as several task forces and committees convened throughout the
process. I chose to include this account as its own chapter to provide the reader with
context for the upcoming analysis and discussion sections. Exploring the case in rich
detail allowed me to call attention to the variety of actors in the case as well as the
interconnectedness of the three spheres of influence that are present: field, organization,
and groups/individuals.
I began drafting this chapter prior to interviewing participants. After completing
the interviews and starting the analysis of both interview transcripts and other source
documents, I returned to Chapter Four to continue writing it. The work I had done in the
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interim allowed me to bring a more nuanced perspective to the chapter – in part utilizing
the perspectives of the participants to highlight specific events.
A New Chancellor Arrives
On August 1, 2008, Chancellor Robert C. Holub arrived at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst. On behalf of the search committee that recommended Holub’s
nomination to the UMass Board of Trustees, UMass President Jack Wilson stated that
Holub was “a distinguished scholar, a proven administrator…” who was “driven by a
desire to make UMass Amherst one of the premiere public universities in the nation,”
(UMass News Office Report May 1, 2008). Chancellor Holub’s academic career began
at the University of California, Berkeley where he was a full professor and scholar of
German. At Berkeley, Holub served as Chair of the German department and later for
three years as dean of undergraduate education within the College of Letters and Science.
Dean Holub left Berkeley for a the job of Provost at the University of Tennesee,
Knoxville, where he served for two years prior to coming to UMass Amherst as the
twenty-sixth Chancellor. The University of Tennessee, Knoxville is similar in size to
UMass Amherst, with an undergraduate population of approximately 20,000
undergraduates and 6,000 graduate students.
From the time he interviewed on campus and in most of his public addresses and
written pronouncements, Chancellor Holub proclaimed the following plan:
Perhaps my most important task as Chancellor will be to take UMass Amherst to
a higher level. [UMass] Amherst cannot be content excelling among publics in
New England. In my view, it should seek to compete with the best public
institutions across the country (UMass News Office, May 5, 2008).
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During his first public address at the annual Community Breakfast on August 28, 2008,
and also at the first University Convocation on September 12, 2008, he reiterated that
“the Amherst campus of the University of Massachusetts should be more than a regional
power; it should aspire to the upper echelon of national public universities” (UMass
News Office, September 12, 2008).
Chancellor Holub highlighted further ambitions at the fall Convocation of faculty,
where he stated:
To be a more effective administration, I believe that we should undertake a
number of modifications in our present central administration, either to emulate
best practices of the finest public research institutions in the country or to align
units for greater effectiveness (Office of News & Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, September 12, 2008).
In each of these statements, he acknowledged UMass Amherst’s participation in the
wider field of research universities. This continued throughout his time on campus.
He described eight areas of campus that he believed required improvement in
order to reach his goals, including: research, fundraising, communications,
administration, graduate education, undergraduate studies and general education,
facilities, and faculty hiring. (Office of News & Media Relations, UMass Amherst,
September 12, 2008). While the Chancellor’s remarks seemed to be foreshadowing the
restructuring proposal he announced several months later, at the Convocation, he was not
anticipating the challenging economic difficulties that lay ahead.
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Budget Woes
Over the last few weeks, there has been a great deal of focus on the global
economic crisis, and the effect it will have on all of us personally, and on the
university community as a whole. In times of crisis, there is much speculation and
misinformation. There is no shortage of concern, or even pessimism, and there
have been many viewpoints shared about how we as an institution will weather
this storm. (Chancellor Holub email to campus, October 23, 2008)
Shortly after the September Convocation address discussed above, Chancellor
Holub received word from the office of Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick that a
drop in state revenues would precipitate a mid-year budget cut to the campus.
Addressing the UMass Faculty Senate on the following day, the Chancellor announced
that despite the anticipated budget cut, his goal was to continue investing in faculty and
working to improve general education for undergraduates. He called on the faculty to
help solve the problem, stating: “Nothing is new at any university. How do good
universities deal with these issues?” (Office of News & Media Relations, September 23,
2008). In this statement, the Chancellor appeared to suggest that the answer to this state
higher education field crisis might be found by exploring strategies in the research
university field.
By mid-October of his first semester, Chancellor Holub learned that the governor
was planning a mid-year cut of $12 million. Despite the difficult budget forecast, the
Chancellor’s message continued be about striving for a better position among
institutional peers: “While it is clear we face difficult financial circumstances, we must
remain committed to making the strategic choices necessary to help UMass Amherst
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compete as one of our nation’s best public research universities” (Holub email to campus,
October 15, 2008). After the Governor’s announcement Chancellor Holub installed a
budget planning task force comprised of faculty, staff, and students and charged them
with investigating strategies that would increase revenues to campus. By December
2008, this group was meeting regularly to consider revenue-generating strategies that
were seen as best practices at other research universities.
Throughout the 2008 fall semester after learning about the Commonwealth’s cuts
to the campus budget and it became clear that the nation was in a serious economic crisis
that would affect state appropriations for a long time to come. Chancellor Holub
continued to talk about his plans to propel UMass Amherst forward. In an email message
to alumni on November 24, 2008, he stated, “Yes, these are difficult times, but even in
the face of such adversity, we remain committed to our core mission and to our goal of
becoming one of our nation's best public research universities.” Later in the same
message he declared, “This budget downturn gives us the opportunity, however, to
develop a long-range strategy that will align the assignment of faculty positions with
campus priorities…” (Holub email to campus, November 24, 2008).
Over the course of the next few years, the campus was threatened with significant
cuts to its state appropriation. Chancellor Holub sent regular updates to the UMass
community that provided updates on the budget situation. Early in the spring semester of
2009, the Chancellor shared the news that he was anticipating a $45 million cut in the
state’s appropriation to campus. This figure represented approximately ten percent of the
overall campus budget. Despite having faced significant budget cuts over several years,
this financial crisis was more severe than anything in recent memory. After several
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months of anxiety, the campus community learned that federal stimulus funds would
largely cover the lost appropriations but until that was clarified, faculty, staff and students
existed in a state of dread over the potential negative changes to the University. This
budget situation is an example of the influence of the MA public higher education field.
Restructuring
Within the economic and campus budget context described above, Chancellor
Holub began to talk about restructuring in various corners of campus. In an email to
faculty, staff, and students on December 16, 2008, the Chancellor described cuts he was
planning in the Offices of the Chancellor and Provost to help alleviate the budget cut the
state predicted. The email described the ways the Chancellor and Provost would merge
and share functions among their offices. Other money saving strategies outlined in that
message included: deferring maintenance and planned renovations, instituting energy
efficiency measures, and cutting expenses for travel, advocacy (lobbying), and events.
Chancellor Holub later explained that his goal in making cuts to the executive area was to
“protect the core mission of campus and keep the faculty strong” (Holub interview, June
29, 2015). When interviewed for this research, Chancellor Holub mentioned that his
restructuring efforts during this time also included reorganizing of the Student Affairs
units.
While Chancellor Holub enacted the budget cutting measures described above, he
also began conversations with the college deans, indicating that there would likely be
restructuring within the academic units. Email exchanges between the Chancellor and
the dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences (SBS) at that time provided
evidence of an informal meeting of Deans with the Chancellor in mid-December wherein
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they discussed potential restructuring of schools and colleges. It was clear that the
Chancellor anticipated some resistance to his proposals, particularly from faculty in the
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences. In an email to SBS Dean Janet Rifkin, he
wrote, “I recognize that there is resistance to change; ironic in some sense that the
greatest resistance to change comes from the putatively most radical spots on campus”
(Email between Holub and Rifkin, December 17, 2008). This statement could be
considered an acknowledgement of the power and influence of campus-level actors.
In December, 2008, the first versions of a proposal to restructure schools and
colleges began to circulate among faculty. These plans were initiated by the Chancellor
and included reducing the number of colleges from nine to six by merging the College of
Natural Sciences and Mathematics with the College of Natural Resources and the
Environment, merging the College of Humanities and Fine Arts with the College of
Social and Behavioral Sciences, combining the School of Nursing with the School of
Public Health and Health Sciences.
Also in these early versions, Chancellor Holub suggested that the departments of
Polymer Science and Engineering and Computer Science be relocated to the College of
Engineering. Despite eliminating this plan from his proposal early on, the Chancellor
urged the chairs of the two departments to continue exploring the possibility of moving
their programs into the College of Engineering. In interviews for this research, several
participants pointed out that it is common for Research 1 universities to house the
Departments of Polymer Science and Engineering and Computer Science within their
Colleges of Engineering. During an interview with Chancellor Holub, he explained that
increasing the size of the College of Engineering could be helpful in improving the
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standing of UMass. Ultimately, however, through the strong influence of faculty leaders
in these two departments, this aspect of the proposal was permanently dropped.
Merger Part One – Spring Semester 2009
On January 13, 2009, Chancellor Holub stated in an email to campus that he was
anticipating a $45 million cut in the state budget appropriation to campus. In that
message, he remarked that he had asked the Budget Planning Task Force to consider a
number of options for “reducing expenses and increasing revenues.” He included
“reorganization of the schools and colleges” among these options. Later that month,
Chancellor Holub encouraged the UMass community to provide comments and
suggestions on a public webpage set up by his office to gather feedback on the budget
issues. It transpired that the Budget Planning Task Force was not the appropriate
committee to work on a restructuring plan, but by the end of January, the Chancellor’s
decision to restructure had become public.
On January 29, 2009, at a special meeting of the Faculty Senate, requested by
Chancellor Holub and by a petition of the faculty, the Chancellor discussed the
seriousness of the national economic crisis and asked that members of the campus
community face the challenge as a united front. His address began a campus-wide
conversation about the restructuring of schools and colleges, which, in his view, would
save money through cuts in staffing and the elimination of dean positions. Chancellor
Holub’s stated goal was to preserve faculty positions, and he claimed that there was an
expectation on the part of off-campus stakeholders that cuts should be made to campus:
Elimination is something that we have to do in order to preserve other things on
the campus. It’s something that is almost expected of us because this is the way
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that one handles these kinds of crises. I’m thinking in particular of our donors,
the Board of Trustees and the politicians who control our other sources of
revenue. (Faculty Senate minutes, January 29, 2009)
During his presentation, Chancellor Holub did not explicitly describe his favored
model for academic reorganization, although he did begin to describe his ideas for
restructuring. Specifically he mentioned that it would be beneficial to consolidate the life
sciences and that the plan being considered might eliminate three colleges. He stated that
the professional schools would not be affected by restructuring because changes in their
administration and autonomy could potentially lead to accreditation difficulties. He
planned to release his restructuring proposal within a few days of this meeting and
explained his anticipated timeline for reorganization, which included: continued
information gathering, drafting a proposal, seeking the Faculty Senate’s recommendation
for the proposal, and implementing a restructuring by July 1, 2009 – less than six months
away. In his estimation, the attitude of the faculty and their willingness to participate in
carrying out a reorganization would strongly influence the success of the plan.
Following his presentation, several faculty members asked Chancellor Holub
questions about his plans, including what other alternatives besides restructuring were
considered, how the reorganization might increase the profile of campus, and how the
administrative staff came up with the envisioned $1-2 million in savings that would be
realized from a reorganization. Finally, some faculty called for the Chancellor to create a
committee that would look specifically at the restructuring proposal. Chancellor Holub
addressed some of these issues before the meeting ended with a plan to continue the
discussion on February 9, 2009.

88

Before the Faculty Senate could reconvene, Chancellor Holub shared the first
official version of the proposed reorganization on February 3, 2009. The specific
proposal eliminated 4 colleges: Humanities and Fine Arts (HFA), Social and Behavioral
Sciences (SBS), Natural Resources and the Environment (NRE), & Natural Sciences and
Mathematics (NSM) and created two: the College of Humanities, Arts and Social
Sciences (CHASS) and the College of Natural Sciences (CNS). The proposal kept most
of the departments in their respective colleges during the mergers, but the Department of
Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning was shifted from NRE (to be CNS) to the
CHASS and the Department of Psychology moved from SBS (to be CHASS) to CNS.
The Department of Resource Economics was scheduled to move to the Isenberg School
of Management. This proposal also maintained the autonomy of the School of Nursing
(there would be no merger) but it proposed a shared administrative structure between
Nursing and the College of Public Health and Health Sciences. The original proposal
also added the Department of Communication Disorders to the CHASS. The Chancellor
asked the Faculty Senate to deliberate and make a recommendation on the proposal by
the end of the spring semester so that the plan could be implemented on July 1, 2009.
Faculty Senate Meeting Part 2
The special meeting of the Faculty Senate that began on January 29, 2009 was
resumed on February 9, 2009, after Chancellor Holub released his reorganization
proposal to the wider campus community. At that meeting, Chancellor Holub spoke
about the federal stimulus bill, which campus constituents were hopeful might be used to
fund higher education and which was being discussed in Congress at that time. Faculty
members and the Chancellor also continued their discussions of the academic
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restructuring. Sensing discontent, Chancellor Holub cautioned faculty to keep budget
and restructuring discussions “internal to campus” rather than to air grievances about the
campus restructuring in the press.
Also at the February 9 meeting, Faculty Senate secretary, Ernest May, explained
the process the restructuring proposal would have to go through in order to move
forward. Over the course of the spring, each of the six councils of the Senate would
generate a report about the Chancellor’s restructuring proposal. The Rules Committee
would be responsible for aggregating the reports and presenting them to the Chancellor,
along with a “rational response and a political response” to the restructuring. The Faculty
Senate planned to vote on the restructuring proposal later in the spring semester and their
recommendation would be sent to the UMass Board of Trustees who were responsible for
the final approval. In fact, the vote of the Faculty Senate was only advisory to the
process.
Task Force on Reorganization
In the days that intervened between the meeting on January 29 and its conclusion
on February 9, 2009, Chancellor Holub announced that he had convened a Task Force on
Reorganization (TFR, later known as the RTF) to address concerns from faculty that
there was a need for more study of the reorganization proposal. The task force was
comprised of 16 tenure-track faculty members, all but two of whom were from colleges
that were being considered for merger. The TFR had one month to complete their
assignment; which was to “provide advice about a proposal on college reorganization,
and to explore as well the possibility of a College of Arts and Sciences, or any other
alternative organizational structure that it finds appropriate for campus” (TFR
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Preliminary Report to the Chancellor, March 6, 2009, p. 2). The Chancellor expected a
final report of the task force’s findings by March 6, 2009.
Table 1: Evaluation Criteria for Academic Reorganization
• Efficiencies in administration: immediate and longer term
• Demonstrated responsiveness to the economic crisis
• Minimizing disruption to strategic planning or implementation processes
already in progress
• Strategic opportunities/positioning the campus for the future. Potential effect
of a reorganization alternative on the ability to position the campus to increase
excellence in research, teaching and engagement.
• New research and engagement opportunities for collaboration and partnership
within and across departments, schools and colleges and with other
universities and research organizations
• New education and outreach opportunities for collaboration and partnership
within and across departments, schools and colleges and with other
universities and research organizations
• Other strengths/weaknesses
(Source: Task Force Preliminary Report, p. 5)
Over the course of February and into early March, 2009, the Task Force on
Reorganization collected suggestions and opinions to gauge the interests and concerns of
their colleagues. They collected campus-level data from the UMass Office of
Institutional Research. They developed a list of peer institutions to which they compared
UMass Amherst (note: this was a comparison of institutions in the research university
field). This list included the thirty four public universities that were members of the
AAU, as well as ten universities that UMass campus administrators considered to be
“peer institutions,” and another set of twelve universities categorized in the same way as
UMass in the Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education: “very high
research, [with] no medical and veterinary school.” The task force studied the
organizational structures of each of these peer institutions and discovered that 75% of the
public universities in the AAU had a College of Arts and Sciences structure, and the
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percentage among private universities was even higher. Finally, task force members
established a set of criteria by which they could evaluate several different restructuring
proposals (See Table 1 for a list of criteria).
By February 24, 2009, the task force established an online forum that offered
faculty and other members of the UMass community a space to comment publicly on the
Chancellor’s restructuring proposal and their task of studying it. Twenty one responses
appeared in that forum, almost all (19) were from tenure-track faculty, and an
overwhelming majority (15) were from faculty affiliated with either SBS or HFA, many
of whom were writing in opposition to the proposed merger of the College of Humanities
and Fine Arts with the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Two professors from
the sciences wrote to support a restructuring that would bring together the physical and
life sciences, stating that such a move would be beneficial in attracting and supporting
increased research dollars. Several commenters requested that the Task Force examine a
re-establishment of a College of Arts and Sciences – a structure that existed at the
University until 1993.
The Task Force on Reorganization provided a draft report to Chancellor Holub on
March 6, 2009, in advance of the March 12 meeting of the Faculty Senate. The report
contained five primary recommendations. The first of these urged the Faculty Senate and
the Chancellor to consider the two proposed college mergers as separate plans because,
“the considerations and logic of each of these proposed mergers are completely different”
(TFR, Preliminary Report to the Chancellor, March 6, 2009, p. 2). The second
recommendation was to move forward in merging NSM and NRE into a College of
Natural Sciences, with the further suggestion that deans and faculty who would be
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affected by departmental moves be consulted by the administration prior to crafting any
implementation plans. The third recommendation was for the University to work toward
an ultimate goal of re-establishing a College of Arts and Sciences, which would contain
“the core scholarly research departments, as well as related applied research units” (TFR,
Preliminary Report to the Chancellor, March 6, 2009, p. 2).
The fourth and fifth recommendations addressed the strong opposition of many
faculty members to the merger of the colleges of Social and Behavioral Sciences and
Humanities and Fine Arts. As an alternative to the College of Arts and Sciences model,
TFR recommended creating a seven-college model that would bring together the life
sciences while maintaining the autonomy of the arts and humanities and the social and
behavioral sciences. The seven-college model could serve as an interim step in moving
toward a CAS model but would keep HFA and SBS separate until that time. The final
recommendation was even stronger, the TFR, “strongly recommend[ed] against a merged
college combining HFA and SBS” (TFR Preliminary Report to the Chancellor, March 6,
2009, p. 3). Task force members reasoned that the logics of the colleges were so
different that such a merger would work “against strategic advancement of research,
education and engagement for the campus” (TFR Preliminary Report to the Chancellor,
March 6, 2009, p. 3).
The Task Force on Reorganization described their report as “one contribution at
the outset of a longer, broader process of transformation on the campus during a period of
acute economic scarcity.” The report went on to state that in their deliberations, the TFR
wanted to, “protect the core missions of the campus – research, education, and outreach,
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while also working to position the campus over the longer run for strategic growth in the
present and future” (TFR Preliminary Report to the Chancellor, March 6, 2009, p. 4).
Chancellor Holub’s Reorganization Plan Announced
In the afternoon of March 12, 2009, Professor Jane Fountain, as head of the Task
Force on Reorganization, presented the committee’s findings and recommendations to the
UMass Amherst Faculty Senate. Following this presentation, Chancellor Holub thanked
Professor Fountain and the rest of the task force for their work and then provided the
details of his proposed academic restructuring plan – as he had also done in a campuswide email that same morning. The Chancellor directed the creation of a College of
Natural Sciences to take place by fall 2009. Along with this merger, Holub again urged
the chairs of the departments of Polymer Science and Engineering and Computer Science
to enter into discussions with the Dean of Engineering with the goal of bringing those
two departments into the College of Engineering. The proposed merger of the Colleges
of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Humanities and Fine Arts was postponed because
of strong opposition to it. However, the Chancellor asked the deans (one an interim to be
named) to study the concerns and work toward a merger. Another part of the
restructuring brought the administration of the School of Nursing into the College of
Public Health and Health Sciences (PHHS), although Nursing was to maintain its own
dean. Also in this plan, the Department of Communication Disorders was transferred
into the College of Education from PHHS, the Department of Resource Economics
moved from the College of Natural Resources and the Environment into the Isenberg
School of Management, the Department of Landscape Architecture and Regional
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Planning was transferred into the College of Humanities and Fine Arts, and the
Department of Psychology moved to the College of Natural Sciences.
Chancellor Holub also spoke to the Faculty Senate about his concerns regarding a
return to a College of Arts and Sciences model, which was the structure supported by the
TFR. He believed that creating a College of Arts and Sciences (CAS) would produce a
great imbalance of power on campus because most of the faculty and resources of the
University would be included in the CAS, which would disadvantage the professional
schools.
Following Chancellor’s Holub’s restructuring announcement, he tried to address
various concerns of the faculty regarding a perceived inequity of funding between the
north and the south ends of campus. For many faculty, this distinction between the north
and south represented a conflict between the sciences and engineering (perceived as the
resource-rich entities in the “north end”) and the humanities, arts, and social sciences,
which had fewer resources and were located in the southern part of campus. This
situation fueled some of the mistrust around reorganization. Among some faculty in the
social sciences, humanities, and arts, there was the notion that the mergers would offer
more advantages to the sciences than to a newly created CHASS. To address these
concerns, Chancellor Holub announced some initiatives that would help to fund travel
and research expenses for departments in the Humanities and Social Sciences. His plans
also included creating a minimum startup fund for all tenure-track faculty who were hired
in the future; this was a way of balancing perceived inequities between expensive lab
sciences and areas where research was less expensive.
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Faculty Senate and Faculty Union Continue Discussions
Following the report from the TFR and after Chancellor Holub announced his
restructuring plan, the councils of the Faculty Senate released their own reports on the
reorganization proposal. Over the course of the 2009 spring semester, these reports were
released and discussed. On March 26, 2009, the Faculty Senate held an open meeting to
discuss the reorganization plans. At that meeting, Senate Secretary Ernest May detailed
his interpretation of the seven actions that the Senate would need to vote on in order to
move any recommendation from the Faculty Senate to the UMass Board of Trustees:
•

The closing of the College of Natural Sciences and Mathematics,

•

The closing of the College of Natural Resources and the Environment,

•

The establishment of the College of Natural Science,

•

The relocation of the Department of Communication Disorders from Public
Health and Health Sciences to the School of Education,

•

The relocation of the Department of Resource Economics from the College of
Natural Resources and the Environment to the Isenberg School of Management,

•

The relocation of Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning from Natural
Resources and the Environment to the College of Humanities and Fine Arts, and

•

The relocation of the Department of Psychology to the College of Natural
Sciences. (Faculty Senate Minutes, March 26, 2009, pp. 1-2)

Professor May was clear to state that the Faculty Senate was only serving in an advisory
capacity and that the Trustees had the final say on the restructuring.
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Also at the March 26, 2009 Faculty Senate meeting, Randall Phillis, President of
the Massachusetts Society of Professors (MSP)2 spoke out about the need for more
faculty to participate in Chancellor Holub’s plans to restructure the schools and colleges.
He was dismayed at the lack of involvement by faculty members who were not
department chairs and he discussed the efforts of the faculty union to ensure that the
restructuring would not negatively affect the personnel processes for faculty tenure and
promotion. Phillis urged the faculty to take their time in deciding whether the
reorganization plan was a good one; he explained that Massachusetts Governor Deval
Patrick announced that same week that there would be federal stimulus money available
to keep the campus afloat until the 2011 fiscal year. Professor Phillis also recommended
that any decision to reorganize should be made based on “scholarly and academic value”
and without rushing (Faculty Senate minutes, 3-26-09).
In early April 2009, the Faculty Senate released a number of reports from the six
Senate councils3. Across all reports, there was higher support for the merger of the
College of Natural Resources and the Environment with the College of Natural Science
and Mathematics than there was for the merger that would bring together the Social and
Behavioral Sciences with the Humanities and Fine Arts. The Academic Priorities
Council stated specifically that they were in favor of returning to a College of Arts and
Sciences model or creating a seven-college model that would merge NSM and NRE and
be in line with the Massachusetts Life Sciences Initiative. However, they were not
supportive of merging SBS and HFA. Other concerns the councils raised included:

This is the union that represents UMass Amherst faculty and librarians.
The councils named after their focus on the following issues: Research, General
Education, Academic Priorities, Public Services and Outreach, and Academic Matters

2
3
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questions about how any reorganization might affect recruitment of faculty and graduate
students, suggestions about preserving interdisciplinarity in teaching, requests that any
reorganization could help distribute responsibility for teaching general education courses
more evenly across campus, and recommendations that newly named deans be educated
about the differences among various academic programs for the purposes of research and
tenure decisions.
Faculty Senate Vote
On May 14, 2009, after much discussion and debate, along with some
modifications by the Chancellor to the original reorganization plan, the Faculty Senate
approved five motions:
1. That the Faculty Senate approve the establishment of the College of Natural
Science
2. That the Faculty Senate approve the transfer of the Department of Psychology to
the College of Natural Sciences
3. That the Faculty Senate approve the transfer of the Department of Resource
Economics to the Isenberg School of Management
4. That the Faculty Senate approve the inclusion of the Department of Landscape
Architecture and Regional Planning in the College of Natural Sciences for a
period of one year to allow the Department to assess the new administrative
structures of the Colleges that will result from reorganization, to conduct planning
meetings with allied departments, and to present a proposal for the permanent
location of the department that will best support its research and educational
missions.
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5. That the Faculty Senate approve the closing of the College of Natural Sciences
and Mathematics and the College of Natural Resources and the Environment…
(Faculty Senate Minutes, May 14, 2009, p. 6)
Once the Senate voted, the next step was to seek the approval of the UMass Board of
Trustees at their next meeting on June 10, 2009.
Opposition and Opinion Polls
There was, over the course of this process, opposition to the Chancellor’s
reorganization plans. Faculty in SBS and HFA were the ones to most publicly voice their
disapproval to the proposed creation of a College of Humanities, Arts and Social
Sciences with the faculty in SBS playing the role of most outspoken critics. At the same
time that the Task Force on Reorganization was exploring possible reorganization
structures and the Faculty Senate committees were drafting reports, groups of faculty
were meeting informally to discuss their thoughts about the merger proposal and what
might be done to stop it.
Department heads and chairs in SBS met often and also discussed their
disapproval of the Chancellor’s plan over email. Some of their opposition centered on
the lack of evidence that such a restructuring would save a projected $1.3 – $1.5 million.
Several faculty members in SBS had posed questions on the blog created by the Task
Force on Reorganization, asking for more proof that the restructuring would indeed save
money. As mentioned above, another common argument was that a restructuring would
lead to an unequal distribution of resources across the campus with more support going to
the sciences (located on the North side of campus) than to the humanities and social
sciences (on the South side of campus). Some even speculated that the restructuring was
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intended to strengthen research in the sciences while undercutting support for research in
the humanities and social sciences, which would then be expected to teach a greater
proportion of general education courses. One faculty member articulated the argument in
this way:
Regrettably, this plan will divide the university into a research campus in the
north end and a teaching campus in the south end. I foresee the flight of
considerable talent from the south if this is so, which would surely hurt cutting
edge interdisciplinary initiatives such as Science, Technology and Society (STS).
The loss of research talent in the southern campus will surely affect student
perceptions of the quality of faculty and teaching at UMass, especially since these
disciplines attract the most undergraduate majors. (LaRaja, TFR blog comment,
February 26, 2009)
It was apparent from comments like this that there was anxiety around a merger of
HFA and SBS. While many faculty publicly cited the issues above as their reasons to
oppose the merger, it also seemed that much of the dread was related to the unanswered
question of who would become dean of a merged College of Humanities, Arts and Social
Sciences. At the time of the Faculty Senate’s vote in May of 2009, the much-beloved
Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences was on the verge of retiring and
the Dean of the College of Humanities and Fine Arts was relatively new to campus.
Many SBS faculty expressed concern that the HFA dean would not manage the new
college in ways that would benefit the work they were doing. In particular, resource
allocation in each of these two colleges was managed quite differently; in SBS budgets
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were allocated to individual departments and programs, whereas in HFA resources were
managed centrally and expenditures required approval at the dean’s level.
Opposition to the creation of a College of Natural Sciences seemed to be less
pronounced. There were few comments on the TFR’s blog regarding the merger of NRE
and NSM but those were relatively supportive of a merger. The only issue that was
somewhat publicly contentious was Chancellor Holub’s original proposal to move the
departments of Computer Science and Polymer Science and Engineering into the College
of Engineering. Faculty in both of those departments objected to this move because they
claimed that the cultures were too different. In the end, their resistance urged the
Chancellor not to proceed with this plan to increase the size of the College of
Engineering.
The public opposition to the restructuring on the part of faculty in SBS and HFA
encouraged the Faculty Senate to seek the opinions of all faculty on campus regarding the
proposed reorganization. In May, the Faculty Senate arranged for the UMass Student
Assessment, Research and Evaluation Office (SAREO) to conduct an opinion poll that
was distributed to all campus faculty. The purpose of this poll was to assess the levels of
support for various aspects of Chancellor Holub’s proposed merger. The questionnaire
was crafted and launched online on June 2, 2009, after the Faculty Senate had voted to
support parts of the restructuring plan. Table 2 provides a summary of the results,
including a break down of responses by the school or college to which each participant
belonged.
Overall, participation in the poll was higher among faculty in the colleges that
would be affected by a reorganization (See Table 2). Sixty one percent of faculty in the
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College of Natural Resources completed the poll and overall these faculty members were
less supportive of creating a College of Natural Sciences (31% in favor/52% opposed)
than their counterparts in the College of Natural Sciences and Mathematics (50% in
favor/32% opposed, with 56% participation). A vast majority of respondents from both
Table 2: SAREO Survey Results: All Faculty
Process: Administered online to 1,484 tenure stream faculty, Response Rate =
lecturers, and librarians from June 2-8, 2009
40%, N=601
Neither support
Item
Support*
nor oppose
Oppose
Create a College of
44%
25%
31%
Natural Sciences
Create a College of
30.5%
13%
56%
Arts and Sciences
Create a College of
Humanities, Arts and
28%
21%
50%
Social Sciences
*This combines the totals for “supports strongly” and “supports somewhat”
(Source: SAREO Faculty Survey)
of the science colleges opposed the creation of a College of Arts and Sciences (75%
opposed in NSM and 75% opposed in NRE), whereas faculty in HFA and SBS were
more likely to be supportive (at 41% and 47% respectively).
Regarding the creation of a College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, a
vast majority of faculty respondents in the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences
opposed it (80% overall, with 69% “strongly opposed”). A majority of responding
faculty from the College of Humanities and Fine Arts were also opposed to the creation
of a CHASS (63% opposed overall, with 38% “strongly opposed” and 25% “somewhat
opposed”). Faculty respondents from the other colleges did not have these levels of
opposition to the creation of a CHASS, indicating a measure of indifference to this
structure.
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Table 3: SAREO Survey Results: Response Rates, By College
Total Faculty
# survey
College
in Fall 2008*
responses
Natural Resources and the
Environment (NRE)
123
75
Social and Behavioral
Sciences (SBS)
190
110
Natural Sciences and
Mathematics (NSM)
244
136
Humanities and Fine Arts
(HFA)
275
131
Public Health and Health
Sciences (PHHS)
53
23

% response
to poll
61%
58%
56%
48%
43%

Engineering

92

35

38%

Education

67

24

36%

Management

92

30

33%

Nursing
Commonwealth Honors
College

23

7

30%

11

n/a

0%

Other**
10
30
TOTALS
1180
601
51%
* Total faculty numbers as reported by the UMass Office of Institutional Research
(Factbook Academic Year 2008/09)
** This discrepancy is likely due to the fact that UMass librarians, as MSP
members, would likely have responded to the survey but would not be
accounted for in the faculty totals in the Factbook.
Creation of CNS
On July 1, 2009, the College of Natural Sciences (CNS) opened for business
under the leadership of Dean Steve Goodwin and Executive Associate Dean Jim Kurose.
The two men previously served as deans of the College of Natural Resources and the
Environment and the College of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, respectively. The
College of Natural Sciences also became the new home of the Department of Psychology,
which voted to move from its previous position in the College of Social and Behavioral
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Sciences because several faculty (particularly those in the behavioral neuroscience track)
felt that a connection to the life sciences was a better fit for research collaboration.
Over the course of the next year or two, the Deans worked diligently to bring
together two distinct college cultures, to integrate the staff in the CNS Dean’s Office and
retool most of the individual job descriptions, to craft a personnel policy for the hiring
and promotion of faculty, and to tweak systems and spaces to oversee the work of the
college. Conversations with each of the deans indicated that there were several
challenges inherent in this merger and that it resulted in some upfront costs that were not
anticipated. There were also, however, new opportunities for research collaboration and
some efficiency by bringing together a number of graduate programs.
A New Provost Arrives
In October 2008, soon after Chancellor Holub’s arrival, UMass Amherst Provost
Charlena Seymour announced that she would step down from the position she had held
since 2001. There was speculation that the Provost decided to leave because her work
style conflicted with the Chancellor’s; however, this version of the story was not
substantiated in the public record. Provost Seymour’s departure was planned for the end
of the 2008/09 academic year, which gave Chancellor Holub approximately nine months
to find a replacement.
Over the course of the spring semester, campus administrators conducted a
national search for a new provost. In May 2009, three finalists came to campus to meet
various stakeholder groups. One month later, on June 4, 2009, the Chancellor’s Office
announced the hiring of James V. Staros as Provost. Staros joined the UMass Amherst
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campus on August 2, 2009 from Stony Brook University where he had served as the
Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. The official announcement read, in part:
As dean [of Stony Brook], Staros led the college’s efforts to increase
undergraduate retention and graduation rates through an aggressive program of
matching resources with student needs to reduce unmet demand and by careful
coordination of student advising within the college and units outside the college.
These improvements have contributed to the recent improvements in Stony
Brook’s undergraduate retention and graduation rates and to the concomitant rise
in Stony Brook’s ranking for undergraduate programs (National Universities) in
U.S. News & World Report, which has improved 21 places in the past five years.
(UMass Office of News and Media Relations, June 4, 2009)
Provost Staros came to campus ready to support Chancellor Holub’s restructuring
plans. In an interview for this research, he spoke about his belief that larger colleges
were more effective than smaller ones. He imagined it was possible to work towards the
recreation of a College of Arts and Sciences model. Provost Staros also supported
Chancellor Holub’s desire to see UMass Amherst invited into the American Association
of Universities. A UMass news story on October 19, 2009, chronicled this:
Despite the current difficulties facing the campus, Staros said the administration’s
actions are aimed at positioning the institution for membership in the Association
of American Universities, an invitation-only organization of leading research
universities. “There is nothing the [C]hancellor and I would like better than to
lead UMass Amherst to the AAU,” he said.
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It is worth noting in these statements the references to research university field and
prominence.
Merger Part Two – Fall 2009-Spring 2010
In the fall of 2009, after the College of Natural Sciences was created and the new
provost was installed, conversation turned once again toward merging the College of
Social and Behavioral Sciences with the College of Humanities and Fine Arts.
Chancellor Holub had tasked Provost Staros with combining the two colleges. On May
14, 2009, when the Faculty Senate voted to recommend the creation of CNS and other
pieces of the reorganization, Chancellor Holub asked HFA Dean Joel Martin and Robert
Feldman, the interim dean of SBS to take the 2009/10 academic year to review the
various reports and come up with a plan for merging the two colleges.
In early November, 2009, Deans Feldman and Martin named faculty and staff
from SBS and HFA to a College Reorganization Study Committee, which was tasked
with examining the prospect of merging the two colleges. Provost Staros attended one of
the first meetings of the committee. He explained that he supported a merger because in
his experience, larger colleges were stronger. He cautioned the committee to keep the
academic mission at the center of a merger, while also considering the importance of
budgetary realities. College of Natural Sciences Dean Steve Goodwin also attended this
meeting. He responded to questions about the challenges and surprises he encountered
while overseeing the merger of NRE and NSM. He remarked that at that time the merger
had not increased interdisciplinarity nor did it bring in more research money, as most
units spend more money to support the research enterprise than it generally brings in.
“The dean spends more money supporting research in the college than is realized from
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RTF. So RTF doesn’t really support other aspects of the college,” he said (CHFA-CSBS
Reorganization Study Committee minutes, November 17, 2009).
After this information gathering meeting, the committee began its work in earnest
in December 2009. The deans of the two colleges advised the group to focus on the costs
associated with merger (both economic and human resources) and asked for a final report
by April 2010. Committee co-chair, Elizabeth Chilton explained:
In our original charge we were supposed to look at the costs and benefits, but in
our meeting it seemed like the Provost and Chancellor see the benefits already, so
it should be up to us to focus on the costs, since that’s something they haven’t
been focusing on. (Committee minutes, 12-9-09).

Once the committee has its charge, members devised a plan for crafting the
report. Several subcommittees were formed to examine a variety of aspects of merging
colleges; these included: personnel and finance, advising, development, personnel,
curriculum teaching loads, and research support. Faculty members headed up the
subcommittees dealing with issues that were more pertinent to faculty whereas staff led
the others.
Over the course of December 2009 and January 2010, subcommittees collected
data on the workings of the two colleges, met with faculty and staff from the College of
Natural Sciences to hear about their merger experiences, and drafted initial reports that
detailed the financial and human/personnel costs that merging would require. In March,
2009 the committee met and the subcommittees reported out their findings. The chairs of
the College Reorganization Study Committee explained that they felt their job was to
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create a concise report that addressed the costs of a merger since the Provost had already
presented the benefits.
On March 21, 2010, the College Reorganization Study Committee submitted a
final draft of its report to its members and the deans of the two colleges. The report
presented input from faculty and staff, and used data from the report produced by the
Task Force on Reorganization. Overall the committee recommended against merging the
two colleges. Some of the reasons for opposing the merger included: faculty in the
affected colleges were strongly opposed to the creation of a CHASS, a merger would take
time and energy away from the various revenue-generating efforts that colleges and
departments were undertaking, a merger would be expensive both financially and in
terms of lost productivity and morale, and regarding the balance of power on campus, the
committee reasoned that it might be beneficial to have two deans to support the
humanities, arts, and social sciences rather than just one. A final argument against
merging the two colleges was that it would create a unit that was an anomaly among
peers:
Finally, we want to underscore that no major research university in the U.S. has a
College like the proposed College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences: at a
minimum it would need to include the Department of Psychology in order to be
viable both intellectually and financially. (CHFA-CSBS Reorganization
Committee Final Report, p. 18)
In April, 2010, Deans Feldman and Martin brought the committee’s report to the
Provost. After laying out the Chancellor’s reasons to merge, they described what they
considered to be three types of costs: 1) start up costs, associated with moving staff and
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records, 2) rebranding costs associated with creating a new website, stationary, etc., and
3) opportunity costs from staff and faculty who would be spending much time and energy
on creating a new college in addition to the work they were already expected to do. In
the end, the deans presented four potential options and outcomes for moving forward:
Option 1. Merge without Structural Investment
Outcome: Merger damages already stressed colleges and damages the campus
Option 2. Merge with New Structural Investment
Outcome: Merger yields benefits to college and campus and creates conditions for
excellence
Option 3. Do Not Merge and Do Not Invest
Outcome: Undermine potential excellence
Option 4. Do Not Merge but Do Invest
Outcome: Avoid short-term costs and create conditions for excellence
(Memorandum to Provost from Deans Martin and Feldman, April 30, 2010, p. 6)
The Provost and the Chancellor were dissatisfied with the results of this
committee’s report, however they did not force the colleges to merge. In May 2010,
following the release of this report, Provost Staros met with the Academic Priorities
Council of the Faculty Senate. The Council had been working on its own report
regarding the creation of a CHASS. The Provost asked the Council to postpone the
release of their report until the fall, so that he would have more time to consider the best
structure for advancing the University.
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Merger Part Three – Provostial Working Group – Fall 2010-Spring 2011
The following September (2010) Provost Staros explained to a student reporter
from The Massachusetts Daily Collegian that he planned to convene another committee
to consider the merger of SBS and HFA. The Provostial Working Group would be
comprised of department heads and chairs from the two colleges. Provost Staros planned
to chair the working group himself and to ask the participants to begin to envision a new
college structure. “Staros said that he envisions a possible merger where the two schools
no longer resemble their current selves, where he feels last spring’s committee
approached the issue believing the two colleges in their entirety needed to be preserved”
(Daily Collegian, September 21, 2010).
The Provost appointed this working group early in the fall and they met bi-weekly
over the course of the fall semester to sketch a vision for a combined college. In a memo
to the Faculty Senate in January 2011, members of the group described their process:
At the first few meetings our discussions centered on a potential structure and
possible motivations for considering a new college. In late November we were
asked to take on a visioning process for a potential new college that would include
all or most of the current departments in SBS and HFA. A consultant joined our
meetings on 11/30 and 12/10 to help us (1) brainstorm what we saw as some of
the key trends in the academy over the next five years, and (2) formulate themes
that could be used in working towards a vision statement for a potential new
college. Following those meetings the Provost appointed a subcommittee of three
of us to draft a vision statement based on the notes from those brainstorming
meetings.
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The provostial working group spent several months debating and discussing
various ideas, many of which were examples from other research universities. In the end,
a subcommittee drafted a vision statement and delivered it to the Provost. He, in turn,
presented it to the Faculty Senate on January 20, 2011 as a full-fledged plan to merge
HFA and SBS into a College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS),
effective on July 2011. In a nine-page introduction to the vision statement, Provost
Staros expressed his reasons for wanting to create a CHASS. He detailed various
changes in campus circumstances since the original plan to merge SBS and HFA and
suggested that these would support the creation of a CHASS. Some of these changes
included: the formation of the College of Natural Sciences which prevented the return to
a College of Arts and Sciences structure; with the financial standing of the University
finally stabilized, a merger at this time would be for academic and organizational reasons;
there had been an energetic push towards revenue generation and interdisciplinary work
that could be further supported by a merger; and there was an interest for more
collaboration among the liberal arts. In the Provost’s proposal, budget savings were no
longer a rationale for merging. He presented the connecting theme of the newly merged
college: to investigate “what it means to be human” from a variety of disciplines. Staros
also wrote about the need to create “bridging mechanisms” that would help connect
faculty and research in all of the arts and sciences.
Several members of the Provostial Working Group were not pleased that the
Provost sent this document as a proposal to the Faculty Senate. In a memo to the Faculty
Senate, the SBS-affiliated members of the working group explained the origin of this
proposal. Their letter explained that the proposed reorganization was based on a
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visioning exercise undertaken by the working group, that it was drafted by a
subcommittee, and it was not endorsed by the entire group. In the memo, the writers
pointed out that the Provost’s proposal did not contain any implementation plan. Finally,
this memo clarified that the Provost had submitted the proposal to the Faculty Senate
after giving working group members less than twenty-four hours to comment on it. “The
Working Group was not asked to further comment on, vote on, or otherwise ratify the
proposal that was submitted to the Faculty Senate on January 20, 2011” (SBS Working
Group memo January 27, 2011).
Further opposition to the Provost’s merger proposal came from the collected
department chairs and heads, as well as the program directors of the College of Social
and Behavioral Sciences who also submitted a memo to the Faculty Senate on January
31, 2011. Their communication spelled out their opposition to the Provost’s proposal,
stating that it did not “reflect the previous efforts of faculty committees to spell out the
costs and benefits of the proposed merger, nor does it propose an administrative structure
or financial plan for the merged college. Since the faculty have previously voted in
opposition to the proposed merger and the current proposal ignores legitimate concerns
and faculty preferences, we cannot support the proposal before the Faculty Senate.”
In an effort to gauge faculty sentiment about this merger, the Massachusetts
Society of Professors initiated an online opinion poll that was sent to all faculty and
librarians on campus on February 14, 2011. The brief poll asked only two questions: “Do
you support the Provost’s proposal for a merger of CHFA and CSBS” and with which
college respondents were affiliated. The results of the survey showed that ninety-four
percent of respondents from HFA and almost ninety-five percent of respondents from
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SBS were opposed to the merger. Of the smaller number of respondents from other
colleges, almost eighty percent opposed the merger.
While faculty members disputed the proposal, it continued to work its way
through the Faculty Senate’s process. Faculty Senate Secretary Ernest May sent the
document out to the nine Senate councils for consideration and asked them to report back
to the full Senate by April 1, 2011. On March 3, 2011, in a campus news story, Provost
Staros announced that he would soon name two interim deans to head the colleges of
SBS and HFA and that they would be charged with addressing the implementation of a
plan to merge the colleges. “Staros said the existing colleges will continue to operate
through 2011-12 while the deans lead discussions on issues such as combining efforts in
the area of research support and administrators address solutions to housing a CHASS
dean's office” (UMass Office of News and Media Relations, March 3, 2011). He also
stated that he and the Chancellor believed that merger of SBS and HFA would help the
University get closer to its goal of attaining a position in the AAU because the merged
college would be part of a campus structure that was more similar to those at AAU
institutions.
Despite the forward momentum on the merger, by the end of March, 2011,
Provost Staros withdrew his proposal for a merged SBS and HFA and instead tried a new
strategy. He reappointed Julie Hayes and Robert Feldman as interim deans of HFA and
SBS respectively and announced the appointment of Linguistics Professor John
McCarthy as Special Assistant to the Provost. Provost Staros pointed to his own
experience at Vanderbilt where he served in a similar capacity:

113

That is why I have adopted a “troika” arrangement that combines the trusted
current leadership of the two colleges and a respected faculty member from a
social science department that is located in HFA. I myself was a participant in
such an arrangement at the departmental level at Vanderbilt, and I can attest that it
worked very well. (Staros email message to university leaders naming interim
deans March 2011)
This remark appears to represent an acknowledgement of the influence of the research
university field.
The Deans and Special Assistant McCarthy were charged with working within the
colleges to decide how to best implement a merger. They began having conversations
with faculty and staff in the two colleges to come up with a plan that the Provost would
submit to the Faculty Senate in the upcoming academic year. Special Assistant
McCarthy wanted to maintain the momentum from the Provostial Working Group’s
meetings. The members had considered several examples from the field of research
universities that would allow interdisciplinary exploration and partnerships, such as the
creation of a Center for Liberal Arts. Professor McCarthy’s draft of the implementation
issues contained several references to connection to the research university field:
A range of academically coherent undergraduate majors and graduate programs in
the social sciences and humanities that (1) lead national conversations about the
state and future of their fields; (2) contribute distinctive specialties to those fields
against a backdrop of broad student preparation; (3) enable interdisciplinary
linkage with a minimum administrative obstacles; and (4) recruit and encourage a
sustainable number and broad range of graduate and undergraduate students,
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broad from the perspective of ethnic, national and economic background, form of
academic preparation, and academic competencies. (Draft, CLASS
Implementation Issues, 2011)
During a brief few months there was a lot of activity around the creation of a
College of Humanities Arts and Social Sciences. A joint committee with participation
from various councils of the Faculty Senate discussed the potential impacts of the merger
on undergraduate education. A separate and unofficial proposal to create a School for the
Arts surfaced, only to be rejected by a task force that investigated peer institutions where
fine arts departments were combined into a performing arts unit. Their verdict was that
this would require substantial investment and this was not the appropriate time. The
Office of Research Development began to investigate new opportunities for bringing
research dollars into the future CHASS. Meanwhile, as all of this planning was taking
place, Chancellor Holub’s job performance was being reviewed.
The Chancellor’s Review and the End of Restructuring
Over the course of the spring semester in 2011, an evaluation committee with
representatives from UMass faculty, alumni, and Trustees reviewed Chancellor Holub’s
performance in advance of the end of his three-year contract. The committee’s purpose
was to recommend whether the Chancellor’s contract be renewed. In a May 22, 2011
article in the Boston Globe, sources tipped off reporters that the evaluation committee
was planning to oppose a continuation of Chancellor Holub’s tenure. The article
discussed a variety of perceived flaws that led to the committee’s negative decision, and
it also presented the successes of Chancellor Holub’s tenure. The case of academic
restructuring that is the subject of this research was not mentioned in the story. The
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author hinted that the Chancellor might soon be in negotiations with President Wilson
about the terms of his departure.
Although no official statement had yet been made to the wider campus
community, Provost Staros announced at a meeting of the Dean’s Council in early June
that Chancellor Holub was planning to step down. At that moment, it was unclear
whether the Chancellor would remain on campus for another year or if the University
would be under the leadership of an interim chancellor. Because of the uncertainty,
Provost Staros decided that it would not be prudent to go ahead with a merger of SBS and
HFA.
Shortly after the Provost’s announcement to the deans, Special Assistant to the
Provost John McCarthy sent an email message to several individuals in the two colleges
who had spoken with him about the potential merger. It read:
A short while ago at the Deans’ Council meeting, Provost Staros said that a period
of interim leadership for the campus would not be the right time to proceed with a
merger. If in the coming weeks the campus gets an interim chancellor, the merger
of HFA and SBS will be taken off the table and searches for permanent deans of
these colleges will begin early in the Fall semester. (McCarthy email, June 7,
2011)
On July 1, 2011, Chancellor Holub announced officially that he would step down
at the end of June 2012. With that message, the era of restructuring came to a close.
Stimulus Funds Save the Day
Throughout the period under study, warnings and updates about the budget
situation were both common and alarming. From early in the fall 2008 semester,
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Chancellor Holub communicated frequently with the campus community, sending regular
budget updates over email. In the spring of 2009, there was preliminary information
about the ways that the federal stimulus funds, also known as the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), might be used to shore up higher education across the
country. Even when it seemed certain that the stimulus funds would allow UMass
Amherst to avoid draconian budget cuts, campus administrators continued to plan for the
worst. The expression “the fiscal cliff” was a refrain that echoed throughout this period
of financial instability and it referred to the time after the stimulus funds had been
expended when campus leaders anticipated a return to the enormous deficits that
followed reductions in the state’s appropriation.
Throughout the spring 2009 semester, campus leaders waited to hear about the
distribution of ARRA funds. On March 24, 2009, Chancellor Holub emailed campus
with the news that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts would likely receive $1.88
billion in federal stimulus funds over two years to bolster funding for preschool, K-12,
and higher education. At that point, Governor Patrick proposed awarding $81.6 million
to the UMass system for fiscal year 2010, with approximately half coming to the UMass
Amherst campus. The Chancellor reported that if the stimulus funds came through, they
could be used in part to rebate increased student fees.
Much of the rest of the semester was spent waiting for the state legislature to
decide how the stimulus funds would be dispersed. In an April 2009 message from
Chancellor Holub, he shared the opinions of the Governor and Speaker of the House
when he recommended that the campus community not rely on stimulus funds to fix a
difficult situation. Instead, he intended to go ahead with budget-cutting plans,
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anticipating that there would be a larger cut down the road even if stimulus funds were
available to patch things together in the current period.
Finally, in the summer of 2009, the Massachusetts legislature approved its budget,
which allowed gap funding for the next two years to support higher education at a level
close to what was intended prior to the economic crisis. Despite this restoration of funds,
UMass continued to live under the shadow of difficult economic times. The state of the
budget and the unknowns about what would happen once the stimulus funds were gone
was an ongoing conversation. Chancellor Holub’s frequent email updates provided a lot
of information on the process, which perhaps contributed to the level of anxiety on
campus.
In the end, the stimulus funds did save the day and UMass was spared from
drastic cuts that would have been devastating to all parts of campus. The Chancellor’s
revenue generating plans also served to bolster the UMass budget and the threat of falling
off the “fiscal cliff” was never realized.
Campus Survival Strategies and the Framework for Excellence
During this period of budget crisis and reorganization, University leaders
recognized that they would have to find new approaches that would contribute to the
economic survival of the campus. At the same time that campus leaders were struggling
to raise revenues, the Chancellor was also speaking about the ways that he would move
UMass Amherst into the upper echelons of public research institutions. While it may
seem unachievable to advance in the rankings while experiencing significant reductions
in state appropriations, Chancellor Holub continued to pursue both of these aims over the
course of his tenure. He alternately used the reorganization of the academic side of
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campus as an example of both: it could be a way to achieve savings in the budget crisis,
and it could be a way to reposition the University to achieve greatness.
One of the approaches Chancellor Holub took at this time was to appoint an ad
hoc Budget Planning Task Force to look for ways to save money and raise revenues for
the campus. While this group was initially asked to explore the possibility of
restructuring schools and colleges in order to save money, it became clear in early 2009
that such a project was beyond their scope. Instead, the task force came up with a variety
of plans to bring new revenues into campus. They looked to peer institutions to see what
kinds of approaches had successfully bolstered campus funding. Over the course of two
years, the University adopted a number of the strategies recommended by the Task Force,
including: increasing the number of out-of-state and international students who would
pay higher tuition; reforming general education so that all courses would be four credits
rather than three; increasing online course offerings and developing certificate and degree
programs through the Division of Continuing and Professional Education (because the
different revenue structure meant more money would stay on campus), developing
programs to serve the Massachusetts Life Sciences Initiative, and establishing a number
of five-year combined bachelors-masters degrees. The Budget Planning Task Force also
looked into a variety of new fees that might be imposed on students as well as ways to
increase the overhead earning on grants.
Chancellor Holub himself signed a contract that would bring the UMass men’s
football team into Division I competition. This move angered many faculty but was
anticipated to bring in revenues over time. He also began to investigate an alliance with
Bay State Medical Center in Springfield for the purposes of evolving into a medical
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school in the Pioneer Valley. Both of these strategies were intended to make UMass
appear more like an AAU institution.
The strategies mentioned above were not only intended to increase campus
revenues, some were also intended to help with the Chancellor’s goal of raising the
profile of UMass Amherst. In the spring of 2009 and again in the spring of 2010,
Chancellor Holub shared with the campus community his “Framework for Excellence.”
This document provided the Chancellor’s vision for moving UMass up in the rankings
with the eventual goal of being invited into the AAU.
Conclusion
This chapter presented a detailed narrative of the decision-making process upon
which this research is based. I have introduced the major actors and their relationships to
each other as well as their roles in the series of events that took place on the UMass
Amherst campus during this period. This section also provided a preliminary look at the
ways that individuals and groups at UMass reacted to the challenges created by the
economic crisis and the ways that the state government officials and Board of Trustees
responded to that crisis. Finally, in this chapter, I discussed strategies that leaders at
UMass planned and adopted in order to continue along a trajectory to remain competitive
with their peers. The next chapter offers findings and analysis from an in depth
examination of several documents as well as a series of interviews with participants in
this case.
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CHAPTER 5
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
This chapter presents the results of data analysis for this study. The literature
review provided an opportunity to explore theoretical connections between organizational
field, restructuring, and mission in higher education. This chapter first explores the
various fields to which UMass Amherst belongs and the ways interaction with those
organizational fields influenced decisions that were made during the case of restructuring
at UMass Amherst. Considering UMass Amherst as its own field provides a useful way
to look at the influence of various individuals and groups. Next, I discuss the ways that
field-level influences factored into the strategies adopted by university leaders during the
time of this case. Following this, I present findings related the possibility that the
restructuring process was indicative of shifts in missions and priorities over time at
UMass Amherst. Finally, several motivations for restructuring were revealed through the
research, however three central organizing principles emerged with frequency from
almost all sources. I describe these organizing principles along with ways various
stakeholders in the restructuring process utilized them in support of their own interests
and preferences. One surprising result was that individuals and groups used field – and
mission-inspired rhetoric to support their positions – even when those positions were at
odds with others.
Research Questions
This study began as a search to answer the following questions:
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1. How was the restructuring at UMass Amherst influenced by its position in and
interaction with specific organizational fields?
2. How did individual actors influence the restructuring and in what ways might
their roles have been influenced by their position on campus and the
University’s position within the organizational fields?
3. In what ways did the restructuring indicate a possible shift in
mission/priorities at UMass Amherst?
Presentation of Findings
The data sources for this study consisted of close to two hundred documents
related to the university restructuring that were written or recorded during the period
under study (see Appendix B for this list) as well as interviews with 14 individuals from
the UMass Amherst campus (interview participants are described in Appendix C).
During the time of the restructuring, each of the interview participants had an
administrative role on campus – some were college deans, some were administrators in
the Provost’s or Chancellor’s Offices, others were department chairs or program
directors. I was also able to interview Chancellor Holub. As discussed in Chapter 3,
participants were asked during their interviews whether they would be willing to allow
the use of their name in this study or, if they preferred, they would be given a different
designation. Because some of the participants did not permit the use of their name, I
have decided to use participant numbers for this section, with a few exceptions. It would
be very difficult to disguise Chancellor Holub’s identity in this case because his was a
singular role. In a few other instances, I have disclosed a participant’s identity when it
best served the purpose of the study, and only when the participant has provided consent.
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As I reviewed and analyzed the documents and interview transcripts, I began to
outline themes from the findings. Also, I determined that not all of the sources should be
taken at face value, particularly the interview transcripts since participants were operating
with their own biases and were recalling their thoughts and actions after a considerable
amount of tine had passed. Therefore, I compared multiple interview transcripts as well
as original source documents to verify statements and recollections as much as possible.
While I have not given equal weight to all of the participants’ claims, I have presented
quotes that best support the findings and are reinforced by multiple sources. I have made
an effort to avoid opinions and assumptions that seemed to be outliers.
Fields and Influence
The findings affirm that actors at UMass Amherst situate themselves most
strongly in two fields, both of which contain at least two subfields. These are: 1) national
public research universities, with the subfields AAU institutions (specifically public
universities) and Carnegie classified “Research 1” institutions; and 2) higher education in
Massachusetts. The Massachusetts higher education field includes at least three specific
subfields: elite or selective institutions including MIT, Harvard, Boston University,
Northeastern, etc; as well as public institutions of higher education in Massachusetts
along with the legislature and Department of Education; and the UMass System
controlled by the UMass Board of Trustees. Finally, as mentioned above, UMass
Amherst can be considered its own field, which consists of a variety of groups and actors
who vie for position and scarce resources.
Important to situating an organization within a field is the idea that an
organization will be compared (or compare itself) with others like it. The UMass System
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Report on Annual Indicators identifies a peer group against which the University of
Massachusetts Amherst should benchmark its goals, outcomes, and actions:
The Top American Research Universities … identifies nine performance
indicators as measures of academic quality to evaluate the comparative
performance of 160 research universities. These public and private institutions
generate over $40 million in federal research annually. Included in this group are
ten public research universities with a Carnegie classification of very high
research activity (RU/VH) with which the Amherst campus is comparing its
progress on these and other indicators. All but two of the peers, the Universities
of Connecticut and University of Delaware, are among the 63 members of the
Association of American Universities (AAU), which are recognized for their
excellence in research and education. Hence, the benchmark for the Amherst
campus is quite high, and its performance is generally lower than its peers. (2006,
p. 14)
These criteria, adopted by the UMass System Office, situate UMass Amherst in
the public research university field, and the authors observe that the campus is positioned
somewhat lower than the institutions to which it compares itself. It is interesting to note
that this list was developed by another player in the field, The Center for Measuring
University Performance, a research center at Arizona State University. The Center for
Measuring University Performance defines itself as a “research enterprise focused on the
competitive national context for major research universities” (Center for Measuring
University Performance, 2017). As such, they are also part of the organizational field of
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research universities and might be considered a governance unit in the sense that they set
expectations and establish norms for that field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012).
Chancellor Holub and members of the UMass Amherst administration were
largely in agreement with the list of peers identified by the UMass System Report. In
Chancellor Holub’s 2010 Framework for Excellence, he explained his thoughts about the
field in which UMass should consider itself:
Our campus matches the excellence of the public universities that are members of
the prestigious Association of American Universities (AAU). We are the
Commonwealth's flagship campus and the citizens of Massachusetts regard us as
their flagship institution. (Holub R. C., 2010, p. 1)
The statements above describe UMass actors’ affiliations with the public research
university field. Sources also described the campus’ alliance with the field of MA public
higher education and MA politics. The UMass System Report (2006) spelled out the
audience for its research: “trustees, legislature, and state-level policy makers” (p. 1).
However, the authors also stated:
Depending on the indicator, data for the UMass system are compared with
Massachusetts private universities, Massachusetts demographic data, New
England public universities, or (for the financial indicators) a small group of
public university systems in other states (2006, p.1).
This provides two different views of the Massachusetts higher education field.
One refers to the leadership, the trustees and legislators who make decisions about policy
and funding, whereas the other outlines the institutions those leaders should be
considering when comparing the campuses of the UMass System to peers. That this
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comparison group contains private institutions in the Commonwealth is important to the
ways that actors at UMass Amherst perceive and react to the Board of Trustees, the
governor, and the legislators and perhaps how those leaders perceive them.
It used to be common for administrators on the UMass Amherst campus to
compare the institution with the most selective private research universities in the state
because they were using the example set by the UMass System Reports. However,
during the Holub administration, a branding effort intentionally changed the institutions
to which the Amherst campus compared itself. In an email to campus in January 2010,
Chancellor Holub explained:
Previous positioning efforts were based on validating our academic strength in
direct comparison of those private universities located primarily in Boston. Given
the extremely competitive higher education market in Massachusetts and a
prevailing perception that private universities are stronger academically than
public institutions, simply asserting our academic excellence against these privates
does not work. Rather, we must change the terms by which UMass Amherst is
judged. Instead of defining ourselves in comparison to private colleges and
universities in both the state, and New England, we must clearly articulate our
unique strength as a public research university and the flagship of the
Commonwealth thus removing ourselves from a side-by-side comparison of
private institutions and opening up the possibility of defining ourselves through
our own real advantages.
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Through this effort, leaders at UMass Amherst were attempting to identify more
closely with the public research university field, rather than a field within Massachusetts
that included selective and very selective private institutions.
Placement in the Field(s)
In terms of field placement, UMass actors indicated that they believed the
University was ranked somewhere lower than it ought to be in the field of public research
universities, as demonstrated by Chancellor Holub’s consistent message about “moving
into the upper echelon of public research universities,” and his desire to “get to the
doorstep of the AAU.” Other faculty shared this view. One participant in particular
stated:
We’re just not quite where we ought to be in terms of reputation. We have some
incredibly great programs. We have some incredibly great faculty. We do a lot
of good things as a campus and yet, somehow, we’re not quite there in reputation.
(Participant #4)
For the most part, the actual position of UMass Amherst in various ranking
systems such as the U.S. News and World Report correspond to what UMass actors
perceive they should be. During the Holub administration, upper level campus
administrators adopted language about bringing campus into the “upper echelon” of
public research universities. Each year, these leaders selected a group of peer institutions
(some were considered close peers and others were considered aspirational) so that
academic and other units on campus would be able to benchmark their outcomes
alongside these peers in an effort to become more competitive and earn a better place in
various ranking systems.

127

Between 2008 and 2015, U.S. News and World Report ranked UMass Amherst in
the top 50 public national universities several times. Table 4 below shows the movement
in rankings according to this source.
Table 4: UMass Amherst Rank Among Public National Universities
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Top Public
#45
#50
#52
#45
#42
#42
#40
National
Universities
Best National #96
#102
#106
#99
#94
#97
#91
Universities
Sources: *U.S. News & World Report; UMass Amherst News Archives

2015
#30
#76

In the 2011 Report on Annual Indicators for the UMass System, the authors
revealed that the University of Massachusetts System had been ranked nineteenth in the
world on the Times of London’s World Reputational Rankings list, perhaps adding
international research universities to the list of fields in which the University might
consider itself a player. The individuals I interviewed for this study acknowledged the
importance of rankings for the success of the University as well as the influence of the
field on University decision-making.
Participant #3 stated:
Every flagship public university in the country aspires to be in the top 20. That
requires more than one institution that’s currently in the top 20 to decline in
quality. This is a zero-sum game – getting into the top 20 – and there just isn’t a
lot of permeability in the top 20. Michigan is not going to fall apart next year and
create a space for somebody else, and Wisconsin isn't and Virginia isn't and
Berkeley isn't and UCLA isn't. The places of most of the institutions in the top 20
is [sic] secure.
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Participant #12 had this to say about moving up in the rankings: “Your plan is
based on your moving and everyone else standing still, so to change the game, you have
to do something radical.”
Participant #12 also discussed Chancellor Holub’s intention to move UMass
Amherst into the prestigious Association of American Universities (AAU), an
organization that would be classified by Fligstein and McAdam (2012) as a governance
unit in the field of research universities. The AAU has created a list of measures that
universities must reach before they would be invited to become a member. This
organization is viewed by leaders in the research university field as an organization that
sets and upholds standards of excellence in the field. In addition to their stated standards,
Participant #12 reported that there were also unstated criteria, such as geographic location
that were important to AAU membership. Regarding his thoughts about whether UMass
Amherst would be admitted to the AAU, he said:
There are institutions in the AAU that we are as good as and …that we are really
quite comparable to, but they are already there. And the fact that we’re as good as
some institutions that are in the AAU is not a reason that the AAU lets you in.
Fields and Environmental Forces Influence Actions
The way that campus administrators and state-level policy makers perceived the
position of UMass Amherst in its fields had an influence on decision-making. As
described in Chapter 2, a key piece of field theory is that organizational decision-makers
will adopt strategies that are in line with their peers for a number of reasons. They may
be undertaken to meet a goal such as the one Chancellor Holub declared early and often:
“moving UMass Amherst into the upper echelon of public research universities in the
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country.” Other strategies were undertaken because they helped the University align with
political and economic pressures in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This section
will explore these responses to field pressures.
Why a Restructuring?
Leaders at the University of Massachusetts Amherst were primarily responding to
the economic crisis of 2008 and the accompanying cuts to the state allocation when they
began considering a restructuring effort. In other words, this was a response to the
political and economic realities of the Commonwealth and the Massachusetts higher
education field. Chancellor Holub was clear that he was looking for any area of campus
where he could make cuts and find savings that would not damage the primary foci of the
University – research and teaching. He stated on multiple occasions that he was most
concerned with hiring and retaining excellent faculty because they are the foundation of a
strong university.
The restructuring as originally proposed would purportedly have saved the
campus one and a half to two million dollars. For many campus-level actors, this did not
seem like enough of a gain for them to support the plan. In the end, only the merger of
the science colleges took place, along with the movement of a few departments to other
colleges. The specifics behind the failure of the proposed merger of SBS and HFA are
discussed at length throughout this chapter. In part, the fact that the merger that created
the College of Natural Sciences proceeded with very little resistance can be explained by
the influence of environmental actors, in particular federal and state agencies that fund
research in the sciences. This Participant #11 explained the influences of these actors:
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One of the things that was happening at the time was sort of the ascendancy of the
importance of life sciences and…personalized medicine…It was a time when the
NIH research budget was doubling…so [there was] a lot of emphasis on the life
sciences and there were schools that were forming life sciences institutes or
colleges.
Chancellor Holub also spoke about this:
I was hoping in that kind of restructuring with the sciences, that it would be – that
we would be better able to compete for large grants, whether they be
Massachusetts grants or federal grants, that's what I was aiming at or would hope
to be one of the outcomes.
Because the coalescence of life sciences in the field of science research had been
happening prior to the 2008 budget crisis, it is no surprise that conversations about
bringing the life sciences together at UMass Amherst had already been happening.
Former CNS Dean Steve Goodwin mentioned this in his interview:
Some years before [the restructuring] there was an attempt to explore the
possibility of creating a College of Life Sciences…They brought in a pretty
distinguished outside panel – Rita Caldwell, who became the director of the
National Science Foundation actually was one of the people on it – to look at that
possibility, but it just, it kind of fell apart, quite frankly, not too dissimilar from
the SBS/HFA portion of this restructuring.
Other participants believed that the CNS merger was easier to accomplish because
science faculty had been having these conversations prior to the 2008 situation.
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Strategies for Advancing in the Public Research University Field
As discussed above, the academic reorganization at UMass Amherst appears to
have been inspired mainly by two factors: 1) the economic crisis of 2008 and resulting
budget cuts to the University, and 2) by a trend in the sciences, particularly among
organizations that funded research, to organize the life sciences. However, because it
was also the desire of Chancellor Holub, the UMass Systems Office, and the Board of
Trustees to raise the status of the University of Massachusetts Amherst, several strategies
were developed and implemented during the time of this case that were intended to bring
in additional revenues in response to the budget cuts and the trend of decreasing state
allocations. The rationale was that generating revenues in these ways would allow
UMass to be able to afford to take the steps it would need to move up in the rankings.
Most of the approaches discussed below were also taking place at peer institutions during
this same time.
The Budget Planning Task Force that was convened during the fall of 2008 had
the charge of drawing up plans to bring additional revenues into the University. Their
approach was to survey other public research universities to learn what strategies they
had employed to bring in revenues. The primary sources of new funding that emerged
from this task force were: 1) increasing the population of out-of-state students, including
international students, 2) boosting the number of online courses the University offered, 3)
diversifying and expanding the number of master’s programs offered at the University,
and 4) increasing enrollment fees for specific, high-interest programs. Participant #12
remarked on how these initiatives would aid in moving UMass Amherst up in the
rankings.
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Here is what I understood to be the plan… We set these goals and then we would
bring in a significant amount of money from out-of-state students… We would use
that to hire additional faculty, because that’s how you do it. Because you have to go
out and hire good faculty and wait for them to be productive and you have to be
strategic... in the investments that we make. So you are ...thinking about when
we’re working on how to make the most impact and on having a top ranked
graduate program... In the realm of what the AAU cares about, you need a war chest
and you need the will to do it.
The specific actions discussed in this section were put in place at UMass during the time
of this case. Despite the fact that they are not related to the restructuring under study,
they are tied to the ways that UMass administrators responded to pressures increase
revenues and maintain their position in the field of public research universities.
Other study participants corroborated the evidence above. Many participants said
something similar to Participant #9 who stated: “the fiscal stresses caused us to
reorganize other things like how we recruit students and one of the things [we were]
charged with doing was figuring out a successful policy for recruiting out-of-state
students.”
Participant #10 highlighted the University’s online education strategy: “The big
ramp up to online education…already existed in certain sectors of the campus but in HFA
we went from…well under $200,000 a year in revenue to well over $1 million in revenue
in about three years.”
Chancellor Holub recalled with pride the strides made to diversify the revenue
stream:
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We generated, I think, $22 million in new funding, new recurring funding, not
one-time funding, which doesn’t do you much good at a university, but new
recurring funding. And most of these revenues came from an increase in the
nonresident population.
The strategies detailed above were intended to increase revenues to allow UMass
Amherst some latitude its decision-making. At the same time, some participants
highlighted other efforts that were put in place to help UMass Amherst garner a better
place in the rankings and to look more like an AAU institution. Participant #13 stated:
The exceptional merit [pay increase system for faculty] was simply an effort to try
to raise the average salaries of the faculty because we looked bad in the rankings.
That if you looked at where we stood with the average salary of full professor,
associate, assistant professor, that we were well below our peers and that cost us
in the rankings. So instead of just doing across the board raises or whatever to try
to raise everybody up, he created this exceptional merit system, which was very
controversial… There was a vote of the faculty that came out 55-45 or something
in favor. It just barely passed… That was simply his mechanism of raising
average salaries. The average was computed by great big salaries on top pull up a
lot. So he knows how to do the math or at least Jim Staros did.
Some of the strategies that Chancellor Holub explored and undertook at that time
were not about revenue generation but instead were about making UMass look more like
other institutions that were in the AAU. As he said in our interview:
I knew that for UMass to become a better institution, we had to address the
decaying infrastructure and the more than $2 billion in deferred maintenance. So
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I forged ahead. I also moved football from FCS to FBS, a move that was also
controversial and not meant to please all constituencies. But my reasoning was
that all public flagships in the AAU had football teams playing at the FBS level,
and we needed to be the pride of MA and compete with the best. I also explored
the possibility of medical education in Western Mass with Baystate [Medical
Center], something that aroused the ire of many people throughout the state. Had
this initiative gone forward, it would have altered UMass Amherst and Western
Mass in very positive ways...everything I did was done to make UMass better...
Massachusetts Field Influence: Trustees, Politics, and Economy
There are a few ways to consider Massachusetts-specific field and environmental
influences at UMass Amherst during the time of this case of restructuring. One
component is the role and power of the Board of Trustees, which hired Chancellor Holub,
and is the governing body that oversees all University of Massachusetts System
operations. The Massachusetts State Legislature controls the state allocation to the
University System, as well as the rest of public higher education in the Commonwealth,
and during this time of widespread economic crisis, there was a lot of fear on campus that
there would be a sizeable cut to the higher education budgets. Separate from what was
taking place at the University, state leaders at this time were investing in specific
initiatives to encourage economic development and the dire economic conditions in the
state and the nation formed the backdrop for this situation.
By several accounts, when members of the Board of Trustees hired Chancellor
Holub prior to the economic crisis, they did so with the intention of moving UMass
Amherst up in the ranks of public research universities. Holub himself stated:
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It was right up front in the position description, and it said that my job would be
to move the flagship campus into the top tier of public research universities… So
I saw my charge from that advertisement as moving the campus in that direction,
and that thought probably guided...my activities while I was Chancellor.
Other participants corroborated Chancellor Holub’s views that the Trustees had brought
him in to raise the stature of the Amherst campus. Participant #12 stated:
He seems to have come here with this vision [to get into the AAU]. They [Pres.
Wilson and the Trustees] hired a guy who, though he wasn't coming straight from
there, he was coming from Berkeley… Somebody had in mind that we could do
that and the flagship campus was somehow going to really take off and elevate the
system and by hiring this guy who would come in and bring us the Berkeley
vision or something like that.
However, changing politics in the Commonwealth may have derailed the
Trustees’s plan for Chancellor Holub to create a Berkeley-like institution. As Chancellor
Holub pointed out, when he was appointed to his position, the Trustees were mainly
appointees of former Republican Governor Mitt Romney. Over the period of time that he
was in his role, the composition of this body changed as Democratic Governor Deval
Patrick appointed new Trustees. According to Holub, the new members and members of
the state legislature did not have the same desire to move UMass into the “upper echelon
of public research universities,” which was his charge when he was hired. He stated:
I believe there was some sentiment on the Board of Trustees, which was in a
period of change. There were elected officials who also did not believe that this
was the case [that UMass should try to move up in the ranks]...They don't see
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UMass Amherst as having those same kinds of ambitions that I had for the
campus.
In addition to the expectations around the selection of Chancellor Holub, the
UMass Board of Trustees was also influential in the restructuring process. However, it is
unclear how much of this was perceived rather than actual influence. Despite my efforts,
I was not successful in gaining an interview with any of the Trustees from this time
period, therefore results in this section stem from interviews with other participants as
well as analysis of various documents.
Several faculty and administrators at the level of the college deans believed that
members of the Board of Trustees told Chancellor Holub that he had to restructure
campus during the economic crisis or they would not approve an increase in student fees.
Notes and documents from the time of the restructuring show Chancellor Holub alluding
to the ways that he had to act to appease the Trustees in order to maintain funding for
campus. For example, in a January 2009 meeting with SBS chairs and directors, when
talking about why SBS and HFA should merge, Chancellor Holub stated that the Trustees
tended to think about budget reductions in terms of what the campus was going to stop
doing in order to same money. He also remarked that, “These people control a large
portion of our purse strings,” and we “have to show them we are serious with making
changes.” Individuals at this meeting took the Chancellor’s words to mean that he was
being told to restructure campus.
However, in our 2015 interview, he stated strongly that there was no political
pressure on him to restructure:
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Many external stakeholders saw restructuring as something very positive and
encouraged me to proceed with it. However, I did not proceed in order to
'appease' any stakeholders. I believe my record shows that I was not someone
who sought to appease external stakeholders. I always did what I considered was
in the best interests of the campus, even if external stakeholders saw things
differently.
Also in reference to the Trustees, Chancellor Holub stated:
But you know, [the restructuring] was something they could relate to better than,
‘Well, I’m gonna cut $2 million out of Student Affairs.’ That doesn't mean
anything to them, but, ‘I'm gonna restructure.’? [they think] ‘Oh yeah, a lot of
businesses have done that. Oh, Jack Welch did that over at GE.’ or, you know,
that was the way that they thought about it.
Others who were interviewed for this study reported that they believed that the
Chancellor was proposing the mergers in response to pressures from the Board of
Trustees. For example, Participant #11 stated:
But I was absolutely convinced that the initial motivation was…the Chancellor
felt that we needed to respond to public… you know, primarily manifested
through the Board of Trustees, ‘What are you doing given the financial crisis?
The crisis is a financial thing and so what are you doing financially?’
and he later said, “despite what the Chancellor said, I can't believe there wasn’t …
implicit pressure to show in a very short term what you’re doing in reaction to the new
reality…And a reorganization is just sort of the natural thing...”
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Massachusetts Life Sciences Initiative
At the same time that UMass was responding to the state-level pressures brought
about by the budget crisis, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was launching the
Massachusetts Life Sciences Initiative. This effort brought together public and private
interests to collaborate on Life Sciences research and find projects that would spur
economic development. The creation of this state-level initiative was also consistent with
shifts in the larger field of science research mentioned above. Merging the Colleges of
Natural Resources and the Environment and Natural Sciences and Mathematics into the
College of Natural Sciences brought together all of the life sciences departments and
served to align CNS with both the Mass Life Sciences Initiative and action in the larger
field. Conversations at the time of the restructuring and later interviews confirmed that
there had been an earlier (failed) attempt to bring the life sciences into the same college at
UMass Amherst. One of the rationales used to help faculty accept this transition was that
this merger would position UMass researchers well for future funding. As Participant
#13 stated:
I think the Mass Institute for Life Sciences was a political creation by the state
legislature largely driven by their observation of the life science industry in the
Boston area. So it became an obvious point of investment for the state and then
UMass, of course, properly latched on to as much as they could and took some
ownership of it, but I think that was a political decision that has had great benefit.
Participant #7 highlighted the ways that this initiative connected with the
University administration’s goals to rise up in the rankings:
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And because we got this $95 million capital appropriation for a life science
building… in terms of national rankings that really could help because the
facilities are there now, you can attract good faculty, you have a strong dean, you
have a strong sense of support. And that could attract some serious federal money
and industry money as well, which could help them through those kinds of
rankings.
Chancellor Holub’s Restructuring: Bridging Two Fields
Chapter Four provided a look at the restructuring plan Chancellor Holub
presented to campus in January 2009. This initial plan seemed to represent what he was
aiming for: reducing the number of colleges from nine to six in an attempt to provide
certain economic benefits that would help the campus weather the economic crisis while
he focused on activities that would position UMass Amherst to be invited to the AAU.
The idea to restructure as a result of what was happening in the state higher education
field, and specifically in reaction to the economic crisis of 2008, appears to have been
influenced by the Chancellor’s prior experiences on other campuses and his knowledge of
the public research institution field, as well as his interactions with the trustees and
members of the legislature who represent the Massachusetts higher education field.
In his interview, he spoke about a similar restructuring that he had experienced
when he was a professor at the University of California, Berkeley:
I lived through some restructuring at Berkeley. The biological sciences were
totally restructured during the time I was there. We changed the administrative
structure at Berkeley from a two-Provost structure. There was a Provost for the
professional schools and colleges and a Provost for arts and sciences, so it was
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about 50-50 in terms of the faculty members on campus, and made one Provost.
There was a savings there.
He went on to explain the ways this restructuring and others he had read about informed
his thinking as it related to the circumstances at UMass Amherst:
I’d lived through restructuring, and lived through restructuring also in my
department... And I’d read about these things all over the country but you can’t
take a model from another campus and just put it onto a bit of different set of
circumstances, places with a different history and different needs.
In other words, the Chancellor was clear that he would not be able to craft a restructuring
at UMass Amherst simply by using the models other institutions had.
When asked why he had attempted his proposed reorganization, he spoke about
the need cut costs wherever he could in order to protect what he saw as the most
important asset of the University – its faculty. He said:
My emphasis was always the same, ‘I’m looking to save on administrative costs,
because if I don’t save on administrative costs, I have to save somewhere else,
and it's probably going to come from faculty.’ And I didn’t want it to come from
faculty. I’d rather it come from administration, so that was the kind of bottom line
argument that I had.
He also stated that he knew the restructuring and cuts to administrative offices in the
upper administration would not cover all of the predicted budget cuts the University was
expecting the state legislature to impose. He explained his proposal in this way:
Again, this wasn’t a solution to – I mean, you know, the understanding that this
was going to bring us out of the financial crisis, that was never the plan, and I
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never thought it would. But I was looking to save anywhere that I could save, and
this seemed to be a place where I could save a half million dollars, let’s say. A
half million dollars, I’m thinking when I hear a half million dollars, I’m thinking
five faculty positions in social sciences...
Chancellor Holub’s reorganization proposal might have been a reaction to what
he perceived as external pressures from the Trustees and state-level decision-makers
during the time of the budget crisis. As mentioned above, in 2009, Chancellor Holub
spoke at a meeting of chairs and directors in the College of Social and Behavioral
Sciences, informing them that the Trustees and the legislature were expecting changes on
campus and if the restructuring did not happen, “we endanger funding we get from
outside” because the University had to “build up structures we need to be more
competitive.”
Despite the strong language above and the impression he made on many of the
participants in this study that the restructuring was not just being supported by but
actually forced upon the University by state-level overseers, Chancellor Holub expressed
his views differently in our 2015 interview. At that time, he reported that the Trustees
probably appreciated the restructuring, although they did not encourage him to do it:
I'm sure that there were people on the Board [of Trustees] and people in
government, since most of these people have business backgrounds, who thought
that restructuring was a good way to deal with the financial crisis. So I'm sure that
there was an appeal to them – that restructuring appealed to them for that reason.
Through analysis of the findings, it is apparent that there were multiple rationales
behind Chancellor Holub’s specific restructuring plan and that it likely stemmed from the
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influences of two separate fields. The economic crisis meant that the University was
potentially facing unprecedented budget cuts, and at that time two deans (in SBS and
NSM) were poised for retirement. Mergers with these particular colleges would mean
that the salaries of two deans would be saved. It was convenient that the state was
creating the Massachusetts Life Sciences Initiative at this time, and it likely helped that
conversations about bringing the life sciences departments together at UMass had already
taken place. The shift in research funding for the sciences would support the kinds of
research UMass faculty could do more easily if these colleges were combined, and this
dovetailed with the Commonwealth’s desire to cash in on public-private partnerships that
might lead to economic development opportunities. As the heading of this section
suggests, evidence indicates that Chancellor Holub’s merger plan was influenced by a
variety of aspects within both the Massachusetts higher education field and the public
research university field, yet it resulted in a restructuring outcome that was specific to the
UMass Amherst field.
The next section will specifically address the ways that individuals and groups on
the Amherst campus worked to influence the reorganization process. However, it is
worth mentioning here that Chancellor Holub’s influence over this process, while
considerable, did not override the power of other actors on campus.
It seemed to many of the interview participants that Chancellor Holub did not
appear to seek the opinions of other members of campus when he was developing his
restructuring plan. When I asked with whom he had consulted, he said:
Restructuring was something that…we discussed with the senior staff, something
I conferred with the Provost about, first Provost Seymour…and then Staros when
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he was appointed. I conferred with the Deans. I got a lot of the input back from
faculty members and chairs in the various colleges. The topic came up frequently
in discussions with the Academic [sic] Senate, with the faculty union. I listened
to what people had to say on the topic, and as I said, I responded personally to
every email that I received on this.
Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) and Fligstein and McAdam (2012) highlight the
importance of social skills in the ability to make change in an organization. While
Chancellor Holub stated that he did consult with individuals on campus, interviews
revealed that Holub was not perceived as a good listener, and was not seen as persuadable
on the topic of the restructuring.
At the same time, Chancellor Holub reported that individuals on campus were not
always able or willing to see the bigger picture of what was happening on campus in
order to understand what he was trying to accomplish. In an interview, one of the
members of Chancellor Holub’s leadership team stated that faculty seemed to make up
their minds about the kind of reorganization they wanted and then they pointed to specific
research universities that had the structure they were looking for and then they used that
example to support their case.
This perspective aligns well with W. R. Scott’s views about the ways strategic
action fields operate. As he wrote, “Actors are both constrained and enabled by
institutional frameworks, and they are capable of using them to pursue their own interests
as well as challenging and attempting to change frameworks if necessary” (Scott, W. R.,
2015, pp. 28-29).

144

Local Influence: The UMass Amherst Field
The University of Massachusetts Amherst can be viewed as its own field, within
which various groups and actors interact (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). As Barrier &
Musselin (2016) discussed, sometimes university decision-makers have an idealized
version of what they want their university structure to look like based on what are
considered to be successful models, however, local conditions within the university
prevent leadership from carrying out these plans fully. This is where local influence and
considering the institution as its own field can be useful in understanding outcomes. This
section focuses on the ways in which local influence played a role in this case. It
explores that parts of the restructuring process that were brought into a campus-wide
dialogue while others were decided at more local levels. Further, I discuss the ways
campus groups and actors utilized arguments related to field concerns in order to support
their positions on the restructuring and other actions taking place on campus. This
section provides evidence that the local field can be more influential than the
environmental or organizational field.
Participant #11 spoke about the ways groups and individuals influenced the
process during the restructuring. He quoted a colleague from another campus who
explained: “You know, everything that happens in terms of academic structure is a
product of the local ecosystem and there are going to be people who don’t get along…”
He went on to say, “I mean if you want to start talking about what happened in life
sciences here...so much of that has to do with the individual personalities, it's not an
intellectual argument about what's right or wrong.”
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Participant #3 spoke about the way that individuals on campus used field-related
arguments to debate the validity of the mergers Chancellor Holub was proposing. This
participant’s view corresponds to W. R. Scott’s (2015) description of the ways that
stakeholders sometimes use models to support their own beliefs.
Group Influence and Perspective in the UMass Field
One interesting finding was the degree to which various campus groups and
individuals considered the issues and had influence over the outcome of this case.
Chancellor Holub understood this and seemed frustrated by it when he stated: “People
look at themselves as part of interest groups who are advocating for something rather
than people who are trying to solve problems together.” This section explores the roles
of particular groups on campus and the ways they understood and influenced what
happened in the UMass Amherst field. It is of note that these groups are primarily
comprised of faculty members. Participant #11 stressed the importance of having faculty
buy in whenever large-scale changes are being proposed on campus:
I feel that with faculty it’s gotta be bottom up and you can’t really move the
needle unless you’ve got faculty on board…Chancellors can say what they want
and provosts and deans can say what they want but if you don’t have the goodwill
and belief of the faculty behind you, it’s going to be incredibly hard.
Faculty Senate
Most of the individuals I interviewed for this research spoke about the role of the
Faculty Senate in the case of restructuring. However, not all participants were in
agreement about the group’s position and influence. Some believed that the Faculty
Senate served as a support for the positions of the majority of the faculty at UMass, while
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others reported that the Faculty Senate was primarily used by administrators as a rubber
stamp and therefore did not have the capacity to change any decisions made by those at
the top.
Several participants reported that they viewed the Faculty Senate as a group
without much power. Participant #1 stated:
I said, ‘This should be called the administration senate’ because whenever there’s
an important vote, the Chancellor and the Provost would make sure all the deans
were there and all the administrators would show up and they would outnumber
the faculty and the faculty didn’t want to disagree with them anyway...
Participant #13 agreed, calling the administration’s consultation of faculty into question
when he stated, “The Faculty Senate is an advisory board, it is the sounding board for the
administration to at least make an appearance of consulting the faculty about decisions
that are made.”
In reference to the Faculty Senate vote that approved the creation of the College
of Natural Sciences, Participant #11 reported that deans and other administrators were
expected to attend that meeting:
You know in the Faculty Senate meeting where the [CNS] merger was approved,
it was by one vote if I recall. All the deans were told [by the administration] that
we have to go and vote… I’d never seen that before, where the administration
says, ‘You’re allowed to vote at faculty meetings [senate] and you can vote your
conscience...’
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On the other hand, Participant #12 believed that the Faculty Senate’s actions did
help to slow down the merger of SBS and HFA because the majority of faculty members
were opposed to the plan:
Oh, I think the Senate made it impossible to merge HFA and SBS just by fiat. The
fact is that the Chancellor had the authority to do that [merge without a vote]…So
in a way, the vote of the senate is always advisory…But it’s still important, right,
and to have done it over the opposition of the senate would have been enormously
expensive and would have led to lots of questions from the trustees and
President’s Office and so on.
In 2011 during the second attempt to merge the Colleges of Humanities and Fine
Arts and Social and Behavioral Sciences, Provost Staros presented another proposal to
the Faculty Senate. That plan was quickly tabled by the Faculty Senate. Several
participants believed that the Senate membership understood that the plan, as written by
the Provostial Committee, was not intended to be a full proposal.
It is difficult to know precisely what the influence of the Faculty Senate was in
this case given the various, and sometimes contradictory, statements. However, looking
at the evidence, it is true that the CNS merger occurred after the Faculty Senate’s vote in
May of 2009 whereas the plan to merge SBS/HFA was postponed with a
recommendation for further study. When the SBS/HFA merger plan resurfaced two
years later, the Faculty Senate again delayed action on it and it never took place. The
Faculty Senate approved other parts of the original proposal in 2009 without much
discussion e.g., the move of the Department of Resource Economics to the Isenberg
School of Management, and the blending of the administrative functions of the Schools
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of Nursing and Public Health and Health Services. Some parts of the original proposal
never made it to public forums, such as the plan to move the Departments of Polymer
Science and Computer Science into the College of Engineering. This particular situation
will be discussed later in this section.
Faculty Union
The Massachusetts Society of Professors (MSP) represents faculty and librarians
at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. The union’s official role is to negotiate
labor contracts, represent members in grievances against the administration, and serve as
an advocate for public higher education. At the time of this case, the MSP leadership had
quite an adversarial relationship with Chancellor Holub and created for themselves an
expanded role in response to the restructuring proposal. One of the MSP members
reported that the union dubbed itself the “conscience of the university,” saying:
…a lot of us were kind of involved in changing the union and talking about, ‘We
want a better UMass. You know, we care about students, we care about teaching,
we want to do our research.’ All of those things are not necessarily typical of
faculty unions – they don’t negotiate them into contracts.
This participant spoke about the decision of MSP leaders to initiate a survey of faculty in
2010 that would ask about their views on the proposed merger of SBS and HFA:
The MSP really didn’t have any jurisdiction over college mergers, but that never
stopped us from working on issues. And I think once it was clear that it was such
an overwhelming majority of the faculty [who were opposed] then we felt like we
could and should say something about it...we certainly publicized the results [of
the faculty survey] like crazy.
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Another participant affiliated with the union spoke about the ways that the union
could influence decision-making, despite the fact that the union had no authority over
administrative decisions like restructuring:
Even though we couldn't bargain whether or not an administrative structure A or
B was invoked by the Chancellor, we certainly could rally the faculty to express
their views and collect and organize their opinions and present them effectively. I
think that's a reasonably fair thing and it drives the administration nuts because
we’re doing something ‘the union shouldn’t be doing’ or doesn’t have to do...
None of the other individuals who were interviewed spoke about the role of the
union in the same way that the two union-affiliated participants did. Participant #7 (a
non-union employee) mentioned that she recalled that union members spoke to the press
about the on-campus issues. Chancellor Holub’s only mention of the influence of the
union was when he mentioned the various groups that he had met with to talk about how
to deal with the economic crisis. In my interview with him and throughout his abundant
correspondence with campus, the influence of the union was not a topic of discussion.
Participant #13, an active union member also talked about the ways that the work
of the MSP and the Faculty Senate complemented each other:
We actually, the union, joined with the Faculty Senate rules committee and tried
… to find the cost savings. The transition costs of going through the
reorganization event were probably more substantial than any savings that we
could see going forward… So in that sense I think the union and the Faculty
Senate were nicely complementary because the union was not going to be able to
do the administrative committee work, consider all the issues that were engaged
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by the Faculty Senate and the Faculty Senate was certainly not going to do the
organizing required to have people's voices heard.
Similar to the discussion of the influence of the Faculty Senate, the findings are
not definitive and the evidence is mixed that the actions of the MSP members influenced
the outcome of the restructuring at UMass, but it does seem likely that there were some
effects as a result of their advocacy, particularly as they related to the SBS/HFA merger.
SBS/HFA Heads and Chairs
Chairs of departments in the Colleges of Social and Behavioral Sciences and
Humanities and Fine Arts were vocal about the proposed merger of their two colleges.
Particularly in SBS, department chairs were actively stalling the merger. Participant #7
reflected on her belief that the SBS chairs influenced the Chancellor’s decision to create
the first task force to look at the restructuring proposal:
But then the SBS chairs got together and we wrote a memo together … to the
Chancellor saying, ‘These are the reasons why [we shouldn't merge with HFA].’
So there was that leadership level among the chairs… As a result of that there was
enough pushback that then Jane Fountain's group was asked to write the first
study, whether or not we should do the merger.
There is no ambiguity in the data regarding the sentiment of faculty and chairs in
the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences. From the start they were opposed to
merging with the College of Humanities and Fine Arts. The findings regarding faculty
and chairs in HFA are less clear-cut.
Participant #12, who represented HFA faculty reported that some of the HFA
chairs were not opposed to the merger the way their colleagues in SBS were:

151

And that's where it became very clear that the SBS faculty were – the SBS chairs
– were quite content [with SBS in its current form] and saw this as a real threat.
And that the HFA chairs just didn’t, which I thought was very interesting.
The views of the rank-and-file faculty, however, did not seem to match this view
of the HFA chairs’ position. As mentioned above, the MSP conducted a survey of
faculty in February, 2011 as Provost Staros and Chancellor Holub were continuing to
urge the SBS/HFA merger. Ninety-four percent of HFA faculty and ninety-five percent
of SBS faculty who responded were not in favor of a merger. This survey seems to
confirm Participant #13’s views that the faculty were not in favor.
Science Faculty
Because the merger that created the College of Natural Sciences took place more
quickly than the process that kept the SBS/HFA merger on the table for so long, there is
less evidence about the views of faculty from the sciences. There was discussion about
specific issues, such as changes in personnel decisions for faculty and reconfiguring job
descriptions for staff in the dean’s office within the merged college. However, there was
not much indication of dissention among faculty. Participant #8 reported that the merger
of the Colleges of Natural Sciences and Mathematics and Natural Resources and the
Environment was more favored by the NRE faculty:
So when we talk about the creation of CNS, that was mostly driven by the life
science departments in NRE…and NSM – they were trying to get together.
Chemistry and physics and the other ones were just along for the ride. If there
was going to be such a college, they were sure going to be in it but they weren't
driving the train.
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Participant #11, who was affiliated with NSM had a more nuanced view:
…with NSM, I think people generally felt – and I’m talking about the department
chairs here – generally felt that the unification of the life sciences would be a big
plus and also uniformly felt that being part of the bigger college would be a
downside. I think those were the two major things that I would say pretty much
everybody felt. And we talked about it a lot.
Generally, there seemed to be agreement that the CNS merger was not contested and in
fact, there is evidence that the faculty were mostly in favor of this merger.
Polymer Science and Computer Science Faculty
In Chancellor Holub’s original draft of the restructuring plan, the departments of
Computer Science and Polymer Science and Engineering were projected to move to the
College of Engineering. Findings indicate that this proposed move was related to the
Chancellor’s desire to increase the size of the Engineering College and therefore begin to
look more like the AAU institutions against which the University was benchmarking
itself. Participant #11, who was closely involved in this situation, spoke about the
Chancellor’s aspiration to increase the size of the College of Engineering:
We have a very small School of Engineering here…at the time we had maybe 90,
92, [or] 93 faculty members there, and if you look at the top 20 engineering
schools, they typically have a lot more than that. You know, Rice has a smaller
number, Cal Tech has a smaller number, but generally bigger is better, right? And
we’re all worried about rankings because students look at rankings and things like
that...and the Chancellor felt, correctly, I think that...our engineering school
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simply wasn’t big enough given the importance of Engineering ...to the
Commonwealth, to the nation, for students who want to be an engineer.
The Chancellor’s plan to quickly add faculty to the College of Engineering was
not successful, however, because the faculty in the two departments designated to move
resisted and Chancellor Holub backed down. This appears to be the only instance in this
case where the Chancellor was convinced to change his mind that was not related to
issues of accreditation (as had been the case with the original proposal to merge Nursing
and Public Health). It was pressure from faculty in the Departments of Computer
Science and Polymer Science and Engineering that quickly and quietly stopped the
proposed move from taking place.
Interview participants who were close to the situation reported that the faculty and
leadership in these departments were ranked at the top in their field and were very
effective in bringing millions of research dollars to the University. Participant #4 stated,
“I would say there was a lot of pressure applied to the Chancellor…I think the fact that
they were as highly rated as departments as they are, certainly helped them to have
enough clout to…[stop the move].”
Participant #13 explained it this way:
The guys in Polymer Science said, ‘No, we’re not doing that and you’re not gonna
make us or we’ll all leave,’ or whatever they threatened...They have tens of
millions of dollars in funding and are world leaders and the Polymer Science
department here has long been known as one of the best in the country. So the
notion that he’s [Holub] gonna mess with that or not, yeah, that was not gonna
happen. They have a lot of clout.
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Reorganization Task Force
Over the course of the case being studied, three separate committees were set up
to explore various aspects of the reorganization process. The first of these was the
Reorganization Task Force (RTF) created by Chancellor Holub in February of 2009. The
Chancellor charged this twelve-member ad hoc committee to consider his proposal to
reorganize campus and make recommendations for other potential structures.
Reorganization Task Force members were effective at using field-related rhetoric
to argue for what seemed to be the part of the plan that was most acceptable to the
majority of faculty, the creation of CNS, while arguing against other options such as the
creation of a CHASS. They also used this language to support keeping Computer
Science and Polymer Science and Engineering in the College of Natural Science and
Mathematics, or in a combined College of Natural Sciences, and to stop the Departments
Food Science and Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning from being shifted to
places that their faculty members did not want to go. One of the strongest
recommendations of their report was to (re)create a College of Arts and Sciences. They
employed all of the three top organizing principles (discussed below) as they made their
argument. They also made arguments based on comparisons with other institutions in the
public research university field.
Here are some examples from the RTF final report that specifically consider the
ways other institutions were structured:
The fact that there are no Food Science Departments in Schools of Public Health
in the U.S. is likely due to the major differences in these fields. While Food
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Science supports the consolidation of the Sciences, it sees no benefits and many
detriments in joining the School of Public Health.
and, “Although Computer Science is housed in a College of Engineering on many
campuses (through alignments made mostly in the 1980’s and 90’s), on many others it is
housed in a College of Arts and Sciences.”
The RTF also referred to field position, and specifically to public universities
within the AAU and other UMass peers, when they recommended the creation of a
College of Arts and Sciences as the ultimate structure for reorganization. Their argument
was:
We base this recommendation on a detailed examination of the four colleges
involved and on a benchmarking process which examined the organizational
structures of the 34 public universities who are members of the American
Association of Universities, a group of ten peer universities developed by campus
administrators, and the universities categorized by the Carnegie Foundation for
the Advancement of Teaching as having ‘very high research, no medical and
veterinary school.’
The Reorganization Task Force strategically compared the University of
Massachusetts Amherst to other universities in order to make its case. The
recommendations of the Task Force report did end up mirroring, in part, the results of the
restructuring.
CHFA-CSBS Reorganization Committee
The CHFA-CSBS Reorganization Committee was the second group convened to
consider aspects of the Chancellor’s reorganization. This group was formed after the
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merger of the College of Natural Sciences and its goal was specifically to look at the
proposed merger of the College of Humanities and Fine Arts with the College of Social
and Behavioral Sciences. In their final report, committee members explained the purpose
of their work:
The committee was charged by the deans to determine how merging these two
Colleges would affect the work of faculty, staff, and students, to estimate what
challenges and costs a merger would entail, and to discover what lessons we
might learn from the merger last year of [the College of Natural Sciences and
Mathematics] and [the College of Natural Resources and the Environment].
As discussed in Chapter Four, this committee did not recommend the merger of
the Colleges of Humanities and Fine Arts and Social and Behavioral Sciences. Similar to
the Reorganization Task Force, the Reorganization Committee also utilized field-level
arguments in making their case:
We want to underscore that no major research university in the U.S. has a College
like the proposed College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences: at a minimum
it would need to include the Department of Psychology in order to be viable both
intellectually and financially. Thus, we also recommend that if a merger is
deemed necessary, that other models be considered, such as a College of Arts and
Sciences.
In addition to these field-level arguments, this group also called upon traditional
research university missions to support their case. They presented reasons why a merger
was not conducive in terms of the importance of research: “In a Research 1 University,
maintaining the research productivity and reputation in all departments should be one of
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the central priorities shaping any reorganization of units.” They argued that creating this
particular combined college would not meet this standard. The authors were also
concerned that the merged college would jeopardize research by placing too much
emphasis on teaching: “The other chief challenge posed to research by reorganization is
the danger of creating a chronically underfunded research faculty within a ‘teaching’ or
‘service’ college.”
The authors of the CHFA-CSBS Reorganization Committee report referred to the
dangers of reinforcing North/South division of campus through the proposed merger:
Failing to redistribute RTF, at the same time as student revenues are effectively
redistributed institution-wide, means that teaching activities by faculty in CSBS
and CHFA are subsidizing research activity and lower teaching loads in other
Colleges while reinvestment in CSBS and CHFA research activities is lagging
and lacking.
Similar to the Reorganization Task Force, members of this committee also
referenced field and mission when it benefited their perspective. While Chancellor
Holub and the campus leadership used this kind of rhetoric to support a merged College
of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, these two groups used it to oppose this
proposal.
Provostial Committee
After these two previous committees did not support the merger of HFA and SBS,
Provost Staros convened one more group in an attempt to reconsider the creation of a
College of Humanities Arts and Social Sciences. The Provostial Committee was
comprised of chairs from the Colleges of Humanities and Fine Arts and Social and
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Behavioral Sciences. When discussing his motivation for bringing this group together as
well as the end result, Provost Staros said:
I felt … that you can’t do these things [restructuring] without faculty buy-in.
There had been this reaction on campus to the initial push. It was very negative
and I thought, ‘Well, why don’t I set up a forum without too tight an agenda
where people get to know each other and start and see if they can discover the
benefit to doing this.’ And it didn't work. I think the whole thing had been too
poisoned.
The Provost hoped to use his influence to gain the goodwill of the chairs at the table so
that he might be able to merge the colleges after all. The Provost’s motivations for
merging SBS and HFA will be discussed further in the section on organizing principles.
One member of the Provostial Committee spoke about her role in the process and
how it may have been effective in blocking the merger of SBS and HFA for the third and
final time:
There was that third group where it was just – the Provostial group – where I felt
like I had to really try to push to have our charge clear, which it never really was.
And I felt that that was important because I didn’t want to go on record as being
one of the chairs who helped the merger happen without being asked whether we
thought it was a good idea or not.
In the end, this committee drafted a vision statement at the request of the Provost,
who used the statement as part of a proposal presented to the Faculty Senate in the spring
of 2011. Members of the Provostial Committee wrote a memo to the Faculty Senate
clarifying that they had not endorsed the Provost’s plan and their work had been taken
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out of context. The result of these actions was that the Faculty Senate tabled the
proposal. This committee, along with the Faculty Senate, was able to further postpone a
merger that most faculty and staff in the affected colleges believed was inevitable.
Mission
One of the research questions for this study asked how the restructuring might
have had an effect on the mission and priorities of the UMass Amherst campus. I
suggested that changes in fields might influence the mission and priorities on the UMass
Amherst campus. Moreover, because of the ways that fields operate, organizations
influence one another within fields, therefore it seemed likely that changes in mission and
priorities on one campus could eventually have the effect of influencing the field. The
results are not definitive and it would be difficult to generalize from one case study,
however it is thought provoking to consider the shifts in priorities that were taking place
at UMass Amherst during this time and compare them to changes in the fields to which
the University belongs.
This section first discusses the ways that participants used mission-based rhetoric
to support their particular versions of the restructuring proposal. Later, I present
evidence of the different shifts in mission and priorities that developed out of the data
analysis. The significance of possible new missions or mission shifts will be explored
further in Chapter Six.
Research, Teaching, and Service
The findings of this study proved that for faculty at UMass Amherst, the
traditional university missions of research, teaching, and service were paramount. In his
discussion of university missions, J. Scott (2006) reported that the research mission is
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currently the most prominent of these three and this claim rings true in this study as well.
References to the importance of research were ubiquitous in interviews, the UMass
System reports, and reports from Faculty Senate and ad hoc committees. Participants
used the rhetoric of the traditional missions of research, teaching and service in order to
support their arguments for or against parts of the proposal with particular emphasis
placed on the research mission. Sociology Professor Donald Tomaskovic-Devey’s
comment on the blog created by the Reorganization Task Force sums up the sentiment of
many faculty:
If I were to set out core principles for the University it would be to support faculty
research and teaching, support student’s education, and create structures that favor
investments in excellence and strategic opportunities across the various
disciplines which make us a University.
The Reorganization Task Force plainly stated the traditional tripartite mission as a
guiding force for their work to consider the appropriate structural model for campus:
The deliberations of the task force are guided by the importance of gaining
economic efficiencies in order to protect the core missions of the campus –
research, education, and outreach – while also working to position the campus
over the longer run for strategic growth in the present and future.
Using Mission to Rationalize Choices
Several committees and individuals supported arguments for their own vision of
the restructuring by framing their opinions in terms of mission. This statement from the
CHFA-CSBS Reorganization Committee Report provides a good example, “In a
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Research 1 University, maintaining the research productivity and reputation in all
departments should be one of the central priorities shaping any reorganization of units.”
The faculty in SBS and HFA seemed to use this strategy frequently as a way to
support their desire not to merge the two colleges. Minutes from a February 2009
meeting of the Academic Priorities Council where SBS Dean Janet Rifkin and other SBS
faculty were present discuss the importance of the research and teaching missions and
present the account as a way of opposing the SBS/HFA merger. In this statement the
authors present why the merger is bad for teaching students:
What hasn't been talked about is what it means to run two colleges that have huge
majors. In the two colleges, there would be close to 8,000 majors. Meeting the
needs of those students will require more adjuncts and part timers, and improved
advising, all of which would suck up additional resources.
The Academic Priorities Council also discussed why the merger could disadvantage
faculty research:
There also needs to be a climate for research opportunities. Both colleges [SBS
and HFA] are research oriented but they are not thought of in those
terms…Faculty in SBS indicated that Dean Rifkin has been instrumental in taking
SBS on a path of increased and transparent funding for research. Concern was
expressed that the reorg will destroy this accomplishment. An SBS-HFA merger
will result in this unit being the poor unit on campus.
For faculty in the former Colleges of Natural Resources and the Environment and
Natural Sciences and Mathematics, the importance of the research mission was used to
support the merger well. The following rationale for the CNS merger, written by the
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Reorganization Task Force, reflects both the importance of the research mission as well
as the influence of the research university field:
The ‘revolution’ in the life, information and nano-sciences have led several
universities to attempt to build greater coherence within and across research
groups to facilitate new scientific advances, research environments that reflect
current challenges, and collaboration required to bring together scientific
expertise.
Shifting Missions
In addition to the references to the traditional missions of higher education
discussed above, there was also evidence of shifts in the mission, goals, and priorities at
UMass Amherst during this time of restructuring. These are likely not new missions at
all, but rather the evolution or modernization of already familiar missions. Below, I
discuss each of these in more detail:
•

Reframing the Land Grant Mission

•

Interdisciplinarity, and

•

University as Driver of the Local Economy
Each of these shifts in mission seems to correspond to the direction of the larger

field of higher education in the U.S. The first of these missions, Reframing the Land
Grant Mission, is related both to the way science is viewed in the public research
university field and also to the reaction of the MA higher education field as the agrarian
economy in the Commonwealth continues to contract. The second mission,
Interdisciplinarity, corresponds to the progression of higher education and the ways those
in the field look at problems. Funders at the national level have begun to seek out
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projects that use a multidisciplinary approach. Statewide fields of higher education are
the primary influence behind the third mission, Public Education as a Driver of the
Economy. In this this case, it is a response to the Massachusetts legislature’s call for
public-private research partnerships as well as the expectation that students be trained to
accumulate job skills that will allow them to be prepared for employment. At the same
time, because the goal of economic development is echoed at other institutions across the
country, many universities within the field are looking to their peers for examples of
strategies they can adopt. The next section will explore these new missions in depth.
Reframing the Land Grant Mission
The mission of the Massachusetts Agricultural College, a.k.a. Mass Aggie,
originated from the Morrill Act and is described by J. Scott (2006) as the public service
mission of universities, particularly in the U.S. Originally this land grant mission meant
that it was important for an institution to give back to the local community by helping
farmers figure out the best planting techniques, etc. However, as agriculture in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts continues to decline and the ways that science is
practiced change, this mission has shifted.
While Chancellor Holub’s restructuring did effectively dismantle the old
Agricultural School at UMass Amherst, the shift in the ways science research is carried
out predates his tenure on campus. Prior to his arrival, the broader field of science
research was already moving in the direction of life science consolidation and state
leaders saw this as an opportunity for economic development through research, and
particularly biomedical research. As Participant #13 said about this shift toward the life
sciences:
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It probably is the modern era’s version of applied science stuff. It’s now, ‘how do
we apply life science?’ It’s not in better planting or plowing techniques. It’s now
in, ‘how do we do tissue engineering?’ or ‘how do we develop pharmaceuticals
better?’ or that sort of stuff.
From this perspective, the creation of the College of Natural Sciences is a
complicated response to shifting missions and priorities in multiple fields. Nationally,
science research has shifted over the past few decades to a life sciences approach. At the
state level, a biomedical industry has developed in the Boston area and beyond. In
response, the state legislature created the Massachusetts Life Sciences Initiative as a way
of encouraging economic development through research; and they began to provide
funding to support research. UMass responded to this political and economic motivation,
which made it easier to create CNS because faculty and administrators were already
thinking about how to capitalize on these changes and had explored the possibility of
bringing the life sciences together prior to 2008. This demonstrates the recursive nature
of field influence on mission.
Chancellor Holub agreed that the conditions were right for this merger and
championed a move away from the initial vision of the land grant mission, “I think you
could do it in Massachusetts. You’d have a lot more trouble doing it in Iowa where
agriculture has a much bigger investment in the university.”
Participant #11 felt that the old Mass Aggie mission was not going away quickly
enough. His preference was to focus the public service mission on something very
different. He stated, “I’ve got this university and what can it do for the Commonwealth
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in terms of the kinds of outreach to the community that we could do? I would say, ‘Well
you know, Massachusetts is driven by a knowledge economy.’ ” (p. 19)
Interdisciplinarity
Throughout the case, there were multiple references to increasing
interdisciplinarity and the benefits that would bring to UMass Amherst and the wider
field of research universities. The concept served as a way to support bringing together
the sciences to create CNS. Chancellor Holub spoke about the need to create the
appropriate structure to support interdisciplinary research:
There are changes that go on at universities and that there's more of a recognition
that the kind of interdisciplinary research that has been promoted by federal
agencies and that has been favored by a lot of industries…that this kind of
research is something that has to be built into your academic structure rather than
something that comes afterward.
Provost Staros and Chancellor Holub both tried to use the idea of bridging
disciplines as a way to make the merger of SBS and HFA more appealing to faculty. The
following quote is from the Provostial Working Group’s vision statement for a College of
Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences:
CHASS supports the integrity of its constituent disciplines while at the same time
fostering transdisciplinary connections and interactions that expand knowledge
and understanding. The College is dedicated to making a significant contribution
to research, teaching, policy, creativity, and outreach in the social sciences, fine
arts, and humanities; it serves as a model of engaged scholarship, academic rigor,
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interdisciplinarity, and innovative research; and it articulates its broader impacts
to a wide group of stakeholders.
Campus leaders went as far as to create specific incentives for SBS and HFA
faculty to work together by creating “cluster hires” that would allow a faculty line to be
created, but only if it spanned disciplines and the proposing departments were able to
make a case that the faculty hire would be doing research in an innovative,
interdisciplinary way that would build bridges across departments in the two colleges.
All of the committees that were convened to discuss the merger proposals during
this time cited the importance of interdisciplinarity to the core purpose of the University.
The Reorganization Task Force members used this mission as a rationale for supporting
the creation of a College of Arts and Sciences:
Colleges of arts and sciences are the core of the university. An organizational
structure that fragments departments into separate administrative units to balance
resources and enrollments serves no strategic purpose, is likely to be unproductive
and counter to the promotion of interdisciplinary research and teaching… It is
imperative that we reorganize in order to build on strength – the CAS model
clearly achieves that objective in an efficient and integrative manner.
The General Education Council of the Faculty Senate remarked about the
importance of the interdisciplinary mission of the university in relation to undergraduate
education. As minutes of their March 2009 meeting reported, “Developing a student's
abilities to think across disciplines, to bring different disciplinary perspectives together in
thinking through a problem, to forge interdisciplinary syntheses, and to write across the
curriculum, are the core goals of General Education.”
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In both documents and interviews, mention of interdisciplinarity as it relates to all
aspects of higher education was ubiquitous. There is also evidence that funders such as
the National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Health value interdisciplinary
work in the research grants they support. The creation of the Massachusetts Life
Sciences Initiative also encouraged research across disciplines. The pervasiveness of this
concept indicates that it has permeated the mission of the research university, not as a
mission that is separate from research, teaching, and service, but instead as an integral
part of those components.
University as Driver of the Economy
This particular mission shift might also be considered an extension of the public
service mission of the university, or it may be comparable to the nationalization mission
seen in Europe (J. Scott, 2006), or perhaps it is a blend of these two. The concept of
University as a Driver of the Economy is expressed as an expectation on the part of state
government and also UMass officials that public higher education should have a positive
effect on the state or regional economy. This economic impact might be derived through
training students to be employed by businesses or by adding economic value to the region
through research and public/private partnerships.
Individuals on the UMass Amherst campus referenced this mission in interviews.
Participant #2 stated: “economic development is a high priority for lots of…especially
public institutions, mainly public institutions.” Participant #4 agreed that contributing to
the economic development of the region was a way for UMass Amherst to prove itself as
an institution. Chancellor Holub spoke directly to this purpose of University-prompted
economic development when he stated, “I wanted UMass to be among the premier public
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institutions in the country. It also had to serve an increasingly diverse student body and
provide economic development for the state, and especially Western Mass.” It was also
stated as one of the core values in the 2010 Framework for Excellence:
Economic development and global competitiveness. Supporting the economic
development of the Commonwealth by providing assistance to small business and
industry; encouraging technology transfer; undertaking research in areas of
economic importance; and providing the language instruction and other tools
necessary for participation in the global economy.
Finally, when asked in 2015 whether universities were expected to provide
economic development for the states from which they receive funding, Chancellor Holub
responded, “I think that’s something that increasingly public institutions have been
charged with and I don’t think it’s unfair to charge institutions with that.”
As Chancellor Holub implied, it likely that this new calling for institutions to
consider economic development as one of their goals has evolved from the governing
bodies and legislatures that provide appropriations, as opposed to an idea that has
emerged from faculty. That this mission exists is clearly spelled out in annual reports
from the UMass System Office. There is a category within the report itself called
“Service to the Commonwealth.” The authors of the reports define this to mean that the
UMass System exists in part to provide education for people in Massachusetts, but they
also consider the UMass System’s “contribution to an educated citizenry and workforce”
(emphasis is mine). More specifically, the 2006 Report on Annual Indicators stated:
As part of that unique mission, UMass is transforming students’ lives, shaping the
future of our Commonwealth and addressing key state needs. We provide an
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accessible and affordable education to more than 65,000 students, the vast
majority of whom are sons and daughters of the Commonwealth. We conduct
more than $489 million in research that leads to groundbreaking discoveries and
spins-off companies that create jobs and fuel economic growth. And, our
graduates remain in Massachusetts, entering the workforce in critical fields such
as nursing, primary care medicine, computer science, the life sciences and
teaching.
To further support the idea that universities and the greater public have accepted
this new mission, the UMass Donahue Institute, a research organization within the
UMass System, publishes an annual report that details the economic impact of UMass on
the Commonwealth.
The Interplay of New Missions
There is evidence that these three evolved missions complement each other within
the university. During the time of this case, the administration at UMass constructed a
series of new buildings on campus to house interdisciplinary research teams that were
working on life science research projects that could potentially spin off small businesses
or patented research. As Participant #9 stated:
The Life Sciences laboratories were not gonna be ceded to any school or college.
They were going to house interdisciplinary research groups. They were gonna be
organized in a completely different way…Nobody had ever tried to mix people in
groups that had more than one department, more than one college in the same
research group, same research cluster. And it seems to be working in the sense
that it’s quite productive in terms of research grants coming in and so forth.
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This particular quote demonstrates the ways that the three new missions presented
here almost merge into one. Interdisciplinarity as a mission – together with the changing
land grant mission – blend to become the University as Driver of the Economy mission.
What Participant #9 has described above is the way that the campus was striving to bring
in interdisciplinary research grants in the life sciences that would help seed public/private
research partnerships.
Organizing Principles for Restructuring and Decision-making
Similar to the ways that individuals used mission to fortify their positions in
regards to the restructuring, I uncovered three distinct organizing principles that were
also used by many actors to support their thoughts and opinions about the process. Some
stakeholders used these organizing principles to justify or oppose specific parts of the
restructuring proposal or to evaluate other strategies that were being utilized on campus
during this time. Other individuals, including Chancellor Holub, utilized all three of
these organizing principles at different times as rationales for the restructuring. I noticed,
as did many of the participants I interviewed, that the stated motivations for the mergers
seemed to change over time. The more I analyzed the data, the more I came to see these
three distinct rationales: 1) budget crisis, 2) interdisciplinarity, and 3) striving for
excellence, which I have come to call organizing principles. This section defines and
explores each of these and considers the ways they were used by various actors.
Budget Crisis
The organizing principle “budget crisis” is defined as the rationale used to support
or oppose the reorganization or any part of it due to the need to save money or cut
budgets during the national economic crisis that began in the fall of 2008. This is the
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most utilized organizing principle throughout the restructuring process. Chancellor
Holub was the originator of this organizing principle and it is the one he referred to the
most frequently. He first mentioned the idea of reorganizing the colleges to a campuswide audience in an email dated January 13, 2009. In this message, he presented the idea
as one possible strategy to deal with the budget crisis:
To deal with this fiscal crisis, we have formed a Budget Planning Task Force
composed of faculty, staff, and students, and this group has been meeting
regularly to develop advice and recommendations for me in dealing with this
serious situation. In November I asked this group to consider a broad range of
options for reducing expenses and increasing revenues and also, specifically, to
look at reorganization and consolidation of academic administration, including the
possible reorganization of the schools and colleges.
Reflecting back on the case, Chancellor Holub reiterated the dire straits he
believed the campus to be in during those early days of the financial crisis. During our
2015 interview he stated:
I was looking to save money where I could… Restructuring was never conceived
as a solution; it was one small piece of a solution. You don’t get $35M from just
one place; you need a series of actions that reduce expenditures and generate
revenues. Restructuring was possibly a $2+ [million] piece of this larger puzzle.
Chancellor Holub was not the only actor to utilize the budget crisis as an
organizing principle. Because the case of restructuring took place during an economic
crisis, reference to the budget crisis was ubiquitous in documents. Also, each of the
interview participants referenced the budget crisis as a motivation for the reorganization
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proposal as well as other activities the University had undertaken to raise revenues during
this time. Some stakeholders used the budget crisis as a rationale to support
restructuring, others declared that the budget crisis was not the Chancellor’s true motive,
and still others used this organizing principle as a rational to oppose specific parts of the
merger proposals.
Some of the participants believed that the budget crisis was the impetus for the
restructuring. Participant #5 was convinced that the restructuring was due to budget
constraints. He stated:
I think the impetus was definitely financial. I really don’t think that it was the idea
that this was going to be educationally the best thing ever. I really think that if we
hadn’t had a budget crisis, I doubt if we’d have a restructuring because most of
the arguments were made in terms of [the idea that] it’s going to save us money.
Similarly, Participant #3 stated, “He [Holub] wanted to take as much as possible of the
cuts by cutting administration…his next target was administration within Academic
Affairs, and that’s when he developed the idea for consolidating and combining some
schools and colleges.” This interviewee continued, saying that the academic
restructuring was: “Originally motivated … by the idea that we could save
administrative costs that way…I really don’t think any of this would have happened in
the absence of the budget cuts.”
Other participants felt that the budget crisis was used by Chancellor Holub as a
pretense for something else that he wanted to do. For example, Participant #11 believed
that the budget crisis was a false motive used by the Chancellor and that the real rationale
was a need to respond to the Board of Trustees:
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Initially it was, ‘Oh, we’re going to save a lot of money.’ and …the amount of
money that would be saved was just so miniscule, maybe 2 level 26
administrative positions I think, right? But I was absolutely convinced that the
initial motivation was the Chancellor felt that we needed to respond to
public...you know, primarily manifested through the Board of Trustees [asking],
‘What are you doing given the financial crisis?’
Participant #10 was also dubious about the budget crisis as a motive for restructuring.
She pointed out that while it was announced as a means to save money, the
reorganization did not result in significant cost savings:
So it was very clear when it was announced in 2008-09 that this was about cost
savings, right? And so I mean certainly that was one of the effects of the second
task force was… so there weren't going to be any cost savings.
Participant #12 believed the Chancellor had decided to reorganize parts of the
University prior to his arrival in Amherst:
I don’t actually think, by the way, that the origin of the reorganization is in the
financial crisis. The origin of the reorganization is in a decision that I think
[Chancellor Holub] had made before coming here and that was to get rid of NRE.
And I think everything flows from that... And that’s just a fact, he told them. He
met early on with the faculty of NRE and said – I wasn’t there... I heard it said
that he said that they were an anachronism or something like that.
Participant #4 corroborated this account when he described the August 2008 meeting
between Chancellor Holub and faculty from the College of Natural Resources and the
Environment:
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One of the things that he [Chancellor Holub] said at that meeting was, ‘One of the
things we’ll have to ask ourselves over the course of the next year or so is whether
we really need a College of Natural Resources and the Environment.’
The various committees that were convened to look at aspects of the Chancellor’s
restructuring plan also used the budget crisis organizing principle to express their views.
For example, the guidelines set up by the Reorganization Taskforce stated that their goal
was to preserve the mission of the research university while also looking for ways to save
costs. In their words:
The deliberations of the task force are guided by the importance of gaining
economic efficiencies in order to protect the core missions of the campus –
research, education, and outreach – while also working to position the campus
over the longer run for strategic growth in the present and future.
On the other hand, the CHFA-CSBS Reorganization Committee used “budget
crisis” as a motive against merging:
We believe that any potential benefits are vastly outweighed by the need to focus
on revenue generation and the creation of new programs and activities in response
to the current and continuing fiscal crisis. Further we believe that there would be
base budget costs to such a merger that do not have clear long term benefits.
In the Provost’s proposal to the Faculty Senate, written in the spring of 2011, he
conceded that the budget crisis was no longer a rationale for merging SBS and HFA.
Instead, his motivation was increased collaboration, also identified here as the organizing
principle “interdisciplinarity.”
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Interdisciplinarity
The organizing principle “interdisciplinarity” is also called out as one of the new
missions discussed earlier in this chapter. I have elected to include this concept in both
sections because it is used as both a mission, in the sense that it is a goal that
administrators were hoping to achieve; yet it also served as a rationale for much of the
proposed restructuring. Interdisciplinarity as an organizing principle refers to the ways
that Chancellor Holub, Provost Staros, and others spoke about faculty in various parts of
the campus coming together to do research that spanned disciplines. Chancellor Holub
did not use this organizing principle often in relation to the restructuring but he did
mention it in his interview while discussing the creation of CNS and adding the
Department of Psychology to that college:
I thought that there was a good chance of producing synergies by having all the
bench sciences together. I did something that hasn’t been done, I believe, at any
other university in the country, and that’s move Psychology into the Natural
Sciences, which is something that I thought I could do at UMass because of the
large number of people who were working on neurosciences in psychology.
Participant #3 believed that Chancellor Holub came to see interdisciplinarity as a
secondary reason to restructure:
I think he also came to believe over time that there were also sensible academic
reasons. And I mean, he wouldn’t have…forced a merger…he believed that
while the primary motivation clearly was saving money, that there also would be
some academic benefits – that there would be increased research collaboration in
disciplines that seemed right for collaboration.
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Participant #11 agreed with Chancellor’s Holub’s use of interdisciplinarity specifically in
relation to the creation of CNS. He stated:
I think everybody thought that…the department chairs [and] the dean's upper
administration [in the life sciences], felt that bringing life sciences together would
help people in life sciences work better, and that life sciences was going to be an
important area.
In the case of restructuring at UMass, however, the primary champion of the
interdisciplinarity organizing principle was Provost Staros who said:
My interest in doing it is because there are disciplines which span the borders and
one obvious one that came into play was Psychology. Psychology spans the gap
between the Social Sciences and the Natural Sciences. So to me, the best thing to
make…to work on these mismatches [where various departments ended up
historically]: Linguistics, Communications, Journalism, History, was to try to
make a college where those would span the borders. And so that’s why I
advocated for CHASS. It was secondarily to save money, if we can do that.
Provost Staros hoped that his enthusiasm for interdisciplinary research would inspire
other stakeholders to support the SBS/HFA merger:
So you don’t save a lot but you do have efficiencies of connection… And so I
came into this with the idea that, ‘Well, there’s a different argument and maybe
that would go down better if people saw the actual benefit...’
In the end, Provost Staros’ vision was not adopted by the faculty in SBS and HFA and
some of the faculty in those colleges used the organizing principle to oppose the merger.
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The Reorganization Task Force utilized this organizing principle in a number of
ways. In the example below, they support the creation of a College of Arts and Sciences
by detailing how merging SBS and HFA without the sciences would not lead to the kinds
of interdisciplinarity faculty wanted:
Both HFA and SBS have begun to build infrastructures and trajectories that
support different strategic directions for growth. Consequently, consolidating
HFA and SBS into a college separate from the sciences is viewed as inconsistent
with – and doing harm to - the current and future education and research functions
of these faculties.
The RTF also referenced interdisciplinarity as a reason not to move the
Departments of Computer Science and Polymer Science and Engineering into the College
of Engineering when they wrote, “The polymer communities within physics, chemistry,
and biology are large and expanding. These connections must be preserved. The
polymer efforts within the engineering subcommunity are smaller and less connected.”
And, “The positioning of [Computer Science] on our campus within a science college has
been a facilitating factor in establishing multi-disciplinary activities, both in research and
teaching.”
Finally, the RTF used interdisciplinarity as a reason to reorganize into a College
of Arts and Sciences:
Colleges of arts and sciences are the core of the university. An organizational
structure that fragments departments into separate administrative units to balance
resources and enrollments serves no strategic purpose, is likely to be unproductive
and counter to the promotion of interdisciplinary research and teaching… It is
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imperative that we reorganize in order to build on strength – the CAS model
clearly achieves that objective in an efficient and integrative manner.
Participant #10 pointed out that the interdisciplinarity motive seemed to gain
popularity when it seemed evident that the other motives for the SBS/HFA merger were
not working:
And so then suddenly [after the budget savings motive didn't work out] the needle
moved and they [the Provost and Chancellor] said that it was going to be about
intellectual collaborations and that sort of thing. And then I think people were
pretty skeptical about that partly because this was a new rationale when the old
rationale didn't work out so well.
Participant #1 struggled with the emphasis the Holub administration placed on
interdisciplinarity because she believed that different kinds of cross-disciplinary research
were valued more highly than others:
[Interdisciplinarity] is also a code word for bringing in federal grants because if
you can be the kind of social scientist that works with ‘real’ scientists, that can
bring in huge amounts of money, then that’s a good way to do cross-discipline but
in the humanities, interdisciplinary work is not valued.
Striving for Excellence
The organizing principle identified as “excellence” or “striving for excellence” is
the rationale used to support, or oppose, plans that would raise the status of the UMass
Amherst campus in terms of the various ranking systems. I also coded items as
“excellence” when they referred to plans to position UMass Amherst for an invitation to
the AAU and in relation to specific kinds of benchmarking, and in particular when
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comparisons were made to institutions UMass leaders considered “aspirational peers.”
Chancellor Holub mainly used this organizing principle in relation to revenue generating
efforts and other plans for which he was advocating. He used it less often in relation to
the proposed reorganization, although he would say that moving UMass Amherst to the
“upper echelon of public research universities” was the overarching goal for all of his
championed plans.
From his first comments when he was appointed chancellor to his responses from
our 2015 interview, Chancellor Holub always considered himself responsible for moving
UMass Amherst up in the rankings. In 2015, he wrote:
I believed – and still believe – that UMass Amherst has great potential, that with
the proper support and strategic moves, it can become an AAU institution. I saw
my charge as moving the campus in that direction, and that thought guided all my
activities while I was chancellor.
Even in 2015, when he was a faculty member at another institution, he still remembered:
In the U.S. News and World Report, I believe when I came in, we were 52nd and
when I left we were 42nd. And because all of the changes that I put in, I think we
continued to drop. I think UMass was in the 30s but it’s very difficult to get
further than that with the kind of funding that we have and with the kind of
campus that we have.
Chancellor Holub’s preoccupation with the rankings motivated him to draft the
Framework for Excellence, about which Participant #12 said, “The Framework for
Excellence is basically just a list of things that you would…need to do to get into the
AAU – and without any consideration of resources that would be required to do that.”
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Participant #7 also spoke about the ways that the Chancellor’s proposals sometimes
seemed like they were not accomplishing what they promised:
There was this sense that he was doing this [restructuring] to look like an AAU
[or] to show the legislature he was doing something to make it look like it was
cost-cutting when we knew that it really wasn't going to accomplish any of these
things.
Each of the three committees that were tasked with looking at the reorganization
also used the “striving for excellence” organizing principle in their discussions of the best
path forward for the campus. The Restructuring Task Force used “excellence” as an
organizing principle when it argued not to move the Department of Polymer Science and
Engineering (PSE) into the College of Engineering: “Because the PSE Department
curriculum is widely recognized as world leading and has been built over the last thirty
years PSE faculty believe it is important to maintain the integrity of this program.” They
also used it to argue for the University to adopt a College of Arts and Sciences structure:
In the American Association of Universities, which is a membership organization
by invitation only for research universities, 75 percent of the public university
members are organized using the arts and sciences model. Among the private
universities, the percentage is even higher.
The CHFA-CSBS Reorganization Committee argued in many sections of their
report that a merger of these two colleges would have negative effects on excellence in
research and teaching. Conversely, the CHASS merger proposal that Provost Staros sent
to the Faculty Senate at the conclusion of the work of the Provostial Committee refers to
the way that this new college would enhance the reputation of the University:
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Creation of a College organized on the principles proposed here would send an
important message across the campus and to the broader community. It would
signify that we are actively engaged in thinking about our role in tackling the
important questions relating to the human condition.
At least one participant pointed out that the search for excellence as an organizing
principle pre-dated Chancellor Holub’s arrival on campus,
[Chancellor] Lombardi started with the benchmarking and that felt like the
beginning of the shift to me where everything was about defining out peer
institutions and measuring. And then suddenly everything in comparison to some
other universities that were supposed to be better than us and how could we be as
good as them? ... We have competition and we’re placing ourselves and trying to
rework ourselves to match our competition.
Participant #1 also pointed out that striving for excellence and trying to get into
the AAU were incongruous with the reorganization plan, “I think the hardest thing was,
[Chancellor Holub] couldn’t point to all these great AAU universities and say, ‘They
have this SBS/HFA thing – the CHASS.’ ”
Where You Sit is What You See: Position Influences Views on Restructuring
One of the research questions for this study was: How did individual actors
influence the restructuring and in what ways might their roles have been influenced by
their position on campus and the University’s position within organizational
fields? Above I discussed the findings regarding the influence of specific groups. In this
section, I will explore the ways that individual actors and groups viewed the restructuring
based on where they were on campus and how they used field-inspired rhetoric and
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organizing principles to support their arguments regarding the outcome of the
Chancellor’s proposal. It seems that individuals and groups used their knowledge of the
field to support their already existing opinions. As Participant #3 stated:
Everybody looked to see how things were done nationally, but people did that
after the fact, basically to buttress their respective cases and there are so many
models nationally that you could find anybody with any model, could find a
handful of other places around the country that did things their way. There are a
lot of Colleges of Arts and Sciences around the country.
The viewpoints of these stakeholders were influenced by their position on campus and
perhaps their inability to see things from a variety of perspectives. Chancellor Holub
explained it like this:
There seemed to be a lack of understanding for the crisis that the campus was
going through and that what I was trying to do was to try to deal positively with
that crisis and trying to do the best for faculty, really. Very often, I've learned that
… people look at things from a kind of a parochial perspective that they don’t
take into account the larger campus and what is going on there and what has to be
done.
Chancellor Holub’s Bird’s Eye View
Of all stakeholders, Chancellor Holub may have been the one with the broadest
perspective of the campus. He arrived at UMass in the fall of 2008, having worked at
two other public research universities. In his position, he reported to the UMass System
President and the Board of Trustees, both located in Boston rather than Amherst, and
therefore providing an external viewpoint. Chancellor Holub was responsible for the
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well-being and survival of the entire campus and in his written correspondence as well as
our interview, he reported that he was trying to carry out his charge of bringing UMass
into the upper echelon of public research universities. His actions, and the rationales for
them, appeared to arise from this particular perspective. Because he did not have a
connection to or history in a specific unit on campus prior to becoming Chancellor, his
interests were not tied to a specific department, group, or discipline. He saw what he was
trying to accomplish as a solution that was best for the campus as a whole under the
circumstances.
When the budget crisis first hit and Chancellor Holub proposed a reorganization
of the academic units on campus, he primarily used the budget crisis organizing principle
to support his proposal to restructure the campus. Several examples of this are given in
the section on organizing principles above. During the 2008-09 academic year,
Chancellor Holub sent close to twenty emails to the campus community to discuss the
budget situation and potential reorganization. In these he most often used the organizing
principle of budget crisis, he referenced striving for excellence less frequently, and
interdisciplinarity hardly at all. During this period, Chancellor Holub was, by all
documented accounts, primarily focused on managing the budget crisis at UMass
Amherst, a situation that was most closely related to the MA higher education field. It is
unsurprising then that he used field logics that were related to MA higher education, as
well as larger environmental concerns regarding Massachusetts’ economy and politics, to
support his decisions. The early emails to campus were mainly about the condition of the
state budget, estimates concerning how much money would be cut from UMass Amherst
by the legislature, and how the various units on campus might have to make substantial
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cuts in order to deal with the difficult budget situation. In his proposed reorganization
plan, which was formally presented to the Faculty Senate in May 2009, he used two
organizing principles to support his project – budget crisis and excellence:
I believe we will need to proceed beyond the proposed structure, if we are going
to compete with the top public research institutions in the country. In addition,
depending on the financial crisis and its course over the next few years, we may
have to revisit entities within colleges, propose consolidations of their operations,
and thereby further eliminate administration... While none of us would choose
this route, the financial picture may force these actions.
It is possible that Chancellor Holub utilized the organizing principles of striving for
excellence and interdisciplinarity to support the restructuring plan because faculty
members were more willing to be persuaded by these kinds of arguments rather than
financial ones.
Occasionally, Chancellor Holub utilized multiple organizing principles to make
his case for the restructuring, such as in this email message to campus in February 2009:
I believe that the structures I am proposing make the most sense for the campus at
this particular time. They will provide efficiencies in administration, considerable
monetary savings [budget crisis], minimal disruption of faculty, programs, and
departments, as well as the potential for exciting new collaborations in research
and teaching [interdisciplinarity]. They will also demonstrate that we are taking
the financial crisis seriously and that we are managing the campus effectively
[budget crisis]. I know that not everyone will agree, but I hope that faculty will
put aside their personal preferences and work within the proposed structure
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toward the goal we all want: moving UMass Amherst into the upper echelon of
public research universities in the country [striving for excellence].
Whenever he spoke about the budget crisis, it was in reference to the restructuring
or the plans UMass administrators had put in place to generate more revenues. Also, the
budget crisis was most closely tied to the MA higher education field since it was the state
field that controlled the appropriations coming to campus. The striving for excellence or
interdisciplinarity organizing principles, on the other hand, were generally used as a way
to talk about strategies that would help UMass Amherst to move up in the ranks and these
were more closely related to the public research university field.
After the stimulus funds and various revenue generating strategies were used to
stabilize the campus and after the College of Natural Sciences had been created,
Chancellor Holub was able to turn his attention toward moving UMass toward
excellence. His planning document, the Framework for Excellence provided strategies
toward his goal of bringing UMass Amherst into the upper echelon of public research
universities. Whereas the 2009 version did reference the need for savings because of the
budget crisis, the 2010 version did not focus on this. The entire document revolved
around the organizing principle identified as striving for excellence. One of the core
values of the report is: “Excellence. Maintaining a range of academic offerings and
outputs comparable in quality to those offered at public AAU universities.” Chancellor
Holub equated membership in the AAU with the kind of excellence that the campus
should embody.
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An Alternative Perspective on the Chancellor’s Intentions
While Chancellor Holub described his intentions for UMass Amherst as being in
the best interests of the campus, other campus stakeholders had a different view of the
Chancellor’s motives. Some interview participants reported that they believed the
Chancellor was reorganizing UMass as part of a plan to make changes that would allow
him to compete for a more prestigious job in the public research university field.
Participant #13 stated it this way:
Because it’s always been the case that administrators come and go. They waltz in.
They spend their five years someplace. They muck up the works and then they
move on. They’ve got their CV all padded with their fabulous accomplishments
that the rest of us are left dealing with once they’re gone.
Chancellor Holub vehemently denied these claims during his tenure at the University. He
also mentioned during our interview that he found these kinds of accusations, which were
raised while he was still at UMass, to be an affront to his service to the campus.
Other Stakeholder Perspectives
While Chancellor Holub had the bird’s eye view of campus, most other
stakeholders did not. Only a few of the participants interviewed for this study had
positions that required them to think about the campus in a holistic way. Stakeholders
who worked in specific units on campus perceived Chancellor Holub’s goals for the
restructuring in different ways depending upon where they were located. Also, their
connection to their unit and what the restructuring might mean for it seemed to limit their
ability to take a broader view.
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Faculty who posted responses on the Reorganization Task Force’s blog, as well as
the participants I interviewed, typically used field-related arguments to support what they
believed to be the best strategy for UMass. It was not uncommon for the same arguments
to be used to support opposing ideas about what should be done on campus. It is evident
from their comments that individual faculty were speaking about their own departmental
or college interests and not thinking about the issues from the perspective of the
university as a whole. Below are examples of this:
Participant #7 referenced the Chancellor’s organizing principle of striving for
excellence when speaking about the reasons why it would not make sense to remove the
Department of Psychology from the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences:
I think taking psychology out of SBS was a bad move, in part because it doesn't
make us look at all like AAU institutions and research-intensive social science
colleges have psychology. Even social science/HFA merged colleges tend to have
psychology. So it makes us look a little weird. So I don’t think [the
reorganization] met that goal of having us look like other research intensives.
Scott Auerbach, Professor of Chemistry in the former College of Natural Sciences
and Mathematics was in favor of the creation of the College of Natural Sciences. His
post on the RTF blog indicates a perspective that is tied directly to recent developments
in science at the environmental level and a shift to a life sciences mission regionally and
also as it supports the campus research mission. He wrote:
In general, I favor bringing together elements to create a College of Life and
Physical Sciences. Here’s why… We now know that fields that blend
bio/chem/physics are providing the seminal breakthroughs elucidating the
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machinations of proteins, cells, and beyond, providing “rational design” of new
treatments for disease … We put ourselves in a /uniquely competitive position/
for future development – fundraising, faculty recruitment, center grants – by
rebundling Life and Physical sciences together.
In her comment on the blog, Joya Misra, Professor of Sociology, employs all
three organizing principles used by Chancellor Holub but she does this with a different
strategy in mind – not merging SBS/HFA. Utilizing the budget crisis organizing
principle, she explained why would not make sense to merge the colleges under the
current conditions in 2009. She also made the point that the Colleges of HFA and SBS
were intellectually different and therefore it would be difficult to maintain that difference
in a merged college. She wrote, “While under a merged structure, ‘mini-deans’ could be
created, such an approach does not appear to be the best cost-saving measure.” Second,
she referenced interdisciplinarity, noting that if the campus did not want to jeopardize this
quality, it should not change the structure. She provided the example of the
interdisciplinary Center for Research on Families and how it was nurtured in SBS and
that if it were to move to CNS, it might receive less funding from the dean of the new
college. Finally, in response to the motive of striving for excellence, Professor Misra
reported that merging SBS and HFA might interfere with those goals:
At this moment, our Sociology department is poised to move into the very top tier
[of] Sociology programs in the country. Our research strengths have clearly been
supported effectively and efficiently by the College of Social and Behavioral
Sciences. I have doubts as to whether these programs will be supported as
effectively under a different administrative structure.
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Elizabeth Chilton, Professor of Anthropology used two of the organizing
principles to support her claim that HFA and SBS should not merge. Responding to the
budget crisis, she wrote:
The timing is not right for college mergers in the coming academic year. We are
facing a very serious budget crisis…and the current academic leadership (i.e.
Deans) and administrative structures have best prepared us to deal with these
budget crises.
She also referred to the public research university field in her comment: “There might be
good reasons to merge colleges, but if we look to other institutions that have undergone
such mergers, it is clear that there are initial costs, not immediate savings.” Finally, she
referenced interdisciplinarity as a means to provide support for the creation of a College
of Arts and Sciences rather than a College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences:
Because anthropology really straddles/defies the biological-cultural, and
scientific-humanistic boundaries, there may be some benefit to our particular
department to moving to a College of Arts and Sciences that includes the current
departments in HFA and at least some of the departments in NSM. From a
strategic and academic perspective, I do not see any downside to such a college,
and there would be perhaps more opportunities for a true marriage of the arts and
sciences in our teaching and research.
John Kingston, professor of linguistics, argued that creating a College of Arts and
Sciences would be good for the budget and promote interdisciplinarity:
First, a common administrative staff…would be smaller and thus less costly than
the sum of their staffs. Moreover, it would remove those barriers to cross-college
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cooperation that other posters to this blog have complained of. Second, the
authority granted to the executive dean would be great enough and the term long
enough to make the position appealing, but it would not be so grand as to
duplicate the provost's role... Third, by pooling the RTF that would ordinarily go
to the individual colleges, the new CAS would have the resources and the
flexibility to use them necessary to ensure the success of all constituents.
In the semester prior to taking a vote on the Chancellor’s reorganization proposal,
the Faculty Senate leadership requested a report from each of the senate councils
regarding the impact of the proposal on their area of expertise. Through these reports, the
senate councils found ways to utilize organizing principles and field-type rhetoric to
support their favored outcomes. In these reports, it is evident that the councils were
operating from the perspective of their committee’s singular focus rather than from an
overall view of what might be best for the entire campus.
The Academic Priorities Council used all three organizing principles in their
support of either a College of Arts and Sciences structure or a seven-college model. In
reference to the budget crisis and interdisciplinarity, they wrote: “An organizational
structure should encourage efficient use of resources, break down barriers that inhibit
multidisciplinary research and study, allow units to take advantage of synergies, and
foster a sense of community and shared purpose.” They continue to apply the
interdisciplinarity principle in supporting a CAS structure: “This structure was viewed as
potentially superior in encouraging cross-disciplinary use of resources and collaboration
to meet the needs of the general education curriculum.” Finally, they referenced striving
for excellence when they wrote, “We should build a structure that will have the ‘potential
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to foster external funding and investment and build our national and international
reputation.’ ”
The General Education Council was most concerned about the budget crisis and
whether there would be enough resources for the University to continue to support the
General Education Requirement if the restructuring took place:
We have learned from hard experience, when confronted with earlier
reorganizations, to look at the practical bottom line and to note that the question
of resource support for General Education is generally not addressed as an
important consequence of reorganization...Will there be some redistribution of
resources to insure the integrity and quality of General Education, as the
responsibility for providing faculty and TA resources moves from one Deanship
to another?
The Program and Budget Council commented on the potential savings from
Chancellor Holub’s original restructuring plan but refused to comment on whether the
plan would position the campus for excellence. The International Studies Council
supported the Chancellor’s desire for excellence: “Our aim is, like the Chancellor’s and
the Provost’s, to ensure that we move ‘into the upper echelon of public research
universities in the country.’ ” They were specifically concerned with striving for
excellence as it related to internationalization. In their report, they state:
Any reorganization must be done with an attentive eye to maintaining and
increasing the global diversity on campus and in developing international study
experiences as integral parts of undergraduate education.
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Conclusion
This chapter presented findings of this study based on analysis of the data. The
first part of the chapter described the ways that UMass Amherst’s position in two
organizational fields: public research universities and Massachusetts public higher
education, influenced the actions taken by campus leaders and shaped the way campus
stakeholders considered the circumstances of this case. Various groups and individuals
on campus had specific ideas about the way the University should have responded to the
economic crisis it was facing and they typically couched their interests in rhetoric that
was related to one or both of these fields.
The next section discussed the progression of mission at UMass Amherst as it was
related to the case. For the most part, on-campus stakeholders viewed the mission of
UMass as the traditional three-part university mission of research, teaching, and service,
in keeping with the original land grant mission of the University. However, there was
evidence of a shift in this mission, imposed from outside the campus itself, as state
economies struggled to remain solvent during this period. Following the 2008 economic
crisis, many states, including Massachusetts decreased funding for higher education and
expected that institutions would be able to generate revenues to fill the gaps. At the same
time, state leaders continued to put pressure on institutions to find ways to contribute to
local and regional economies. In Massachusetts, where agriculture had declined as part
of the state economy, biomedical research began to fill that void. Campus and state
leaders encouraged the consolidation of the life sciences to meet the demands of shifts in
science research and also to find ways to expand public/private partnerships and
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economic development. These types of strategies were also being used at the restructured
campuses I reviewed in Chapter Two.
Also in this chapter, I presented the three common organizing principles that
UMass stakeholders used to support their positions on the reorganization. These three
concepts: budget crisis, interdisciplinarity, and striving for excellence, were used by most
groups and individuals across campus as rationales for the plans they championed during
the restructuring. It was not uncommon for people who had very different ideas about the
outcome of the restructuring to use the same rationales when they presented their
arguments. In addition to the organizing principles, I found that campus actors also coopted rhetoric from the fields explored here as well as notions of mission in order to build
arguments that would support their chosen outcome for the reorganization.
Chapter Six discusses implications of this study for policy, mission, and practice
in higher education in general and the University of Massachusetts Amherst in particular.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Introduction
This study examined a case of academic restructuring at the University of
Massachusetts Amherst. On its face, the restructuring appeared to be a response to the
severe economic crisis faced by universities and industries alike beginning in the fall of
2008. However, looking at the case through the lens of organizational field theory
provided a more nuanced view of what happened at UMass Amherst during this time.
Chapter Five presented findings to support the influence of multiple fields and actors on
the eventual reorganization that took place at UMass Amherst. The findings also
uncovered indications of potential shifts in the mission and priorities at UMass Amherst.
Using the framework of organizational field theory, it seems likely that the battles over
structure and the shifts in mission discussed in Chapter Five are not isolated to one
campus, but rather, they are present in the larger field of public research universities.
This chapter presents a discussion of possible implications of these findings for
the future of public research universities. In particular, three main topics inspired deeper
reflection:
1. This study revealed the ways that individual and group influence on campus
conflicted with field-level pressures during the process of campus
reorganization.
2.

Incumbents and challengers on campus used various strategies to influence
the Chancellor’s plans. There were specific power dynamics on campus that
led some faculty to perceive a North versus South divide.
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3. This study highlighted certain shifts in university mission that may have
implications for UMass as well as other universities in the United States.
The Interplay of Multiple Fields and the Environment
Organizations operate in multiple fields simultaneously and their leaders may
make decisions that are influenced by one or more of these fields at the same time. Also,
organizations and fields are subject to fluctuations in the wider environmental context.
For example, shifts in the political or economic landscape make a difference in
institutional decision-making. While it is sometimes difficult to pull apart the distinct
threads of field and environmental influence, this case at UMass Amherst provided an
example of what this interplay may look like. A recent study of universities in Europe
referred to this condition as “nested fields” (Hüther & Krücken, 2016, p. 53). The
researchers discussed the ways that influences from regional, state, and national fields
may lead to either isomorphism or differentiation in a university setting. In European
universities, the results of regulation and access to resources from national, state, and
regional governments are intertwined with increased competition among universities
(Hüther & Krücken, 2016).
Chapter Five explored the ways that different fields exerted pressure on
University leadership. Similar to Hüther and Krücken’s (2016) study, the responses to
the various fields were related to regulation and resources as well as competition with
peers in the research university field. In the UMass case, state budget cuts meant a
reduction in resources within the Massachusetts state higher education field. Strategies to
bring in additional revenues, although influenced by the budget crisis, were generally
“borrowed” from the public research university field, as were the strategies to achieve

196

excellence. The interplay of nested fields is not a neat and tidy occurrence but instead
results in complex outcomes making it difficult to identify how much influence originates
from any particular corner to result in actions or changes on campus. The conceptual
model proposed at the outset of this research now appears too simplistic in light of the
study’s findings and therefore a new model is introduced in the pages to follow.
There are implications here for university leaders to recognize what is happening
in the environment and fields around them so that they can better plan for change.
Although campus leaders are not able to exert much direct influence on environments,
depending on where they are positioned in the field, they likely will be able to effect
some of the actions of their institutional peers. In any event, the place where university
leaders have the most influence over outcomes is on their own campuses; however, they
must be able to recognize who holds power and to work with them accordingly.
Fligstein and McAdam wrote about the ways that skilled leaders are able to
operate between the field and individual actors in order to make change: “Action depends
on both the structural position and the opportunities actors have and their ability to
recognize how they can mobilize others in order to maximize their chances for both
narrowly instrumental and broader existential gain” (pp. 48-49). In the UMass Amherst
case, it appeared that Chancellor Holub was not always skilled at recognizing the sources
of power on campus and mobilizing others towards accomplishing his goals.
A Reconsideration of the Conceptual Model
The conceptual model originally designed for this study and presented in Chapter
Two now appears too simplistic to capture the nuances of multiple fields, the influences
of various stakeholders, and the shifts of a few different missions. The findings of the
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study have led me to rework the model in order to capture a more detailed depiction of
the interactions among the different levels of organization as well as the shifts in mission.
Figure 3 presents this new model.

Figure 3. Updated Conceptual Model
This updated model attempts to demonstrate the reflexive influence among the
various levels of organization. The broader economy and political environment influence
all fields, which in turn influence the organizations within them. Groups and individuals
within these organizations also respond to what happens at these external levels. At the
same time, there is also reflexive influence and tension among each of these spheres.
They have the ability to shape each other; shifts in one level of influence affect the
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others. This study found that tension among organizational fields can lead to different
levels of pressure on organizations therefore influencing decision-making in complex
ways. Also, groups and individuals within the organization exert varied pressures on
leadership, resulting in further tensions. Finally, each of these levels influence and shift
the organizational mission and perhaps as organizational missions shift, so does the field.
UMass Amherst as an Organizational Field within the Larger Context
In the case of the restructuring at UMass Amherst, some elements of Chancellor
Holub’s original proposal were carried out while others were not. In this study, I elected
to look at these outcomes through the lens of organizational field theory in order to make
sense of what happened. Traditional organizational field theory (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Zajac & Kraatz, 1993; Scott, W. R., 1994) might have anticipated a different
outcome for this situation as these scholars focused more heavily on the pressures of
organizational fields and considered organizational actors less important. For example,
they might have expected UMass Amherst to adopt a College of Arts and Sciences model
since this is the structure adopted by most public research universities, and UMass peer
institutions in particular.
However, considering UMass Amherst as its own organizational field functioning
within the fields of public research universities and MA higher education while also
being influenced by larger economic and political forces allows emphasis to be placed on
the strategic actions and power of individual actors and groups within the organization
(Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008, Fligstein & McAdam, 2012; Scott, W. R., 2015). In this
case, environmental influence, field-level pressures, and power dynamics among campus
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actors all exerted pressures that contributed to the final outcome of the reorganization
process.
The financial crisis served as a destabilizing event which Chancellor Holub and
other campus actors saw as an opportunity for change. Chancellor Holub was compelled
by the UMass President’s Office and the legislature to reduce budgets at the University in
the wake of this crisis. Pressure came mainly from the Massachusetts political
environment and MA higher education field, however the specific plan to use
restructuring as a way of cutting costs may have originated in the public research
university field. Many institutions were restructuring in the aftermath of the financial
crisis and Chancellor Holub himself had lived through a restructuring at his home campus
of UC Berkeley. The Chancellor’s senior leadership team likely influenced the specific
restructuring proposal that determined where each of the colleges and departments would
settle. To best understand the various levels of influence, it helps to consider three
phases of the restructuring separately.
The Creation of CNS
The creation of the College of Natural Sciences may be viewed as the most
successful outcome of the reorganization proposal – at least in terms of the parts of the
original proposal that were accomplished. From a field theory perspective, this merger
can be viewed as the result of an alignment of fields, a welcoming environment, and the
cooperation and acceptance of strategic actors on campus.
In the research university field and the economic environment, there was already
a shift underway in how scientific research was being carried out and sponsored.
Participants in this study confirmed that funding from the major research institutions such
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as the NSF and NIH were focused on projects that brought the life sciences together. The
creation of CNS was aligned with this field-level shift.
Within the MA higher education field and the larger environment of MA politics
and economy, the Massachusetts Life Sciences Initiative was created to support efforts
that would provide research and economic development through biomedical research.
Bringing together all of the life sciences departments at the University of Massachusetts
Amherst aligned with this field-level activity and allowed UMass to be better able to
accept state-level grant funding.
Finally, at the local level, in the UMass field, there was sufficient support or at
least disinterest enough to allow this merger to happen without difficulty. The
participants interviewed for this research indicated, as did the documentation from the
time of the restructuring, that faculty members in the Colleges of Natural Resources and
the Environment and Natural Sciences and Mathematics were not opposed to the merger
of their two colleges and some were very much in support. Faculty did not organize to
block this merger and this may have been because the idea of merging the life sciences
had been part of the campus dialogue prior to this time and also because faculty saw the
benefits of this merger.
The Little Merger that Couldn’t
The proposed merger of the Colleges of Social and Behavioral Sciences and
Humanities and Fine Arts lingered in a state of “about to happen” for two and a half
years. For the interview participants who were closest to this proposed merger, the
drawn-out process was oftentimes uncomfortable. Faculty and staff continued to oppose
the merger through three different committee processes convened by university leaders
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who seemed intended to force the issue, regardless of the opinions and preferences of
those in the two affected colleges. In the end, this merger did not happen and looking at
the situation from various field levels may provide insight about what stopped it.
In the public research university field, there was no shift in disciplines or research
that related to this kind of configuration as there was for the CNS merger. Also, almost
none of the AAU institutions to which UMass Amherst compared itself had something
like the proposed College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences; most had a College of
Arts and Sciences.
In the MA higher education field and the larger environment of MA politics and
economy, there was no related statewide initiative or focus on the social sciences,
humanities, and/or fine arts that would lead to a merger like this. Finally, at the local
level, in the UMass field, there was very little support for this merger. The vast majority
of faculty in both of these colleges strongly opposed the merger and through the workings
of three committees, they were able to postpone action on the proposal. By the time
Chancellor Holub announced his resignation in 2011, the campus leadership team had
lost momentum and recognized that it would not be beneficial to continue to pursue the
merger. It would seem that the absence of campus-level support coupled with a lack of
corresponding urgency from organizational fields or the broader environment served to
stop this merger from taking place.
The faculty in SBS and HFA presented a more-or-less united front against the
Chancellor’s wish to merge them but this did not seem to make an impact initially. Over
time and through their on-campus influence, with the help of the Faculty Senate and the
union, and by getting the merger timeline extended on several occasions, the faculty in
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HFA and SBS were able to stop the merger of their colleges. This outcome was due to
action and influence within the UMass field with very little influence from either the
research university field or the Massachusetts public education field.
Power and Status in Computer Science and Polymer Science and Engineering
Early in the decision-making process, Chancellor Holub proposed moving the
Departments of Computer Science and Polymer Science and Engineering into the College
of Engineering. The Chancellor quickly retracted this part of the proposal without it
getting much attention from the rest of campus. He did ask for the Dean of the College
of Engineering to continue talks with the chairs of these two departments to consider
keeping this possibility open. From an organizational field theory perspective, this
particular outcome seems to be a reaction to multiple influences, with the defining one
coming from the local level with a reflection in the larger research university field.
At the public research university level, there was precedent for these departments
to join the College of Engineering because that was the case for more than half of the
Departments of Computer Science in the top 20 according to Participant #11. However,
faculty in Computer Science argued that their discipline, like the department at UMass
Amherst had an outward-facing, interdisciplinary focus and worked toward making
connections with other programs on campus, whereas the culture in the College of
Engineering was more internally focused and therefore not a good fit.
At the MA higher education/state politics level, it is unclear whether there was
support for these departments to move into Engineering. The UMass System Office
reports highlighted the importance of the University’s impact on the workforce in the
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fields of computer science and engineering but this does not suggest support or
opposition to a departmental move.
At the local level, in the UMass field, influential actors in these departments
refused to move. Both of these departments bring millions of dollars in research funding
and prestige to campus because they are top-ranked in the research university field and
the individual faculty members are well-known. Therefore they were able to use their
clout to oppose to this move. Ultimately, the outcome of this part of the Chancellor’s
proposal was based on the local power and national standing of the individuals and the
programs they represented.
As this discussion indicates, it is useful to consider the power dynamics among
actors and groups when considering organizations within their fields and also as
organizational fields in their own right (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008). Wherever there is
a field, there are power dynamics at work. In this case, because the faculty in Polymer
Science and Engineering and in Computer Science had high status on campus and in the
research university field, the Chancellor seemed more willing to respect their wishes to
stay within the College of Natural Sciences and Mathematics – and later the College of
Natural Sciences.
North vs. South: Incumbents and Challengers
Throughout the data gathering and analysis, it became clear that there were
groups and individuals on campus who believed that there was stratification between the
science disciplines and the humanities, fine arts, and social sciences. This discrepancy
became evident as faculty from SBS and HFA departments claimed that they received
fewer resources than their counterparts in the sciences. Because the sciences primarily
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occupy the north end of campus and the SBS/HFA departments the southern part of
campus, this state of affairs was referred to as the “North-South divide.”
On the blog that the Reorganization Task Force set up to allow faculty to
comment on the proposal and the process of reorganization, this reference to the NorthSouth divide was a frequent topic of discussion. In a comment on the blog that the
Reorganization Task Force created, John Kingston, Professor and Chair of Linguistics,
clearly articulated the fears of the faculty in SBS/HFA and their sense of being
disadvantaged by this situation:
Our history has been one of repeated economic challenges, which have left us
wounded but not mortally. The wounds have not been mortal because we have
not been divided during tough times into winners and losers. However, I fear that
if the Chancellor's proposal for reorganization (Plan B) is adopted, it will at last
inflict that mortal wound, by bringing about the division we have escaped before
now. It would do so in two ways. First, it joins units that want to be together into
the new CNS, while forcing units that don't want to be together into the new
CHASS. Second and equally corrosive, it concentrates the wealthy into one
college and the impoverished into another.
Using a field theory lens, this situation can be considered an encounter between
incumbents and challengers within the UMass field. W. R. Scott (2015) used the term
“excluded actors” to describe the ways that the SBS and HFA faculty might have
considered their position during this time and he remarked on the ways actors such as
these might be mobilized. In this case there is evidence that the faculty union and
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department chairs galvanized the SBS and HFA faculty to resist action they did not want
to happen.
If the challengers were the SBS and HFA faculty, the incumbents were faculty in
the College of Natural Sciences who seemed to get what they wanted with a minimum of
disruption. Also, faculty in the Departments of Computer Science and Polymer Science
and Engineering were able to avoid being moved without having to organize a protest
because they brought more resources to campus and represented power through their rank
in the public research university field.
Shifting the Mission of the University
In addition to considering the ways that field theory can be applied to the UMass
Amherst restructuring, I also used this study to contemplate the ways that mission might
be shifting in the University and if this is happening, how organizational fields may be
part of these mission changes. Three shifts in mission at the University of Massachusetts
Amherst were identified through this study and I have dubbed them: University as Driver
of the Economy, Reframing the Land Grant Mission, and Interdisciplinarity. These shifts
appear to be linked to each other and influenced by both of the fields as well as the
broader environmental context discussed here. Further, while is it not possible to
generalize results from one case study to all public research universities, it would be
interesting future research to investigate whether other institutions are facing similar
shifts in mission. Such a discovery would appear to support the premise behind the
conceptual framework for this study, which surmises that there is a reflexive connection
among fields and organizations so a shift in an organization’s mission is both influenced
by and influences the fields to which it belongs.
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Each of the mission shifts mentioned above was discussed in detail in Chapter
Five. This section will offer further consideration of the connections between these
evolved missions and where the field of public research universities may be heading. J.
Scott (2006) provided an in-depth discussion of the evolution of the missions of the
university. Two of these missions, democratization and public service, were specific to
universities in the United States. The evolution of mission at UMass Amherst might be
considered an evolution of both of these. Other scholars have pointed to privatization as
an emerging mission of higher education (Allan, 2007; Slaugher & Rhoades, 2009;
Travis, 2013). Tension between an emerging privatization mission and the traditional
democratization and public service missions may be one way to interpret the results of
this study. Labaree (1997), Thelin (2011), and others have written about the shift from
higher education as a public good to a private good at a time when political and economic
environmental influences change the ways that public universities do business; according
to these scholars, universities are becoming more business-like.
As discussed in Chapter Two, democratization as a mission derived from the
founding of an independent nation that valued individual rights and the ideals of selfgovernment (J. Scott, 2006). This mission has evolved over decades to represent
increased access to higher education for individuals at all socio-economic levels and an
opportunity for social mobility. The public service mission originated with the Morrill
Land Grant Act and a vision that universities would provide services to support the public
in their local regions (Scott J., 2006). At the time, the United States was supported
heavily by an agrarian economy and public service typically meant assistance with
agricultural techniques and methods. This mission has shifted in more modern times to
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include community service in urban areas and partnerships that are intended to work
toward solutions to social problems.
Travis (2013) wrote about the challenges to public university survival if the
current trend of shrinking appropriations continues. One of the strategies that universities
are increasingly using as state funding to public higher education decreases is
privatization of some services and generating revenues from other sources. These
strategies are reinforced within the public research university field as institutions compete
with each other. As discussed in this case, universities like UMass Amherst have relied
on similar approaches to bring in more funding; some of these include: increased
enrollment of out-of-state and international students who can pay higher tuition,
development of new master’s programs, more online course offerings, and research with
corporate sponsors that leads to patents and business spinoffs.
Travis (2013) argued that this path leads to increased stratification of higher
education, less access for people in lower socioeconomic groups, and therefore the loss of
another mission – democratization. He also raises concerns about “diminishing
commitment to public service” as ties to corporate entities have increased along with the
call to focus on workforce development and the bottom line (Travis, 2013, p. 7). Other
scholars (Gumport, 2011; Marginson, 2011; Talburt, 2005) are also concerned with the
dangers of adopting market-based strategies in higher education as a way to remain
competitive with peers and in the rankings, and they see this trend as an adoption of
neoliberal values in public higher education.
Through this analysis I am suggesting that the democratization and public service
missions may have been compromised by an encroaching privatization mission and now
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constitute a newly evolved mission that can be described as University as Driver of the
Economy. When discussing the University and its relation to the economy in
Massachusetts, Chancellor Holub and other participants, including reports from the
UMass System Office, have stated that the University should be trying to contribute
skilled employees to the workforce, particularly in specific industries such as “computer
& information sciences and health (bachelor’s level), natural sciences and engineering
(master’s level) and education and natural sciences (doctoral level)” (University of
Massachusetts, 2006, p. 3). This workforce development charge can be viewed as a new
take on the democratization mission, which was intended to provide benefit to
individuals. Rather than developing an educated citizenry for the sake of participating in
the democratic process, perhaps this new mission is now focused on providing individual
citizens with marketable skills to stimulate the economy.
In terms of the public service (land grant) mission that once provided farming
communities with new procedures for planting, the neoliberal public service mission
appears to be about developing new public/private partnerships through research with
corporate sponsors. The Reframing of the Land Grant mission appears to be a subset of
the University as Driver of the Economy mission as they are tied together in many ways.
I have discussed previously the possibility that public research universities are
adopting a version of the European-style nationalization mission, which has been utilized
to provide students and research that would serve the interests of their countries. In the
U.S. some states’ departments of higher education are ratcheting up expectations for
public universities to do more work to benefit local and regional economies through
contribution of skilled workers (graduates) to the local workforce as well as research and
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service that can bring financial benefits to the state and the region (Zumeta, 2004). These
governmental actors are reinforcing the idea of the university as an economic engine.
Where does this conversation leave the new mission of Interdisciplinarity? Based
on this study, interdisciplinarity appears to have its connections in the research university
field and the greater scientific research environment. This mission is likely also
connected to the political environment through shifts in funding support for specific kinds
of research. More directed study is needed to determine the ways that interdisciplinarity
might be viewed as a mission of its own or perhaps as a framework for the traditional
research, teaching, and service missions.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Because the study of higher education is interdisciplinary and applied, research is
intended to contribute to policy and practice. This study can provide guidance for
university leaders when considering how to best approach campus-level changes.
Furthermore, the findings from this study provide insight for policy-makers at the state
and federal levels to reconsider the goals and mission of higher education while setting
policy and considering funding models.
Consideration for Campus Level Changes
The discussion above raises implications for university leaders to recognize the
interplay between broader environmental influences such as the economic, political, and
cultural climate; the pull of organizational fields; and the culture and power dynamics
within the organizational field that is their own campus. This is particularly important
when there is a challenge to the stability or survival of the campus (internal or external).
Within the organization as field, there are actors who have more obvious power than
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others and they will move to use their power to serve their interests. Despite the fact that
other actors on campus may not have the appearance of power, they nevertheless may be
able to influence situations in their favor. In the UMass Amherst case, actors used fieldlevel rhetoric and the organizing principles introduced in Chapter Five as frames to
support their interpretation of and proposed solutions for the situation. Had Chancellor
Holub and Provost Staros recognized more fully the ways that campus-level actors would
react to the proposed reorganization, they might have approached the process differently.
Barrier and Musselin (2016) learned from the cases they studied that presenting
efficiency and cost savings as rationales for merger was less successful than considering
the academic mission of the institutions. It appears that this also happened in the UMass
Amherst case as the creation of CNS, one of the only pieces of the original plan that was
carried out, was seen as aligned with the research mission of the sciences. Much of the
opposition to the HFA/SBS merger was presented in terms of a lack of connection of that
merger to an academic mission. Also in the Barrier and Musselin (2016) cases, some
reorganizing decisions were based on actions that would take the least amount of time
and be the least disruptive to the campuses. Knowing that these are influential factors
might affect the ways that university leaders choose to present their arguments for
change.
Rethinking the Goals and Funding of Public Higher Education: The Noxious Effects
of Constant Competition
The discussion of shifting missions above brings into consideration the viability
of public higher education in the future. The concerns raised by Travis (2013),
Marginson (2011), Gumport (2001), and Labaree (1997) are shared by several scholars of
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higher education. The downward trends in funding for public universities do not appear
to be reversing, which leads institutions to continue to create new strategies for
institutional survival, fueling the endless competition for rankings and resources.
Although not a direct result of this study, questions can be raised about the institutional
search for excellence and the constant competition this entails. As other scholars have
pointed out, the focus on rankings is eroding the democratization mission of higher
education (Gumport, 2001; Marginson, 2011; Thelin, 2011), making higher education,
particularly at competitive universities, less accessible to students who come from lower
income backgrounds and under-resourced school districts.
My initial recommendation for this challenge was to call on university presidents
and trustees, heads of state departments of higher education, and political leaders to
convene to talk about new ways to fund higher education and restore the previous
democratization and public service missions to our universities. Truthfully, I do not
believe this will happen. There has been some movement, mainly at the community
college level, to make higher education more affordable. What organizational field
theory demonstrates is that no one level of organization will achieve change on its own.
It would require pressure in the same direction from each of the levels of organization
discussed here. There would need to be influence from the broader environment, shifts at
a few incumbent institutions within the public research university field (most likely those
who are secure enough in their positions and are located in states where the economy has
fully recovered), along with continued pressure from stakeholders within the institutions
themselves to make these kinds of changes. If incumbents in these fields begin to shift,
contender organizations with the right kinds of financial support may be able to follow.
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Perhaps it requires a revolt against the rankings systems that most institutional leaders
criticize as flawed even while they continue to try to influence their position in them. At
one time, it was thought that online education and massive open online courses (MOOCs)
might serve as a disruptor to challenge the current model of higher education. So far, this
prediction does not seem to have come to fruition.
Directions for Future Research
This study explored one case of restructuring in an attempt to consider
environmental and organizational field influences as well as local influences on a specific
decision-making process. As previously stated, findings from a single case cannot be
generalized to an entire area of study but they can point to areas for additional research.
This section offers suggestions for potential topics of future investigation.
Field Shapes Mission Shapes Field
While the recursive nature of mission and field seem like a logical notion, there is
not enough evidence from this one case study to fully support this idea. Future work
should consider the development of mission through the lens of organizational field
theory. A historical review of mission and planning documents from multiple institutions
within a specific field over a long time period is one suggested approach for this work.
Another way to learn about what is important to a university is to investigate its budget.
Most organizations use their financial resources to support their core functions. A
longitudinal study of changes in university budgets and funding sources, or in the ways
budgets are allocated would also indicate shifts in mission and priorities.
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Consequences of Competition
Another perception that arose out of this research was that access to higher
education, mainly at public research universities, may be decreasing. Without a
continued focus on diversity and access at universities, the constant competition and
pressure to perform better in the rankings may have the consequence of making it more
difficult for students from diverse backgrounds, and particularly those from more difficult
economic circumstances, to access higher education. At UMass Amherst and other
institutions where there was restructuring after the economic crisis of 2008, many
universities began to increase enrollment of out-of-state and international students in
order to generate more revenues for campus survival.
In the UMass Amherst case, Chancellor Holub frequently boasted about the
increased SAT score and high school grade point averages of incoming students.
However, there is evidence of a connection between academic achievement and SAT
performance and family income, and that this disproportionately disadvantages Black
students (Dixon-Roman, Everson, & McArdle, 2013). A study that took a longitudinal
look at the demographic shifts of college enrollment, particularly by race/ethnicity,
socioeconomic, and first generation status, alongside institutional movement in rankings
like the annual U.S. News and World Report might be a first step in investigating this
area of research.
STEM as Driver of Field or Local Priorities?
The creation of the College of Natural Sciences represents the piece of the UMass
restructuring process that seemed to have the most support from those who would be
affected by it. Another aspect of the proposed restructuring that did not take place but

214

was handled quickly and without rancor was the transfer of the Departments of Polymer
Science and Engineering and Computer Science to the College of Engineering. Powerful
faculty in these departments dismissed this proposal and the Chancellor did not continue
to pursue it. Each of these actions happened relatively quickly compared to the
protracted circumstances that personnel in the Colleges of Humanities and Fine Arts and
Social and Behavioral Sciences endured. In each of the former cases, the stakeholders
belonged to the STEM disciplines. As described above, the perception of these
circumstances on the part of faculty from the social sciences, humanities, and fine arts
was that science faculty were given greater campus resources than their SBS/HFA
counterparts. Using field theory language and the SBS/HFA faculty interpretation to
describe this situation, researchers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
fields (STEM) appeared in this case as the incumbents whereas SBS/HFA faculty saw
themselves as challengers who had to work harder for resources while teaching more than
their fair share of students. The answer to who had more resources is difficult to
ascertain but the North vs. South saga of campus was certainly salient for many campus
stakeholders.
The perceived importance of STEM disciplines goes beyond the UMass Amherst
campus. Recently, there has been increased attention paid by government and businesses
to the STEM disciplines in higher education, with an emphasis on the ways that science
research can affect the larger society (and the economy) and also a call to encourage
students from diverse backgrounds to major in STEM fields. Important grantmakers in
higher education have provided funds to attract more women and students of color to
study STEM disciplines. A study that explored whether STEM fields are seen as more
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valuable across the research university field than other disciplines would be interesting,
particularly as it may relate to shifts in the land grant mission and an increasing emphasis
on market-driven strategies. In addition, looking at trends in student enrollment in
various disciplines over time in the context of environmental and field priorities would be
informative to the study of higher education.
Conclusion
This study brought together organizational field theory with the mission of
universities by means of a deep investigation of one university’s attempt at restructuring.
The results offer a look at the interplay of environment, organizational fields, and local
actors and how interactions among them can influence the intended transformation of a
campus. University leaders should be able to gauge the various influences from the
external environment, understand their institution’s position within organizational fields,
and at the same time recognize the various cultures and challenges among stakeholders
on their own campus before embarking on a change process. Thinking about the
university as its own organizational field can be useful in considering the different types
of power and influence that exist within individuals and groups on a campus. It may be
useful to recognize which organizing principles resonate with different facets of the
campus community and which will do not.
This study hinted at possible shifts in mission on this particular campus and these
shifts may be reflected in the field of public research universities as well. The research
presented here offers thoughts about changes to policy and practice that could lead to
improvements on individual campuses as well as in the field of higher education itself.
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Finally, I have offered some avenues for further research into a number of areas that
came to light.
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Northeastern
University

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Arizona State
University

selective private
research university
admissions=very
difficult
2012 acceptance rate
was 31%
undergraduate
enrollment= >16,000
students

comprehensive
public research
university
admissions=moderat
ely difficult
undergraduate
enrollment=59,000
(Tempe campus)

Type/Demographics

University

5)

4)

3)

1)
2)

7)

5)
6)
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The College of Arts
and Sciences (CAS)
was divided into
three smaller colleges

"As Northeastern elevates its overall research
profile, the University has both a challenge and
an opportunity to establish stronger external
identities for research programs... Bringing into
closer alignment programs that have natural
affinities in the research arena—from
infrastructure needs to the potential for
interdisciplinary collaboration—will heighten
the visibility of these programs and their
colleges to key research audiences, including
graduate applicants, potential faculty hires, and
research funding agencies" (Northeastern
University, 2009, p. 1)

"All these things would improve the quality of
academic programs and better prepare students
to enter the workforce and pursue fruitful
careers." (Arizona State University, 2008, p. 2)

Proposed a number of
college mergers to
reduce administrative
overhead. They did
not propose cutting
any tenure track
faculty but they did
cut staff.

1)
2)
3)
4)

Budget cuts
Increased efficiency/effectiveness
Increase interdisciplinary focus
Enhance research to attract new
funding
Branding and competition
Economic development (for the
state)
Growth of university =changing
mission
Competition/ Selectivity
New structure supports new hybrid
management and budgeting system
Enhance research focus to attract
research funding
Expanding its market
(globalization)
Increase interdisciplinary focus

Structural changes Select quotes & connection to the
field/external forces

Stated rationales/discourses

CONTEMPORARY CASES OF RESTRUCTURING AND THEIR RATIONALES

APPENDIX A

• public research university
• first university established
in Ohio and ninth oldest
public university in the U.S.
• admissions= moderately
difficult
• 2012 acceptance rate 77%
• undergraduate enrollment=
>22,500 students

Type/Demographics

University of • public research university
Arkansas
• focus on online education
Little Rock
• 2012 acceptance rate 96%
• admissions=minimally
difficult admissions
• undergraduate
enrollment=10,300

Ohio State
University

University
Several parts: Refocused the
College of Health Sciences
and Professions, moved some
departments into the Patton
College of Education, and
established a multidisciplinary
Academic Health Center.

Structural changes

Proposed restructure
• merging student affairs into
academic affairs
• VP for Research position
changed to Vice Provost for
Research, Innovation, and
Economic Development
• New position Associate Vice
Chancellor for Academic
Programs and Institutional
Effectiveness
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1) Economic development
(for the state)
2) strategically increasing
enrollment by reaching
out to underserved
populations
3) increased expectations of
public accountability
4) Competition
5) Take advantage of
retirements in several
leadership positions

Stated
rationales/discourses
1) Enhance research focus to
attract research funding
2) Economic development
(for the state)
3) Increase interdisciplinary
focus
4) Competition and striving
for prominence
5) Economic development
(for the state)

"The university faces changing student
demographics, declining state support,
changing accreditation standards, a call to
double the number of graduates by 2025,
performance funding, frequent legislative
mandates, more competition from both public
and private universities, increasing technology
demands, and persistent political turbulence in
Washington, D.C." (Anderson, 2013, p. 4)
AND "There are many external forces and
threats affecting UALR. The institution is
facing competition from both in-state and outof-state universities including public, private
and for‐profit institutions." (Toro, 2013, p. 3)

Select quotes & connection to the
field/external forces
"The expansion of the college also will permit
it to become even more entrepreneurial in its
approach to serving the state of Ohio and
meeting the needs of local communities."
AND
"Each of these programs [within the newly
reorganized college] will contribute
significantly to the new college’s potential for
national prominence." (p. 2)

Stated rationales/
discourses
1. Competition/
Selectivity
2. Economic development
(for the state)
3. Increase
interdisciplinary focus
1. They combined the College
of Natural Sciences with the
College of Humanities and
Humanities and Fine Arts,
2. They also cut out one
administrative division
(Marketing and
Advancement), and
3. The merged the English
department into the Dept. of
Modern Languages

Structural changes

and maintain an inclusive educational
environment that prepares students to thrive in
a diverse global environment Goal 5.
Enhance the economic, social, cultural, and
sustainable development of the state Goal 6.
Ensure accountability, affordability, and
access

Select quotes & connection to the
field/external forces
From their strategic plan:
Goal 1. Be a leading undergraduate public
university that provides a strong liberal arts
foundation Goal 2. Provide rigorous and
relevant graduate education that meets the
needs of graduate students, the university, and
the community Goal 3. Lead the state and
nation in pre K‐12 education Goal 4. Create
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Sources: Academic Restructuring Task Force, 2013; Anderson, 2013;Arizona State University, 2013; Arizona State University, 2008;
Arizona State University Senate, 2010; Benoit, 2009; Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2013; Northeastern
University, 2009; Northeastern University News Office, 2009; Northeastern University, 2013; Northern Iowa Student Government,
2010; Ohio University, 2010; Ohio University, 2013; Peterson's, 2013; Toro, 2013; University of Northern Iowa, 2013; University of
Northern Iowa, 2010; Watson, 2008

•

•

•

•

University of
Northern Iowa

public university and
former normal school
2012 acceptance rate
was 77%
admissions=moderately
difficult
undergraduate
enrollment=10,655

Type/Demographics

University

PLAYING THE FIELD
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SOURCE DOCUMENTS

Special Report of the Academic Priorities Council and Rules Committee concerning Procedures
to be Followed in the Merger of Academic Programs to Faculty Senate, February 14, 2002.
Holub nominated for Chancellor: Trustees to vote May 5, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, May 1, 2008.
Robert C. Holub Approved and UMass Amherst Chancellor, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, May 5, 2008.
Trustees approve Holub Appointment, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst,
May 5, 2008.
Holub sets goal of moving campus into top public ranks in US, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, May 6, 2008.
Cole thanks Senate, offers advice to Holub, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, May 19, 2008.
Holub calls for moving campus into top publics nationally, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, August 28, 2008.
UMass Amherst Faculty Convocation to Feature First Formal Address to Faculty by Chancellor
Robert Holub, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst, September 5, 2008.
Holub to address Faculty Senate Sept. 18. Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst,
September 7, 2008.
At Convocation, Holub outlines key areas for improvement, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, September 12, 2008.
Patrick weighs emergency cuts as revenues plummet, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, September 22, 2008.
Faculty, administration should work as partners, Holub tells Senate, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, September 23, 2008.
UMass Amherst Provost Charlena Seymour Announces She Will Resign From Her Position of
Leadership, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst, October 1, 2008.
Seymour stepping down as provost, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst,
October 1, 2008.

Chancellor Holub letter to John McCarthy re: creation of Budget Task Force, November 24,
2008.
Minutes, Board of Trustees, December 11, 2008.
Minutes, Faculty Senate, December 11, 2008.
“Sacrifice” at UMass, Daily Hampshire Gazette, December 18, 2008.
Department of Anthropology Response to Possible College Mergers, December 22, 2008.
Memo from Chairs of SBS regarding Potential College Mergers, January 5, 2009.
Administrative reorganization should protect academic quality, says Holub, Office of News and
Media Relations, UMass Amherst, January 13, 2009.
General faculty meeting called to discuss budget, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, January 21, 2009.
McCarthy reports on activities of Budget Planning Task Force, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, January 22, 2009.
UMass central administrators Shrewsbury-bound, Telegram & Gazette, Worcester, MA, January
22, 2009.
UMass campus braces for budget cuts, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, January 25, 2009.
Minutes, Faculty Senate, January 29, 2009.
Holub addresses budget concerns, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, January 30, 2009.
Holub addresses Senate, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, January 30, 2009.
Holub, faculty discuss budget, possible reorganization, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, January 30, 2009.
Holub forms task force on proposed college reorganization, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, February 3, 2009.
Holub releases details on restructuring, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, February 3, 2009.
Memorandum from Chancellor Holub to Faculty Senate Secretary Ernie May re: College
Reorganization Proposal, February 4, 2009.
Faculty, chancellor to meet again on reorganization, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, February 4, 2009.
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Reorganization task force members named, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, February 6, 2009.
Minutes, Faculty Senate February 9, 2009.
Holub addresses Senate on reorganization possibilities, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst,
February 9, 2009.
Faculty back broader discussion of reorganization, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, February 10, 2009.
A Strategic Vision for UMass Amherst, Chancellor’s Address to Retired Faculty, February 11,
2009.
The chancellor, the students and the campus reshuffle, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst,
February 11, 2009.
Reorganization task force creates blog to solicit comment from campus, Office of News and
Media Relations, UMass Amherst, February 24, 2009.
UMass Board of Trustees vote on $1,500 fee increase, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst,
February 25, 2009.
Minutes, Board of Trustees, February 27, 2009.
UMass Amherst Reorganization Task Force: Community Blog: All comments, February, 2009.
Task force starts blog, invites comments, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, March 3, 2009.
Fountain to brief Senate on reorganization comments, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, March 5, 2009.
Preliminary Report, UMass Amherst Reorganization Task Force, March 6, 2009.
60 UMass Amherst faculty receive notices of non-reappointment, The Daily Collegian, UMass
Amherst, March 11, 2009.
Minutes Faculty Senate, March 12, 2009.
Presentation to Faculty Senate by Jane Fountain, Task Force on Reorganization, March 12, 2009.
Reorganization Task Force Report to Faculty Senate, March 6, 2009
UMass Chancellor: Time to rethink higher ed funding, Daily Hampshire Gazette, Northampton,
MA, March 12, 2009.
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Holub releases academic reorganization plan, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, March 12, 2009.
Holub offers new details, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, March 13, 2009.
Task force favors college of arts and sciences model, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, March 13, 2009.
Faculty Senate to discuss reports on reorganization, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, March 15, 2009.
Stimulus money coming to UMass aid, Daily Hampshire Gazette, Northampton, MA, March 25,
2009.
Minutes, Faculty Senate, March 26, 2009.
Profile/ Heavy decisions weigh on Holub, keep him busy, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst,
March 29, 2009.
Solving the puzzle, UMass Magazine, Spring 2009.
Framework for Excellence: The Flagship Report, UMass Amherst, Spring 2009.
Holub updates campus on advocacy, reorganization, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, April 2, 2009.
Academic Priorities Council Report on Campus Reorganization, April 7, 2009.
Budget plan detailed: UMass to see $10M in cuts, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, April
13, 2009.
Holub calls for $10m cut in campus spending, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, April 14, 2009.
UMass debates massive academic reorganization, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, May 5,
2009.
Faculty Senate creates strategic oversight panel, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, May 9, 2009.
Academic reorganization faces Faculty Senate votes, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, May 11, 2009.
Special Report from Robert C. Holub Concerning a Proposed Campus Reorganization Plan, May
14, 2009.

225

Senate panel proposes $408.8m for University system, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, May 14, 2009.
Memoranda of Understanding for the Transfer of the Department of Resource Economics to the
Isenberg School of Management, May 14, 2009.
Faculty Senate approves College of Natural Sciences, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, May 15, 2009.
James V Staros Named Provost and Senior Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs at UMass
Amherst, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst, June 4, 2009.
Faculty Senate Campus Reorganization Survey--Item-by-Item Results, June 8, 2009.
Legislators Pass $27.4b state budget, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst,
June 20, 2009.
Patrick signs $27.04b state budget, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst, June
30, 2009.
Malone named vice chancellor for Research and Engagement, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, July 2, 2009.
The Budget in Brief: Part 1, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, August
16, 2009.
Holub updates legislators on campus budget, other initiatives, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, September 16, 2009.
Leaders, faculty celebrate “birth” of new college, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, September 17, 2009.
Holub calls for expanding campus revenues, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, September 18, 2009.
Charge to the College Reorganization Study Committee, September 20, 2009.
Faculty convocation address, October 2, 2009.
At installation, Holub calls for developing new revenues as buffer against budget reductions,
Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst, October 2, 2009.
Chancellor Holub addresses the future in first Convocation speech, The Daily Collegian, UMass
Amherst, October 4, 2009.
Provost’s Report to the Faculty Senate, UMass Amherst, October 15, 2009.
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Reinforcements needed at UMass-Amherst, Boston Globe, October 19, 2009.
Provost details plans for closing budget hole, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, October 19, 2009.
Focus is on budget-planning in months ahead, says Holub, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, October 22, 2009.
Email correspondence, CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee, November, 2009
Budget task force focusing on fiscal priorities, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, November 12, 2009.
CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee Meeting Minutes, November 17, 2009.
Review of Impacts to Campus Budget FY10 to FY12, UMass Amherst, December 2009.
CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee Meeting Minutes, December 9, 2009.
Minutes, Faculty Senate, December 15, 2009.
Amid uncertainty, campus shaping budget plans, says Holub, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, December 16, 2009.
SBS Research Committee memo regarding proposed merger of SBS and HFA, January 13, 2010.
Branding effort aims to create “compelling” campus identity, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, January 21, 2010.
Research and Engagement, University Relations announce reorganization, new assignments,
Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst, January 27, 2010.
Patrick proposed $500.5m for University system, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, January 28, 2010.
CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee, Advising Subcommittee Report, February
2010.
CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee, Development, Alumni Relations and
Communications Subcommittee Report, February 2010.
CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee, Curriculum Subcommittee Report, February
2010.
CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee, Personnel Subcommittee Report, February 23,
2010.
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CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee, Structure Subcommittee Report, February 24,
2010.
Minutes, Board of Trustees, February 24, 2010.
Presentation by Michael Malone to Faculty Senate, February 25, 2010.
CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee, Personnel and Finance Subcommittee Report,
February 28, 2010.
CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee, Personnel Subcommittee Lecturer Personnel
Committees Addendum, March 1, 2010.
CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee Meeting Agenda, March 2, 2010.
Minutes, CHFA-CSBS College Reorganization Committee Meeting, March 2, 2010.
Malone identifies “accelerators” to encourage research growth, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, March 3, 2010.
Report of the CHFA-CSBS Reorganization Committee, March 21, 2010.
Report of the CHFA-CSBS Reorganization Committee to Deans Joel Martin and Robert
Feldman, March 29, 2010.
New video provides campus budget primer, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass
Amherst, April 1, 2010.
House budget would cut campus funding by $45 million, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, April 15, 2010.
Executive vice chancellor for University Relations Milligan resigns, The Daily Collegian,
UMass Amherst, April 21, 2010.
Deans response to CHFA-CSBS Reorganization Committee report, April 30, 2010.
Campus assessing impact of state cuts, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst,
July 1, 2010.
UMass Amherst to Restructure Administration, Increasing Focus on Information Technology
and External Relations, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst, July 29, 2010.
Funding cliff looming, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, September 8, 2010.
Faculty Senate has full Sept. 16 agenda, 2010-11 schedule listed, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, September 12, 2010.
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Proposed merger between SBS and HFA met with scrutiny, opposition to faculty, The Daily
Collegian, UMass Amherst, September 13, 2010.
University of Massachusetts Rated One of the Best Universities in the World, Only New
England Public University to Make “Gold Standard” List, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, September 16, 2010.
Provost to convene new “working group” to examine merging HFA, SBS, The Daily Collegian,
UMass Amherst, September 21, 2010.
Holub convocation text, October 1, 2010.
‘Become what we are’ is Holub’s Convention message, Office of News and Media Relations,
UMass Amherst, October 5, 2010.
Memo from Walker regarding research development support for HFA and SBS, November 2,
2010.
New revenue sources a must, says Holub, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst,
November 17, 2010.
Framework for Excellence, Presentation to the Faculty Senate, December 2, 2010.
Framework for Excellence email, December 3, 2010.
Ad Hoc Committee on Strategic Oversight (AHCSO), December 2010.
Framework for Excellence, Vision, Mission, Goals, UMass Amherst, December 2010.
Proposal for the Establishment of a College of Humanities, Arts & Sciences (CHASS), January
20, 2011.
CHASS vision statement draft, January 20, 2011.
Memo Clarification on the Provostial Working Group’s role in the process for submitting the
proposal for a College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences (CHASS), January 27, 2011.
Memo to Faculty Senate regarding proposal to establish CHASS, January 31, 2011.
Report of the Graduate Council on the CHASS Proposals, February 2011.
Address by Chancellor Holub to Faculty Senate, February 3, 2011.
Holub reviews accomplishments, Office of News and Media Relations, UMass Amherst,
February 4, 2011.
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MSP CHFA/CSBS Merger Poll results, February 14, 2011.
MSP survey, February 14, 2011.
Faculty Group Supports CHASS, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, February 15, 2011.
Minutes, Faculty Senate, February 24, 2011.
Report of University Relations and Advancement Committee to the proposed merger of HFA
and SBS, February 28, 2011.
Provost to name interim deans to advance merger discussions, Office of News and Media
Relations, UMass Amherst, March 3, 2011.
Research Council report regarding proposal to merge CSBS and CHFA into one college,
CHASS, March 17, 2011.
Minutes, Faculty Senate, March 24, 2011.
Provost memo regarding reappointments of Hayes and Feldman, March 24, 2011.
Program and Budget Council report on the CHASS proposal, March 30, 2011.
Faculty Senate Status Report and Summary of Improvements on Possible Diversity Impact from
creation of CHASS, March 30, 2011.
SBS/HFA merger update, email from John McCarthy to Merger stakeholders in SBS/HFA, June
7, 2011.
Chancellor Holub to leave UMass, The Daily Collegian, UMass Amherst, September 5, 2011.
45 separate emails from Chancellor Holub to campus community from 2008-2011.
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APPENDIX C
LIST OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS
Former Chancellor Robert Holub
Staff from the Provost’s or Chancellor’s Area (3 individuals)
Deans or former deans (5 individuals)
Department chairs/program directors or former chairs (4 individuals)
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APPENDIX D
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
The purpose of these questions is to get at the following issues:
•

Evidence of influence from organizational fields

•

Information about the participant’s role in the restructuring process and how they believe
they influenced the outcome

•

Evidence of shifts in institutional logics/mission through the reorganization

Tell me how you came to be at UMass?
What was your role at the time of the proposed restructuring?
How do you keep up with changes in the field of higher education?
Where did ideas for the restructuring come from?
What were the motives for the restructuring?
What did the final restructuring look like? What was it supposed to look like?
How was the new structure supposed to match these motives? (What problem were we trying to
solve?)
What do you think the restructuring was supposed to do? What problem was it trying to solve?
Who are we competing against? Which institutions do you look to for guidance on what to do
next? Was there a specific model for the merger?
Where were you trying to go with the restructuring? What did you think the best model looked
like? What got in the way of accomplishing that?
What is the most important thing for UMass to accomplish?
How much do we need to respond to calls from the state to be an engine of economic
development? What does that look like for UMass? How important is this? What does it mean
for us? How might it shape how we do things?
It seemed that the chancellor really wanted all of the parts of the restructuring to happen but it
didn’t. Why do you think it turned out the way it did? What factors influenced the “successful”
creation of CNS? What factors got in the way of merging SBS and HFA? Where there other
pieces that were proposed that “should” have happened?
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Questions should get at how much of the action was field-related and how much was individual
actor influenced.
How did your position/role influence the part you played in the restructuring process?
Who was in charge? Who was able to get things done? Why?
In what ways were you able to influence the outcome of the reorganization? In what ways do you
wish you had influenced the outcome of the reorganization?
Who else should I talk to?
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APPENDIX E
INFORMED CONSENT
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
CONSENT FOR VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION
I volunteer to participate in this qualitative study and understand that:
1. I will be interviewed by Jacqueline Brousseau-Pereira who will be following an interview
guide.
2. I will be asked questions related to the body of public documents regarding the academic
restructuring of the University of Massachusetts Amherst during the tenure of Chancellor
Robert Holub (2008-2011).
3. I understand that the primary purpose of this research is to study the restructuring process
in its entirety – specifically the ways in which the restructuring may have been influenced
by the University’s relationship to other institutions and the state. I further understand that
the researcher is considering how restructuring might influence university mission.
4. The interview will be digitally recorded to facilitate analysis of the data.
5. I have the option of selecting how I would like to be represented in this study (please
choose one):

□ I will allow the use of my name and job title
□ I will allow the use of a descriptive title, e.g. upper-level administrator, professor, faculty
union representative, faculty senator, trustee,

□ I prefer to be classed as a specific category of actor, e.g. witness, decision maker, etc.
□ I prefer to remain anonymous, use a pseudonym and disguise my position.
6. I may withdraw from part or all of this study at any time.
7. I have the right to review material prior to any publication or sharing of findings. I
understand that a copy of the transcript from this interview will be provided to me.
8. I understand that results from this interview will be used in this doctoral study.
9. I am free to participate or not to participate without prejudice.
10. Because of the small number of participants, approximately twelve, I understand that there
is some risk that I may be identified as a participant of this study even if I have chosen to
remain anonymous or disguised.

_________________________________
Researcher’s Signature

________________________________
Participant’s Signature

_______________
Date

_______________
Date
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APPENDIX F
QUESTIONS TO GUIDE PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
•

How was the text produced? By whom?

•

What is the ostensible purpose of the text? Might the text serve other unstated or
assumed purposes? Which ones?

•

How does the text represent what is author(s) assumed to exist? Which meanings
are embedded within it? How do those meanings reflect a particular social,
historical, and perhaps organizational context?

•

What is the structure of the text?

•

How does its structure shape what is said? Which categories can you discern in its
structure? What can you glean from these categories? Do the categories change in
sequential texts over time? How so?

•

Which contextual meanings does the text imply?

•

How does its content construct images of reality?

•

Which realities does the text claim to represent? How does it represent them?

•

What, if any, unintended information and meanings might you see in the text?

•

How is language used?

•

Which rules govern the construction of the text? How can you discern them in the
narrative? How do these rules reflect both tacit assumptions and explicit
meanings? How might they be related to other data on the same topic?

•

When and how do telling points emerge in the text?
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•

What kinds of comparisons can you make between texts? Between different texts
on the same topic? Similar texts at different times such as organizational annual
reports? Between different authors who address the same questions?

•

Who benefits from the text? Why?

Source: (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 39-40)
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APPENDIX G
GUIDING QUESTIONS AND PRELIMINARY CODING STRUCTURE
Questions for Reading Interview Transcripts and Texts
•

What is this person’s role or influence?

•

What is this person’s understanding of the motives for restructuring?

•

Did this participant have a motive for restructuring or not restructuring?

•

How does this person use field-level strategies to support their vision for
campus?

•

Where do I see evidence of field? Which field?

•

What groups did this person belong to?

•

What was their influence in this case?

•

Where is there evidence of mission and priorities? Shifts in those?

•

What is the common language that is used to talk about this case?

•

What are common strategies in higher education?
Codes Used for Data Review and Analysis

The following codes were developed through a systematic review of data, using
the constant comparison method.
Relates to environment:
•

Massachusetts politics

•

Massachusetts economy

•

U. S. economy

Relates to field:
•

Research university field
237

•

Massachusetts higher education field

•

UMass field

Relates to motive:
•

Budget crisis

•

Interdisciplinarity

•

Excellence

Relates to mission:
•

Research

•

Teaching

•

Service

•

Economic driver

•

Interdisciplinarity

•

Mass Aggie

•

Land Grant
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